China’s initiatives to establish significant business interests throughout Africa have been paired with a deliberate strategy of maintaining neutrality. However, the ongoing conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has prompted a change in this stance.
Rwanda has faced widespread allegations of exacerbating the violence in this mineral-rich area, and recently, Beijing, which maintains strong ties with both the DR Congo and Rwanda, has begun to voice its concerns.
China is now attempting to navigate a delicate diplomatic balance, striving to preserve positive relations with both nations while continuing its business operations and securing essential minerals.
How does China’s reaction to this conflict differ?
Historically, China has been cautious about taking sides in African conflicts to prevent jeopardizing its vast commercial interests.
Until now, it has refrained from criticizing African governments that support factions involved in conflicts.
For instance, China has remained largely silent regarding the series of coups in West Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, only urging leaders to prioritize the welfare of their citizens.
According to Prof. Zhou Yuyuan, an expert in African development and security at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), Beijing has consistently adhered to a policy of non-interference in the internal matters of other states.
As a result, it typically avoids suggesting solutions to conflicts, instead advocating for diplomatic or political initiatives led by international organizations like the UN or the African Union.
The conflict involving the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in eastern DR Congo resurfaced in 2021. The group, led by ethnic Tutsis, claims to have taken up arms to defend the rights of their minority community, citing the Congolese government’s failure to uphold a previous peace agreement.
Initially, China limited its response to criticizing unspecified “foreign forces” for aiding the M23 fighters. However, in recent weeks, it has deviated from this approach by explicitly naming Rwanda.
This shift comes in the wake of significant territorial gains by the M23, which has seized the crucial cities of Goma and Bukavu since January.
In February, China’s ambassador to the UN expressed hope that Rwanda would cease its military support for the M23 and withdraw its forces from DRC territory.
Professor Zhou observes that while this statement is noteworthy, the language used remains relatively restrained. He points out that China expressed a “hope” for Rwanda to halt its support but stopped short of issuing a condemnation.
Shortly thereafter, China supported a UN Security Council resolution that explicitly demands the Rwanda Defence Forces to “cease support to the M23 and immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions.”
What has prompted China to change its stance?
Prof. Zhou suggests that China’s recent comments may have been influenced by reports from UN experts, which have presented compelling evidence of Rwanda‘s backing for the M23 group.
“This is a fundamental agreement within the UN Security Council,” he noted.
“The issue has persisted for a considerable time, and everyone is aware of the underlying situation. There is no longer a need for secrecy.”
China’s mission to the UN and its embassy in London did not provide a response when inquired about the reasons behind China’s criticism of Rwanda.
However, China’s significant interest in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) abundant mineral resources could be a contributing factor.
The conflict in eastern DRC has primarily been centered in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, where numerous gold mines operated by Chinese companies are located.
The impact of the fighting on these mines remains uncertain.
Additionally, the M23 has taken control of areas that contain coltan ore mines, which are crucial for China as it imports this resource in substantial quantities.
Tantalum, a metal derived from coltan, is essential for various products, including vehicles and everyday electronics like televisions and mobile phones, with the DRC supplying 40% of the global demand.
A UN expert group reported in December 2024 that the M23 rebel group had been smuggling coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) into Rwanda. The report also highlighted a 50% increase in Rwanda’s coltan exports between 2022 and 2023.
Despite Rwanda having its own coltan mines, analysts suggest that these operations alone cannot explain such a significant rise in production.
It remains uncertain whether the quantity or pricing of coltan imported by China has been impacted.
Cobalt, another mineral sourced from DR Congo, is essential for the lithium battery sector. However, China’s cobalt mining activities are mainly concentrated in the southern regions of DR Congo, far from the conflict-affected areas in the east.
Numerous Chinese firms, many of which are state-owned, are engaged in constructing infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, and hydropower facilities in DR Congo. So far, these operations appear to have experienced minimal disruption.
Is China providing military assistance to Rwanda or DR Congo?
China supplies arms to both nations.
Over the past twenty years, the Rwandan military has acquired Chinese armored vehicles, artillery, and anti-tank missiles, as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri).
In 2024, China assigned a military attaché to Rwanda for the first time.
While UN experts allege that the Rwandan military has equipped the M23, it is unclear if the rebel group is utilizing any Chinese-supplied weapons.
The Congolese armed forces have procured Chinese armored personnel carriers and drones, along with tanks purchased in 1976, which were still operational as recently as 2022.
Reports indicate that at least some of the drones have been deployed in combat against the M23.
Have China’s relationships with either nation been influenced?
The Rwandan embassy in Beijing stated that its relationship with China remains “excellent and productive,” and Rwanda refrains from commenting on China’s remarks regarding the conflict in eastern DR Congo.
In early February, the Chinese ambassador to DR Congo, Zhao Bin, met with Congolese Senate President Sama Lukonde, although no specifics about their discussion were disclosed.
China’s economic involvement in both countries is extensive, as they are integral to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to enhance global connectivity through investments and infrastructure development.
In Rwanda, China has invested in various projects, including stadiums, schools, and highways. Additionally, Chinese loans are supporting infrastructure initiatives, such as a $40 million (£31 million) loan confirmed in January for a dam and irrigation system.
For many years, China has been the primary source of imported goods for Rwanda.
Regarding China’s economic relationship with DR Congo, data from the UN Comtrade Database indicates that China has consistently been DR Congo’s leading trading partner.
China has made significant efforts to gain access to DR Congo’s mineral resources, providing $3.2 billion (£2.5 billion) in loans from 2005 to 2022, primarily for road and bridge construction and enhancing the country’s electricity grid, as reported by the Chinese Loans to Africa Database at Boston University.
Moreover, China has financed and constructed other major infrastructure projects in DR Congo, including hydropower plants and a dry port.
These investments may imply that it is in China’s long-term interest to seek a swift resolution to the ongoing conflict.
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