Inside the cockpit of an F-35 Lightning II, a pilot navigates the night sky, utilizing the jet’s sophisticated radar to identify threats that are not visible to the naked eye. The AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar, the core of this fifth-generation stealth fighter, accurately monitors multiple targets, ensuring the pilot maintains superiority in combat.
However, this technological wonder, crucial to the United States’ air dominance, depends on a little-known metal: gallium. As of April 2025, China, which holds 98 percent of the global refined gallium supply, has imposed stricter export controls to the U.S., raising concerns about the production and upkeep of the F-35 and other essential military systems.
This action, part of a growing trade conflict, highlights a vulnerability that could alter the trajectory of U.S. military strength. The F-35, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is not merely a fighter jet; it is a fundamental element of American defense policy. Engineered to function across air, land, and sea, it combines stealth, sensor integration, and network-enabled capabilities to surpass opponents.
Its AN/APG-81 radar, created by Northrop Grumman, represents a significant technological achievement, capable of detecting small targets at extensive ranges, disrupting enemy systems, and even facilitating cyber operations. Nevertheless, the radar’s high-frequency capabilities rely on gallium arsenide, a compound semiconductor that allows for the swift and dependable transmission of signals within the radar’s monolithic microwave integrated circuits.
The absence of gallium could jeopardize the radar’s performance and the F-35’s advantage in combat. As China’s export restrictions intensify, the U.S. is confronted with a supply chain crisis that affects not only the F-35 but also electronic warfare systems and communication devices, highlighting a strategic error that has developed over decades.
Gallium, a soft and silvery metal often derived from aluminum and zinc processing, plays a disproportionately significant role in military technology despite its relative obscurity. In the F-35’s radar system, gallium arsenide chips enable the AN/APG-81 to switch signals at high frequencies, providing the necessary clarity and range to detect stealthy opponents or small drones. These chips also exhibit greater resistance to heat and radiation compared to conventional silicon, making them well-suited for the demanding environments of modern warfare.
The radar’s capability to track multiple targets simultaneously, conduct electronic attacks, and exchange data with other platforms relies heavily on this material. Additionally, gallium is essential for the F-35’s electronic warfare suite, which features jammers designed to interfere with enemy radars and sensors, as well as its communication systems that depend on gallium nitride-based amplifiers for secure, high-bandwidth data transmission.
These systems allow the F-35 to function as a connected node in joint operations, sharing real-time intelligence with naval vessels, satellites, and ground forces. China’s supremacy in gallium production is remarkable; the U.S. Geological Survey reports that in 2023, China produced 98 percent of the world’s refined gallium, a dominance it has sustained for years. This control is attributed to its extensive bauxite reserves and superior refining capabilities, which far exceed those of other countries.
In December 2024, China intensified its export restrictions on gallium, germanium, and antimony, citing national security as the reason. This action is largely perceived as a response to U.S. limitations imposed on Chinese semiconductor companies. These restrictions persisted into 2025, leading to a halt in shipments to the U.S. and a surge in prices.
According to a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, gallium prices increased by more than 50 percent in 2024, with further hikes anticipated as supply diminishes. For the U.S. defense sector, this situation transcends mere economic implications; it represents a strategic constraint. The F-35 program, already one of the most costly in military history with a lifecycle expenditure surpassing $1.7 trillion, is especially at risk.
Lockheed Martin manufactures around 150 F-35s each year, with over 1,000 aircraft delivered to the U.S. and allied nations by early 2025. Each aircraft relies on gallium-based components for its radar, electronic warfare, and communication systems. The AN/APG-81 radar, for instance, incorporates thousands of gallium arsenide transmit-receive modules, each a remarkable feat of engineering.
A gallium shortage could lead to production delays, increased costs, or compel the Pentagon to prioritize maintenance over new aircraft production, potentially diminishing the number of operational jets. The cascading effects could jeopardize U.S. commitments to allies such as Japan, Australia, and NATO partners, who depend on the F-35 for their defense.
To grasp the importance of the F-35, one must examine its function in contemporary combat. The aircraft’s stealth features enable it to navigate through contested airspace, successfully avoiding sophisticated air defense systems such as Russia’s S-400 and China’s HQ-9. Its sensor fusion technology amalgamates information from radar, electronic warfare systems, and external inputs, providing the pilot with a cohesive overview of the battlefield.
The AN/APG-81 radar, utilizing a gallium arsenide core, is pivotal to this functionality, boasting a detection range exceeding 150 miles for fighter-sized targets and the capability to engage multiple threats at once. In comparison to competitors like China’s J-20 and Russia’s Su-57, the F-35’s radar delivers enhanced situational awareness, a vital edge in critical situations such as a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, a consistent supply of gallium is necessary to maintain this advantage, as its absence could jeopardize the U.S. and its allies.
The electronic warfare and communication systems, while not as prominent as the radar, are equally essential. The F-35’s electronic warfare suite, part of the ASQ-239 Barracuda system, employs gallium nitride amplifiers to jam enemy radar and disrupt missile guidance systems. These amplifiers, which function at higher power levels than gallium arsenide, are crucial for countering advanced threats like hypersonic missiles. Likewise, the aircraft’s communication systems, including the Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), depend on gallium-based components to ensure secure, low-probability-of-intercept connections with other platforms.
