Shortly after President-elect Donald Trump announced his choice of Fox News host and Army veteran Pete Hegseth for the position of Secretary of Defense, U.S. media received a flurry of messages and calls from both current and former senior military leaders expressing their thoughts. One described the decision as “ridiculous,” while another referred to it as “an effing (euphemism inserted) nightmare.” It is important to note that these individuals are not partisans; they are senior commanders who have served under both Presidents Trump and Biden.

Their criticisms were not directed at Hegseth personally. Instead, their primary concern revolves around the perception that Trump, through this and other high-level national security appointments, is assembling a team aimed at implementing significant and enduring changes to U.S. foreign policy.

A retired four-star general shared, “There’s a lack of serious experience in managing the Pentagon or the national security staff processes, but I’m trying to keep an open mind, hoping that new ideas might revitalize what often becomes stagnant.” He added, “However, the prevailing theme appears to be loyalty. While some degree of loyalty is necessary, excessive loyalty can be perilous. Based on the appointments made so far, we risk having a single perspective guiding many actions. I have always believed that a diversity of thought is more effective than relying on one mind, regardless of whose it is.”

The 2024 election is poised to have a significant impact, not only on U.S. foreign policy but also on America’s global standing, distinguishing it from previous elections that had only marginal differences. Trump has consistently indicated his commitment to his “America First” agenda, which includes reducing U.S. involvement overseas and reevaluating treaty relationships that he perceives as unfavorable to American interests. This marks a shift from the traditionally bipartisan perspective on foreign relations. Hegseth, from his position at Fox News, has been a prominent advocate for Trump’s “America First” approach.

In both domestic and foreign policy, Trump exhibits a transactional perspective on U.S. relations, often overlooking the importance of shared values and historical ties. He has suggested that the U.S. is on par with its adversaries, as illustrated by his response to Bill O’Reilly in 2017, where he questioned America’s innocence in light of Putin’s actions. Similarly, during a rally in Michigan in the final week of the 2024 campaign, he remarked that “in many cases, our allies are worse than our so-called enemies.”

This perspective leads Trump to believe that, as president, he can forge mutually advantageous agreements with countries like Russia or China just as easily as with traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia—nations that have historically stood alongside the U.S. and entered into mutual defense agreements.

Engaging in negotiations with Moscow or Beijing is undoubtedly preferable to a conflict between superpowers; however, this strategy overlooks the fact that these adversaries perceive it as beneficial to undermine the United States and the global order it leads. This intent has become increasingly evident as Russia and China strengthen their alliances with North Korea and Iran, evident in various contexts from the conflict in Ukraine to the exchange of nuclear and missile technologies, as well as recent agreements like the mutual defense treaty established between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Is it feasible for Trump to broker a significant agreement that would persuade China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran to reconsider or moderate their strategic goals? While theoretically possible, one might argue against this notion, echoing former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston’s assertion that only interests, rather than alliances, are truly “eternal and perpetual.”

Trump might seek to withdraw from NATO

What implications might this have for U.S. foreign policy in the short term? According to Trump’s former senior advisers, as discussed in recent book, “The Return of Great Powers,” Trump’s worldview would likely lead him to terminate aid to Ukraine in its defense against Russia.

John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, expressed concern, stating, “If I were Ukraine, I’d be very worried, because if everything is a deal, then what’s another 10% of Ukrainian territory if it brings peace, kind of thing?”

Concerns have been raised regarding Taiwan’s situation. While President Biden has repeatedly pledged to provide military support to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion—marking a departure from the long-standing US policy of strategic ambiguity towards the self-governing island—none of Trump’s former senior advisers expressed confidence that he would adopt a similar stance.

The future of US defense treaties is also uncertain. Several advisers indicated that Trump might seek to withdraw from NATO, a move he attempted during his first term. If Congress enacts new legislation to complicate such a unilateral exit, he may still convey that, as commander in chief, he would disregard NATO’s Article 5, which obligates member states to defend one another militarily. They interpreted his February remarks suggesting that Russia could “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO countries that fail to meet their financial commitments as significant.

“I believe NATO would face serious risks,” Bolton remarked prior to the election. “I think he would make an effort to withdraw.”

This situation raises concerns about Trump’s dedication to other global alliances, particularly those in Asia with South Korea and Japan. During his first term, Trump halted large-scale military exercises with South Korea as a conciliatory gesture towards North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, exercises that are vital for Seoul’s military preparedness. In October, Trump assigned a financial value to the ongoing US military presence on the Korean peninsula: $10 billion.

