US races to respond as China halts supply of essential minerals for fighter jets

China’s recent choice to implement export limitations on rare earth elements vital for advanced U.S. military technology has created significant concerns within the American defense industry, particularly affecting the development of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, a next-generation fighter jet initiative.

This decision, part of a wider reaction to U.S. tariffs, specifically targets materials crucial for avionics—advanced electronic systems that facilitate navigation, communication, and precise targeting in modern aircraft.

Given China‘s substantial control over global rare earth processing, these restrictions prompt critical inquiries regarding the vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense supply chain and the future of its air superiority goals. The implications are considerable, as these materials serve not merely as components but as the foundation of advanced systems that characterize contemporary warfare.

Rare earth elements, a collection of 17 metals, are not as rare as their name implies; however, their extraction and processing are intricate and pose environmental challenges. Elements such as neodymium, dysprosium, yttrium, and gadolinium are essential for the avionics of the NGAD.

For example, neodymium and dysprosium are utilized to manufacture powerful magnets that drive electric motors and actuators, allowing for precise control of the aircraft’s systems. Yttrium enhances laser systems that are crucial for targeting and communication, while gadolinium boosts the effectiveness of radar technologies, including active electronically scanned array (AESA) systems that enable pilots to identify threats from long distances.

The absence of these materials could jeopardize the NGAD’s functionality in contested environments, where stealth, speed, and situational awareness are critical. Currently under development, the NGAD is designed to surpass the capabilities of the F-35 Lightning II by incorporating cutting-edge sensors, artificial intelligence, and possibly directed-energy weapons to address the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia.

The NGAD initiative embodies the U.S. Air Force’s goal of preserving air superiority amid increasing global competition. Unlike previous models, the NGAD is envisioned as a system of systems, which may include manned aircraft, unmanned drones, and interconnected platforms operating collaboratively.

Its avionics are anticipated to process extensive data, integrating information from satellites, ground stations, and other aircraft to generate a real-time overview of the battlefield. The aircraft’s radar, likely an advancement of the AN/APG-81 used in the F-35, will depend on rare earth elements to achieve exceptional resolution and jamming resistance.

In contrast, the F-35 utilizes approximately 920 pounds of rare earth materials, and the NGAD is expected to require even more due to its sophisticated features. China’s restrictions on materials such as samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium pose a direct threat to the production of these systems, as the U.S. currently lacks adequate domestic processing capabilities to fulfill the demand.

This vulnerability has historical roots, dating back several decades. In the 1980s, the United States was at the forefront of rare earth production, with the Mountain Pass mine in California supplying a significant portion of global needs.

By the 1990s, China started to take control of the market, utilizing its lower labor costs and lenient environmental regulations to outprice its rivals. By 2002, Mountain Pass had closed its doors, unable to match the competitive pricing from China. Currently, China is responsible for processing nearly 90 percent of the world’s rare earth elements, granting it significant influence.

In the United States, there is only one active rare earth mine—Mountain Pass, which is now owned by MP Materials—but it lacks the necessary infrastructure to refine most heavy rare earth elements domestically. This reliance was not coincidental; it stemmed from a focus on immediate economic benefits rather than long-term strategic stability.

As noted by David Merriman, an analyst at Project Blue, in a Reuters article, China’s grip on heavy rare earth elements is particularly strong, with only one non-Chinese operation in Myanmar providing a limited alternative, which is still subject to Beijing’s influence.

The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program’s dependence on these materials highlights its technological aspirations. The aircraft is engineered to function in highly contested environments where adversaries utilize advanced air defense and electronic warfare systems.

Its stealth capabilities, likely exceeding those of the F-22 Raptor, will rely on specialized coatings and composites that include rare earth elements. Additionally, the jet’s propulsion system, which may feature an adaptive-cycle engine, will necessitate lightweight, heat-resistant components made possible through scandium-aluminum alloys.

In contrast to Russia’s Su-57 and China’s J-20, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program focuses on enhanced sensor fusion and connectivity, enabling it to work in tandem with loyal wingman drones—unmanned aircraft that augment its operational range and firepower.

While the J-20 features sophisticated avionics, it falls short in engine performance, and the Su-57 is hindered by production setbacks. The NGAD’s advantage stems from its incorporation of cutting-edge technologies; however, without dependable access to rare earth elements, this advantage may diminish.

Moreover, the limitations on rare earths pose a risk to a wider range of U.S. defense initiatives. Hypersonic missiles, which depend on these materials for their guidance systems, could experience delays. The Navy’s electromagnetic railguns, currently in the prototype phase, also rely on magnets made from rare earths.

Satellites, essential for communication and surveillance, utilize rare earths in their solar panels and sensors. The impact of these restrictions extends to commercial sectors, including electric vehicles and wind turbines, but the urgency is particularly pronounced in the defense industry.

Although the Pentagon has stockpiled certain rare earths, industry insiders have informed Reuters that these reserves are not enough to support contractors in the long term. The Aerospace Industries Association, which includes companies like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, has consistently highlighted supply chain vulnerabilities, yet efforts to achieve self-sufficiency have progressed slowly.

