Russia admits to using sand and cement to reinforce its tank armor

On April 8, 2025, a significant development emerged from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine: Russia‘s military has officially recognized a severe shortage of explosive reactive armor (ERA) for its tanks.

A report from NII Stali, a leading Russian research institute specializing in steel and armor technologies, reveals that engineers have resorted to creating a new form of non-explosive reactive armor (NERA) and have even recommended that tank crews use sand or cement to fill voids in existing ERA panels.

This acknowledgment, initially suggested by open-source intelligence and now confirmed, highlights a larger crisis within Russia’s armored divisions as they face challenges in maintaining their effectiveness against a resilient Ukrainian defense.

What started as a minor detail in the conflict has evolved into a significant indicator of logistical difficulties, raising concerns about the viability of Russia’s military operations and their impact on contemporary warfare.

The importance of this situation extends beyond the unconventional solutions; it sheds light on Russia’s capabilities during wartime. For years, analysts and observers, including those monitoring destroyed Russian tanks via platforms like Oryx, have documented the substantial losses inflicted by Ukrainian forces utilizing advanced anti-tank weaponry and drones.

With Russian researchers now acknowledging the issue, the global community gains a clearer understanding of how material shortages are altering the dynamics of the battlefield. To appreciate the implications, it is essential to comprehend the technical distinctions between ERA and NERA, as well as the significance of sand-filled panels as a sign of a desperate measure.

Explosive reactive armor has been fundamental to tank defense since its widespread implementation in the late 20th century, functioning by placing an explosive layer between two metal plates.

When a projectile, like a shaped-charge warhead from the American Javelin missile, impacts a tank, the explosive detonates outward. This action disrupts the incoming stream of molten metal, diminishing its capacity to penetrate the tank’s armor. This technology, initially developed by Soviet engineers and enhanced over many years, has demonstrated effectiveness against singular, high-energy attacks.

However, it has a significant drawback: once activated, the explosive reactive armor (ERA) panel is depleted, leaving that area of the tank exposed to further strikes. In contrast, non-explosive reactive armor (NERA), which utilizes materials such as rubber or composite layers between metal, does not detonate.

Instead, NERA absorbs and redirects energy through deformation, providing less protection per impact but maintaining its structural integrity against multiple strikes. Western military forces, including the United States with its M1 Abrams tanks, have adopted NERA-like systems in conjunction with ERA to address these limitations.

Russia’s transition towards a NERA-style approach, as indicated by the NII Stali study, signifies an effort to adapt to this new reality. However, the proposal to use sand or cement as a temporary solution highlights the shortcomings of this adaptation.

Physically, these materials do not possess the reactive capabilities of explosives or advanced composites. While sand may absorb some kinetic energy and cement could provide slight mass to deflect shrapnel, neither can deliver the dynamic response necessary to counter contemporary anti-tank threats.

Photographic evidence gathered by open-source analysts, including images of damaged T-72 and T-90 tanks in Ukraine, frequently reveals large gaps where ERA panels used to be—some visibly repaired with improvised materials. These observations, widely shared in open-source intelligence (OSINT) circles, corroborate the institute’s admissions, illustrating a military stretched thin by combat losses and supply chain challenges.

The origins of this shortage can be traced to Russia’s industrial and logistical difficulties, which have been worsened by over three years of conflict and international sanctions. The NII Stali, based in Moscow, has historically been instrumental in the development of armor for Soviet and Russian tanks, ranging from the T-64 to the T-14 Armata.

However, the production of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) necessitates specialized explosives and precise manufacturing techniques, both of which have faced significant challenges since the onset of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022. Western sanctions have limited access to essential components, while Ukraine’s strikes on Russian industrial facilities have further disrupted production.

A December 2024 report from the Institute for the Study of War indicated that Russia had lost more than 3,700 tanks during the conflict, a number supported by Oryx’s visual verification of 3,387 losses at that time. To address these losses, Russia has brought older T-62s and T-55s from Soviet-era reserves back into service, but outfitting them with modern ERA has proven to be a significant challenge.

