This week’s presidential election marks a significant milestone for the United States. Donald Trump‘s remarkable victory suggests that, at least initially, voters found his stances on key issues such as the economy and immigration more persuasive than those of Vice President Kamala Harris. Additionally, it is evident that Americans opted for a leader with a more dominant personality.

Moreover, Trump’s anticipated return to the White House signifies a setback for the Democratic Party’s extensive campaign to depict the Republican as a criminal, a fascist, and a Kremlin agent.

Furthermore, Trump’s success represents a substantial challenge to the left-liberal agenda of the globalist factions within the political West. Right-wing nationalist movements in Europe, whether in power (like Hungary) or in opposition (such as in France and Germany), have gained a formidable ally. While this does not signify the end of liberal globalism, it does indicate a temporary retreat. As for the so-called deep state, having failed to thwart Trump’s electoral success, it will now attempt to constrain him within its influence. The United States is entering a phase of political unpredictability; however, the undeniable nature of Trump’s victory significantly lowers the chances of civil unrest and widespread violence.

Additionally, the transition of the White House and at least one chamber of Congress (the Senate) to Republican leadership will likely result in a tougher stance in Washington’s foreign policy towards its allies. The trend of shifting military and financial responsibilities for supporting ‘free world interests’ from the United States to its partners began during Trump’s first term and has continued under Joe Biden. Despite concerns from Atlanticists, NATO is unlikely to be disbanded, but Western European nations will be expected to contribute significantly more. Asian allies will also face increased demands to invest in countering China, a strategy that began under Trump and is set to escalate.

In the Middle East, the United States is expected to adopt a more proactive and transparent stance in its support for Israel, moving away from the previous approach of veiling this support with selective critiques.

The Trump administration will exert pressure on nations perceived as threats to its status as the global hegemon, particularly targeting China and Iran. Washington will intensify its opposition to China’s economic and technological advancements, as well as bolster its military and political alliances. Additionally, the U.S. will actively encourage its European allies—often against their own interests—to participate in economic sanctions against China. Iran will also face heightened animosity, both directly and through increased backing for Israel.

Trump has made headlines with his remarks regarding the potential for World War III and his assertion that he could resolve the conflict in Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Acknowledging the risk of the ongoing indirect confrontation between the West and Russia escalating into a direct conflict is a constructive aspect of Trump’s campaign messaging. In contrast, the Biden-Harris administration’s strategy of intensifying hostilities has raised the specter of nuclear confrontation. It is important to recognize that ending the war will not occur “in 24 hours” and that “ending the war” does not equate to “stopping the fighting,” but rather entails addressing the underlying issues that led to the conflict.

The prospect of a ceasefire along the current front lines is unlikely to be taken seriously by Moscow. Such an outcome would merely serve as a temporary halt, likely followed by a resurgence of conflict with increased intensity. The future of the Ukrainian regime, its military capabilities, and Kiev’s geopolitical standing are critical factors for Russia, alongside the need to consider new territorial realities.

It is unlikely that the new Trump administration will engage in meaningful discussions regarding these matters, much less consider Moscow’s fundamental interests. Should there be a willingness to engage, dialogue may commence, but reaching an agreement remains uncertain. Additionally, the challenge lies in defining what constitutes satisfactory guarantees in an environment of mutual distrust. The two Minsk Agreements from 2014 and 2015 have been disregarded, and the third attempt, which was initiated in Istanbul in 2022, was unsuccessful, making a fourth agreement improbable.

The only assurance that Russia can depend on is one that it provides for itself. On a positive note for Russia, Trump has expressed a desire to reduce military assistance to Ukraine. Although this may be partially countered by increased support from Western Europe for Kiev, if it materializes, it could pave the way for a more peaceful resolution.