Proxy Wars Reignite: How Saudi, Emirati, Egyptian, Turkish, and Jordanian Moves Reshaped Regional Security

In recent months, a series of tightly linked military actions across Yemen, Sudan, and the Levant have underscored a defining feature of contemporary Middle Eastern security: the return of open-ended proxy confrontation among regional powers. Far from isolated incidents, these developments reflect a deeper unraveling of post-2023 de-escalation efforts and reveal how overlapping alliances are colliding under the pressure of war fatigue, strategic competition, and shifting US engagement.

Saudis Launch Offensive on UAE-Backed Separatists in Yemen

The Saudi-led military move against UAE-backed southern separatist forces in Yemen marks one of the most consequential ruptures inside the long-fractured anti-Houthi coalition. Riyadh’s operations targeted positions held by the Southern Transitional Council, a force politically, financially, and militarily supported by the United Arab Emirates.

For years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE papered over their competing endgames in Yemen—Riyadh prioritising border security and a unified Yemeni state, while Abu Dhabi cultivated southern autonomy through local proxies. The latest offensive signals that Saudi Arabia is no longer willing to tolerate Emirati-backed fragmentation at a moment when it seeks a negotiated stabilisation with the Houthis.

Strategically, this shift reflects Riyadh’s recalculation: southern separatism now poses a longer-term threat to Saudi influence than the Houthis themselves. By moving directly against UAE-aligned forces, Saudi Arabia is asserting primacy in Yemen’s endgame—even at the risk of straining ties with a nominal ally.

Egyptian and Turkish Backing Shifts the Battlefield in Sudan

In Sudan, the civil war took a sharper regional turn as Egypt and Turkey deepened their political and logistical backing for forces aligned with the Sudanese state, tipping the balance against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—widely reported to be backed by the UAE.

The RSF’s growing casualties signal more than battlefield setbacks; they point to a tightening of supply lines and diminishing external maneuver space. Egyptian involvement is driven by Cairo’s fear of state collapse along the Nile basin, while Turkey views Sudan as a critical Red Sea and Horn of Africa gateway where Emirati dominance would undercut Ankara’s regional influence.

This alignment has transformed Sudan into a secondary theatre of Saudi-Emirati divergence, with Cairo and Ankara acting as force multipliers against Abu Dhabi’s preferred proxy. The conflict now resembles a multi-layered regional contest, where Sudanese actors are increasingly subordinated to external strategic agendas.

Jordanian Airstrikes Target Al-Hijri’s Logistics Network

Jordan’s recent airstrikes against the logistics infrastructure of Al Hijri mark a rare but telling escalation by Jordan beyond its traditionally defensive posture. According to regional intelligence assessments, Al-Hijri’s network has benefited from indirect backing by Israel and the UAE, primarily as part of broader counter-Iran and counter-militia strategies.

For Amman, the calculus is stark: logistics nodes near Jordan’s borders represent an unacceptable spillover risk, regardless of who sponsors them. The strikes signal Jordan’s refusal to become collateral damage in proxy confrontations engineered by larger regional players.

Politically, the move also reflects Jordan’s strategic anxiety—caught between Israeli security imperatives, Gulf rivalries, and domestic stability concerns. By acting unilaterally, Amman is asserting red lines in a region where ambiguity has increasingly replaced deterrence.

The Bigger Picture: Fragmenting Alliances, Hardening Proxy Lines

Taken together, these three developments reveal a Middle East entering a post-alignment phase. Traditional blocs—Saudi-UAE, Arab-Turkish, and US-aligned security frameworks—are fracturing under the weight of diverging threat perceptions.

• Saudi Arabia is prioritising state coherence and controlled de-escalation, even if it means confronting former partners.
• The UAE continues to rely on non-state actors and local proxies to project influence at lower political cost.
• Egypt and Turkey are rediscovering tactical convergence where Emirati expansion threatens their core interests.
• Jordan is moving from buffer state to active enforcer of its security perimeter.

This pattern suggests that regional conflicts are no longer merely proxy wars between global powers—but proxy wars among regional middle powers themselves, each pursuing narrow, often incompatible security outcomes.

Conclusion: A Region Sliding Back Into Competitive Disorder

The Saudi move in Yemen, the RSF’s losses in Sudan, and Jordan’s airstrikes together point to a sobering conclusion: the Middle East’s brief experiment with managed de-escalation is giving way to competitive disorder.

As external powers recalibrate or retreat, regional actors are filling the vacuum with force rather than diplomacy. The result is a security environment where alliances are transactional, proxies are expendable, and escalation risks are no longer centrally controlled.

In this emerging order, stability is not negotiated—it is imposed, contested, and frequently reversed.