This situation sharply contrasts with Russia’s pre-war aspirations. The T-14 Armata, which was introduced with great fanfare during Moscow’s Victory Day parade in 2015, was expected to represent a significant advancement in tank technology, featuring cutting-edge armor and electronics. However, production has been limited, with estimates indicating that fewer than 20 units were operational by 2022, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The majority of Russia’s armored forces predominantly utilize upgraded T-72s and T-90s, which have been the backbone of its military since the post-Soviet period. The T-72, originally launched in the 1970s, is equipped with a 125mm smoothbore cannon and can achieve speeds of up to 37 miles per hour. However, its basic armor, lacking explosive reactive armor (ERA), provides limited defense against modern threats.

The T-90, which is an advancement of the T-72 introduced in the 1990s, offers enhancements such as improved fire control systems and Kontakt-5 ERA. Nevertheless, it has also faced challenges against Ukraine’s arsenal, which includes Javelins, NLAWs, and FPV drones.

These deficiencies have significant implications on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces have effectively capitalized on the weaknesses of Russian tanks, resulting in severe consequences. The Javelin missile, a fire-and-forget weapon provided by the United States, employs a top-attack method to target the weakest points in armor, often circumventing ERA altogether.

Additionally, inexpensive FPV drones armed with explosives have transformed tanks into easy targets, as evidenced by numerous videos released by Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. A compromised or absent ERA heightens this risk, leaving tank crews vulnerable. Analysts believe that Russian commanders, recognizing these dangers, may be adapting their strategies by increasingly relying on infantry operations or artillery strikes to offset the reduced survivability of their tanks.

However, this strategic shift comes with drawbacks. Reports from the front lines indicate that the morale of tank crews has declined, with some opting to abandon their vehicles rather than confront almost certain destruction. This trend is reflected in Oryx data, which shows over 1,100 abandoned tanks by early 2025.

The wider consequences of this crisis reach far beyond Ukraine. Russia’s difficulties in sustaining its armored units raise concerns about the future of its military capabilities. Traditionally, tanks have played a pivotal role in Russian military strategy, from the large-scale armored offensives of World War II to the Cold War confrontations with NATO.

In the present day, however, the emergence of drones and precision-guided munitions is challenging this traditional approach. Some analysts suggest that Russia may hasten the development of unmanned ground vehicles, an area where it currently trails behind countries like the United States, which has already tested systems such as the Robotic Combat Vehicle.

Alternatively, Moscow might strengthen its partnerships with allies like China, whose Type 99 tank features advanced composite armor and could serve as a model or supplier for Russian enhancements. Given China’s increasing role as an economic support for Russia amid Western sanctions, this scenario is quite feasible.

For Western military forces, Russia’s current challenges provide a valuable lesson in adaptability. The U.S. Army, with its inventory of over 6,000 M1 Abrams tanks, has consistently emphasized a combination of explosive reactive armor (ERA) and passive armor, along with active protection systems like Trophy, designed to intercept incoming threats.

The Abrams, weighing 68 tons and equipped with a 120mm cannon, continues to set the standard for contemporary tank design, achieving speeds of up to 42 miles per hour. The Abrams supplied to Ukraine in 2023 has been upgraded with Kontakt-1 ERA and anti-drone cages, showcasing battlefield innovations driven by necessity.

In light of Russia’s difficulties, NATO strategists may intensify their focus on incorporating drones and counter-drone technologies into their armored strategies, ensuring that their tanks remain effective against emerging threats.

Taking a step back, Russia’s use of sand and cement resonates with historical precedents. During World War II, as German forces encountered shortages towards the end of the war, they resorted to improvising with extra steel plates and even concrete on tanks like the Panther and Tiger.

These adaptations provided temporary relief but failed to change the overall outcome. In a similar vein, Russia’s current solutions may extend its military efforts, yet they reveal a more profound weakness. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, now entering its fourth year, has laid bare the limitations of a military once viewed as a rival to the West, compelling it to rely on creativity in the face of dwindling resources.

Ultimately, the insights from NII Stali transcend mere technical details; they offer a glimpse into the harsh realities of attrition warfare. Russia’s armored units, strained by losses and supply challenges, are evolving in unexpected ways that highlight their desperation.

For readers, this serves as a reminder of how industrial strength and innovation influence conflicts far from their origins. As the war continues, one question remains: can these temporary measures support Russia’s ambitions, or do they simply postpone an unavoidable confrontation?