Russia is set to establish its first naval base in Africa, joining the ranks of the United States and China. This development will enhance Russia‘s naval presence in key global waterways, specifically the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Sudan’s geographical position is significant, as it borders Egypt and Libya to the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east, South Sudan to the southeast, and Chad and the Central African Republic to the west. The Red Sea is vital for international trade, with 12 percent of global commerce transiting through it, alongside the strategic Suez Canal located at its northern end.

The establishment of a base in Sudan will allow Russia to offset the loss of its naval facility in Tartus, Syria. Given the ongoing instability in Syria, a reliable base in Sudan will enable Russia to maintain its strategic influence in the region.

The foreign minister of Sudan has confirmed the advancement of this plan after several years of delays. This announcement followed his visit to Moscow, where he engaged in discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Following their talks, Sharif stated that both nations are in “complete agreement” regarding the establishment of the Russian base, asserting that “there are no obstacles.”

The initial proposal for this base was made by former President Omar al-Bashir during a visit to Sochi in 2017. However, his ousting in a coup in 2019 interrupted Russia’s ambitions for a military foothold in the area. A subsequent agreement was reached in 2020, permitting Russia to station up to four naval vessels, including nuclear-powered ships, in Sudan for a duration of 25 years.

The draft agreement presented by Russia in 2020 highlighted that the logistics facility for the Russian Navy in Sudan is intended for defensive purposes, aimed at fostering peace and stability in the region. The document clarified that the base “is defensive and is not aimed against other countries.”

The naval logistics base is intended for the maintenance and supply replenishment of Russian warships. The logistics facility established by the Russian Navy in Sudan is anticipated to encompass coastal, water, and mooring zones.

Negotiations for the deal stalled due to disagreements between the parties regarding its terms and conditions. The situation was further complicated by the outbreak of civil war in Sudan in April 2023, which pitted the army against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, disrupting Russia’s ambitions for a military presence in the area.

The Wagner group, which is supported by Russia, aligned with the paramilitary forces, while the Kremlin provided backing to the Sudanese military. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia was responsible for approximately 87 percent of Sudan’s armaments.

In April 2024, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov made a visit to Sudan, where he expressed unwavering support for the Sudanese army. Additionally, Russia has supported Sudan in the UN Security Council by vetoing a resolution that called for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds.

Following the closure of the Tartus naval base in Syria, Russia faces new options.

Syria’s current government has annulled a treaty that allowed Russia a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean, a pact established under the previously ruling Bashar al-Assad.

The 2017 agreement had extended the Russian Navy’s lease on the Tartus port for 49 years. However, the future of this arrangement became uncertain after Assad was ousted by Islamist rebels at the end of 2024.

The authorities in Tartus have revoked the agreement, compelling the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces. This development represents a significant setback for Russia, as Tartus was its sole refueling station in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Tartus facility held considerable strategic value for Russia, particularly given the constraints on its Black Sea fleet, which is unable to navigate the Bosphorus Strait due to the ongoing conflict with Ukraine.

Following the loss of the Tartus base, Russia has increased its operations to and from an airbase in eastern Libya, indicating a potential pivot away from the Syrian bases that have previously supported its military activities in Africa and the Mediterranean.

While Tartus served as a less favorable alternative to the Soviet Navy’s former access to larger Egyptian ports, Russia’s lack of intent to engage in a Mediterranean conflict meant that a larger military presence was unnecessary.

At one point, the Russian naval contingent in the Mediterranean consisted of no more than 11 vessels, including 3 to 5 auxiliary ships. This was sufficient for deterrent signaling, intelligence operations, involvement in minor conflicts, and demonstrating support for its allies. Recently, it has also played a role in facilitating the export of Iranian oil to Syria and executing Kalibr missile strikes in support of the Assad regime.

The loss of Tartus, although limited in scope, carries significant consequences. This base was crucial for Russia, providing essential services for refueling and resupplying ships, as well as functioning as an important maintenance center in the region.

This situation clarifies why vessels like the Admiral Grigorevich have been able to remain in the vicinity for prolonged durations without returning to their home ports. The closure of the Turkish straits due to the Ukraine conflict has disrupted the Mediterranean fleet’s link to the Black Sea Fleet.

In this context, Port Sudan presents facilities that could accommodate a modest Russian presence in the Red Sea.

Russian Foreign Military Bases

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained naval bases in Cuba, Syria, and Vietnam. Additionally, it had basing agreements with countries such as Albania (1955-1962), Egypt (1967-1972), Somalia (1964-1978), and Ethiopia (1977-1991).

While several nations had port access agreements with the Soviet Union, these did not equate to fully operational military bases.

Soviet air bases were established in various locations, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Cuba, Guinea, Angola, and Vietnam. Between 1989 and 1994, Soviet forces were withdrawn from all bases outside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union.

In comparison to its primary competitor, Russia has a relatively small number of military bases abroad. The United States operates over 700 military installations outside its borders, whereas Russia has fewer than 20.

In addition to its military installations in the former Soviet republics, Russia has been actively increasing its presence in the Middle East and North Africa.

Since initiating its military involvement in Syria in 2015, Russia has set up several facilities, including the significant naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim Air Base. Additionally, the smaller air bases at Tiyas and Shayrat accommodate Russian aircraft and support personnel.

While Russia’s military expansion abroad is modest compared to the extensive presence of the United States, it is relatively significant when compared to other nations such as China.

The United States operates a permanent base in Djibouti, an Air Force facility in Niger, and has deployed troops in Kenya and Somalia. Furthermore, it has authorized special operations forces to assist in counterterrorism efforts across various Sub-Saharan African nations and provides logistical support for French counterterrorism initiatives in Mali.

China currently has only one base in Djibouti, but U.S. officials believe it may be seeking to establish additional bases in several countries, including Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Namibia, the Seychelles, and Tanzania.

Recent reports indicate that Moscow may be transitioning its training and assistance agreements with several African nations into permanent military bases. The countries involved include the Central African Republic (CAR), Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan.

Russia has shown a preference for having access to countries rather than establishing permanent military bases, as the latter can lead to involvement in the host nations’ security challenges and necessitates a much larger financial commitment.

The naval sector stands as the sole exception to this overarching strategy against the establishment of overseas bases.

Historically, both Russia and the Soviet Union have aimed for assured port access for their naval fleets globally, driven by the operational demands of naval missions, which include the need for resupply and maintenance.

Nevertheless, this approach falls short in critical areas like the Mediterranean, where the Russian Navy regularly conducts patrols. Actual bases are essential to maintain a robust military presence in the Mediterranean region.