A potential resurgence of nuclear armament?

Military leaders and diplomats across Europe and Asia express concerns regarding a particularly perilous consequence of Trump’s possible withdrawal from US international commitments: in response to security anxieties, countries in these regions may opt to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, thereby seeking to compensate for the diminishing security provided by the US nuclear umbrella.

Such actions could provoke US adversaries, including Russia, China, North Korea, and potentially Iran if it were to pursue nuclear capabilities, to enhance their own arsenals to ensure effective deterrence. Additionally, other nations within these regions—such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and India—might find it justifiable to follow suit. Consequently, Trump, who has frequently articulated his legitimate concerns about nuclear conflict, could unintentionally ignite a new nuclear arms race.

Is this significant for Americans domestically? The extensive costs associated with America’s prolonged military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have understandably diminished public backing for overseas military interventions. Furthermore, the financial implications of US military support to Ukraine—though a small portion of the overall defense budget—have been perceived as politically challenging during a time of economic strain at home.

Americans must be prepared to adjust to the aspirations of the emerging and increasingly influential coalition of autocratic regimes, which will entail certain sacrifices. Experts in national security highlight that the US-led international framework, despite its unassuming title, offers numerous advantages to Americans that may go unnoticed. These include the respect for sovereign borders, a legacy shaped by the devastation of World War II, which is now under threat due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; secure shipping routes in Asia and Europe; a legal framework that facilitates business transactions and access to international markets for American products; global air travel; opportunities for studying abroad; affordable imports; and globally compatible mobile phones, among others. These benefits could diminish in a more competitive and ruthless global environment.

Mark Milley, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “This rule set…is one of the fundamental contributing factors to not having a breakout of a great power war. It’s not the only reason, but it’s one of the fundamental reasons why there hasn’t been a great power war in eight decades. So if that rule set goes away … then you’ll be doubling your defense budgets because the world will return to Hobbesian nature where it’s going to be only the strong survive and it’s going to be a dog-eat-dog world. And there won’t be any rules.”

U.S. allies will need to recalibrate their strategies

The negotiation landscape has shifted from a once bipartisan strategy, revealing its imperfections. The US and its allies have struggled to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine and may have discreetly advocated for some territorial compromises to bring the conflict to a close, while also stepping back from a firm commitment to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

Milley remarked, “In order to have a successful negotiation, you have to somehow address both sets of national security insecurities or anxieties. So, you have to somehow convince the Russians that NATO is not going to invade, Ukraine is not going to be part of NATO, and that they shouldn’t fear invasion from the West, that sort of thing.”

The previously unspoken reality during the Biden administration—namely, that Ukraine might need to relinquish territory and negotiate security guarantees—has now become widely acknowledged as the Trump administration begins to take form.

U.S. allies will need to recalibrate their strategies, and numerous European diplomats have indicated they were already preparing for this shift prior to the election. At the very least, they anticipate a decline in U.S. leadership in Europe, which will likely prompt a more urgent push for increased military spending and a comprehensive military buildup.

In Asia, existing U.S. treaties with South Korea, Japan, and Australia may no longer serve as effective counterbalances to China. Both Trump and his Democratic opponent, Kamala Harris, would have pursued some level of diplomatic engagement with Moscow and Beijing; however, Harris would have approached this within the framework of the current U.S. alliance system. In contrast, Trump appears to be open to a broader range of possibilities. While this does not guarantee that he will reach agreements—he previously walked away from negotiations with Kim Jong Un when the North Korean leader failed to make sufficient concessions on his nuclear program—it suggests that many options are on the table.

The current state of affairs is fraught with risks. The competitive landscape among major powers is already alarming. Nevertheless, both current and former U.S. military leaders, along with the heads of America’s closest allies, recognize that the “America First” strategy carries its own set of threats. This approach is not truly novel; the rhetoric today echoes the isolationist sentiments prevalent in the U.S. prior to World War II. At that time, America concluded that it could not simply withdraw behind its own borders.

It is important to emphasize that with today’s advanced technologies—ranging from increasing nuclear capabilities to cyber warfare, space weaponry, drones, and artificial intelligence—alongside global issues like climate change and migration, the option to overlook international affairs is even less viable than it was in 1939. The early appointments made by President-elect Trump indicate a willingness to challenge this perspective.