These systems enable the F-35 to collaborate with assets such as the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning aircraft and Navy destroyers, enhancing its effectiveness in joint operations. A shortage of gallium could hinder the production of these components, diminishing the jet’s capacity to function in contested environments.
Historically, the U.S. has encountered vulnerabilities in its supply chain, but the current gallium crisis is particularly severe. The 1973 oil embargo revealed America’s reliance on foreign energy due to OPEC’s restrictions, leading to increased investments in domestic production. The gallium issue mirrors this situation, but the stakes are significantly higher in today’s climate of great power competition.
The U.S. has been aware of its dependence on Chinese gallium for decades, yet efforts to diversify sources have progressed slowly. A 2019 report from the Department of Defense highlighted gallium as a critical material, cautioning that supply disruptions could threaten military readiness.
Nevertheless, domestic production remains minimal, with the U.S. heavily dependent on imports from China and smaller suppliers like Japan and Germany. China’s export controls are not a new strategy; in 2010, Beijing briefly limited rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing significant disruptions in global markets. However, the current gallium restrictions are more focused, intended to undermine U.S. defense capabilities amid rising tensions.
The Biden administration’s sanctions on Chinese semiconductor companies in 2024, coupled with President Trump’s proposed 60 percent tariffs on Chinese imports in early 2025, have strengthened Beijing’s determination. Chinese state media has portrayed these export restrictions as a safeguard of national interests, yet analysts perceive a more intricate strategy at play.
According to a 2024 analysis by the Brookings Institution, ‘China is leveraging its dominance over essential minerals to exert pressure on the U.S. without resorting to military action.’ This subtle tactic could shift the power dynamics, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, where the F-35 plays a crucial role in U.S. strategy. The repercussions of the F-35 initiative are already evident, as Lockheed Martin has reported delays in component deliveries, although the company has not publicly linked these to gallium shortages.
Industry experts indicate that the Pentagon may be discreetly accumulating gallium, but its reserves are finite. The Defense Logistics Agency, tasked with securing essential materials, has faced challenges in sourcing gallium from alternative suppliers, as Japan and Germany do not have the capacity to fulfill U.S. needs. Gallium prices have skyrocketed, with some estimates indicating a doubling since the onset of restrictions, further straining defense budgets already burdened by inflation and competing demands.
Beyond the F-35, the gallium shortage poses a threat to the broader U.S. military capabilities. Electronic warfare systems, such as those on the EA-18G Growler, depend on gallium nitride for their high-power jammers, which are essential for neutralizing enemy air defenses. Likewise, satellite communication systems, critical for global command and control, utilize gallium arsenide solar cells for their effectiveness in extreme space conditions. A prolonged shortage could compel the Pentagon to ration components, prioritizing certain platforms over others.
The potential weakening of U.S. deterrence is particularly concerning in situations where electronic warfare and secure communications play a crucial role, such as a conflict with China regarding Taiwan. While the U.S. has several options, none provide an immediate solution. Prioritizing the diversification of supply chains is essential, with Japan and Germany ramping up gallium production, although their output remains minimal compared to China’s.
Canada and Australia, which possess substantial bauxite reserves, could emerge as future suppliers, but establishing the necessary refining infrastructure will require years. The Pentagon has committed to domestic initiatives, including a gallium recovery facility in Ohio, but these projects are not anticipated to be operational until 2028. Another potential solution is recycling gallium from electronic waste; however, current technologies are both inefficient and expensive.
Research is ongoing into alternative materials, such as silicon carbide for radar applications, but these have yet to become viable substitutes for gallium arsenide or nitride. Geopolitically, the U.S. is relying on its allies to mitigate China’s influence. The AUKUS agreement, which includes Australia and the United Kingdom, features initiatives aimed at securing critical minerals, while the Quad alliance with Japan, India, and Australia is investigating collaborative supply chain strategies.
Nevertheless, these initiatives encounter bureaucratic and economic challenges. For example, while Australia has the capacity to increase bauxite mining, it currently lacks the refining capabilities necessary to produce high-purity gallium.
Meanwhile, China is tightening its control, with reports indicating that Beijing may impose further restrictions on related materials such as indium and tellurium. The gallium crisis serves as a critical reminder of the vulnerabilities within America’s defense industrial base. For many years, the U.S. has prioritized cost efficiency over strategic resilience, leading to the outsourcing of essential materials to adversaries.
The F-35 represents a remarkable feat of engineering, illustrating a complex dilemma: its advanced technology renders it unparalleled, yet its dependence on a single foreign-sourced metal introduces a significant vulnerability. Its operational timeline, beginning with its inaugural flight in 2006 and culminating in its first combat use in 2018 with the Israeli Air Force, highlights its critical role.
The aircraft has conducted missions across Syria, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific, demonstrating its adaptability. However, as China continues to impose export restrictions, the future of the F-35—and the United States’ capacity to project military strength—remains uncertain.
Moving forward, the U.S. must take immediate action to secure its supply chains, although this path is laden with obstacles. Establishing domestic production will necessitate substantial financial investment and years of development, all while diplomatic relations with China remain strained.
The Pentagon’s delay in addressing this vulnerability raises concerns regarding its readiness for upcoming conflicts. As the F-35 continues to be a pivotal element of U.S. military strategy, the ongoing gallium shortage serves as a poignant reminder that even the most sophisticated weaponry is only as robust as its most fragile component.
Will America be able to adapt before its rivals take advantage of this critical weakness? The outcome will influence the nature of future warfare.
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