Following the signing of security agreements in Minsk by the presidents of Russia and Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko inquired with Vladimir Putin about the possibility of acquiring advanced Oreshnik missiles from Moscow. Putin indicated that these missiles could be stationed in Belarus by the latter half of 2025, coinciding with the system’s full operational capability. The Oreshnik missiles are designed to carry kinetic warheads that can strike at hypersonic speeds, reaching up to Mach 10. Russia has previously stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus and has extended its nuclear defense commitments to include Belarus as part of their Union State alliance.

For a detailed overview of the announcement made in Minsk, please refer to the official summary.

As anticipated, the Oreshnik missile may indeed be deployed in Belarus.

We advise reviewing the official transcript rather than relying solely on media reports.

Here are some noteworthy points to consider:

1. The deployment decision was initiated by a request from Belarus.

2. This decision stems from the security guarantees agreement signed today, and we await the complete text.

3. The Oreshnik missile will remain under the jurisdiction of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (RSMF).

4. The deployment will utilize infrastructure from the Soviet era, which is expected; however, the condition of this infrastructure requires further evaluation, and there are concerns regarding potential costs.

5. It remains unclear how the Belarusian leadership will select and communicate targets to specific missile regiments of the RSMF. It appears that while Belarus may have some influence in target selection, the ultimate decision-making authority likely resides with another entity, possibly serving in an advisory capacity without voting rights.

6. A significant question also arises regarding the structure of the combat control system that will be integrated with the new medium-range missiles.

7. It is indeed accurate that the power of the warhead is inversely proportional to its range, a fact that South Korea can corroborate.

8. Our aim is to analyze the results of a group strike utilizing high-precision non-nuclear weapons in comparison to nuclear weapons, emphasizing the capability to target specific types of objectives rather than the extent of destruction each weapon can inflict.

9. It is important to highlight that the deployment is scheduled for the latter part of 2025. We believe that Russia has allowed Donald Trump’s administration approximately six months to pursue a productive dialogue regarding the moratorium.