Efforts to mitigate this dependency are currently in progress but encounter considerable challenges. The Biden administration has activated the Defense Production Act to finance domestic rare earth initiatives, including a $120 million grant to Lynas Rare Earths for a heavy rare earth processing facility in Texas.

Simultaneously, MP Materials is broadening its operations with plans to manufacture magnets in Fort Worth by the end of 2025. General Motors has formed a partnership with MP to ensure a steady supply for its electric vehicles, a strategy that defense contractors might consider replicating. However, establishing a comprehensive supply chain—from extraction to processing to production—requires years of development, not just months.

Australia’s Mount Weld mine presents opportunities, yet its processing capabilities are still limited. Canada and Europe are investigating potential solutions, but their efforts are still in the early stages. Another possibility is recycling rare earth elements from outdated electronics, although existing technologies are both inefficient and expensive.

The human aspect of this crisis is frequently neglected. Workers at Mountain Pass, many residing in nearby towns like Baker, California, are facing uncertainty as the mine increases production amid geopolitical pressures.

In China, rare earth mining has been associated with environmental damage and health hazards, raising ethical concerns regarding global supply chains. At the same time, engineers at Lockheed Martin and Boeing, who are responsible for designing the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) system, must contend with possible material shortages that could delay prototype development or necessitate expensive redesigns.

These challenges raise a significant strategic question: how can a nation effectively balance innovation with resilience? The Pentagon’s initiative for cutting-edge technology relies on a consistent supply of raw materials, a premise that is now uncertain.

China’s intentions go beyond merely responding to U.S. tariffs. By tightening its grip on rare earth elements, Beijing enhances its influence in Asia, providing preferential access to allies such as South Korea and Japan while exerting pressure on others to conform to its agenda.

This approach mirrors its 2010 restrictions on Japan, which caused turmoil in global markets until the World Trade Organization stepped in. However, the current restrictions are more extensive, affecting not only raw materials but also processed goods like permanent magnets.

As Mark A. Smith, CEO of NioCorp Developments, stated to the Investing News Network, China’s maneuvers represent a “precision strike” against U.S. defense capabilities, taking advantage of a vulnerability that has been overlooked for too long. Nonetheless, attributing the issue solely to China overlooks the U.S.’s historical decision to relinquish control of this market decades ago.

Rare earth elements have long been a point of geopolitical contention. During the Cold War, the U.S. depended on domestic mines to develop its military capabilities, from radar technology to early computing systems. The rise of Chinese dominance in the 1990s coincided with the height of globalization, as American companies outsourced production to reduce expenses.

The Pentagon’s emphasis on immediate threats, particularly counterterrorism post-2001, shifted focus away from long-term challenges such as dependency on resources. By 2010, when China temporarily suspended rare earth exports to Japan, it raised significant concerns in Washington. However, subsequent initiatives, including the 2012 reopening of Mountain Pass, struggled due to market dynamics. This history indicates that addressing the current crisis necessitates not only financial investment but also a consistent political commitment.

Despite these obstacles, the development of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is ongoing, with prototypes reportedly undergoing testing. Its rivals, such as China’s J-20, are also facing limitations, including dependence on Russian engines and issues within their domestic supply chains.

Russia’s Su-57, affected by sanctions, finds it challenging to compete with Western avionics. However, the success of the NGAD relies on more than just technological advancements; it demands a fundamental rethink of how the U.S. secures its resources. Research into synthetic materials, which could lessen reliance on rare earth elements, is still in its infancy.

Asteroid mining, although still in the realm of speculation, has garnered interest as a potential long-term solution, with companies like AstroForge seeking funding to investigate extraterrestrial resources. While these concepts may seem far-off, they underscore the pressing need for alternative solutions.

Companies such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are making adjustments, although details remain closely held. Some have begun stockpiling materials, while others are pursuing collaborations with suppliers outside of China.

The Pentagon is also taking steps to diversify its supply chain, awarding contracts to firms in Australia and Canada. However, these actions serve as temporary measures rather than comprehensive solutions. The intricate nature of the defense industry—where a single aircraft relies on thousands of components from various global suppliers—makes it challenging to swiftly reduce dependence on China.

According to an industry insider speaking to Reuters, aerospace manufacturers that rely solely on China for rare earth materials are particularly vulnerable, a situation worsened by the opaque nature of supply chains.

The wider consequences of China’s restrictions extend to national security and economic stability. The U.S. Geological Survey has projected that a complete ban on specific rare earths could result in economic losses amounting to billions, not including potential disruptions to defense operations.

The Pentagon’s modernization efforts, which encompass advancements in hypersonics and cyber warfare, depend on a steady supply of these materials. A shortage could lead to delays, increased costs, or diminished capabilities in various programs. For the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) initiative, this might necessitate a reduction in goals—such as fewer drones in its integrated system—or a reliance on outdated technologies, compromising its competitive advantage.

Looking forward, the U.S. must decide whether to invest in domestic production or to accept a scenario where China exerts significant influence over its military future. The former option requires not only investment in mining operations but also in the education and training of scientists, engineers, and workers to revive an industry that has been inactive for many years.

This approach also calls for bipartisan support, which is challenging in the current politically divided environment. The alternative risks losing strategic ground, as China’s dominance in rare earths could be used to manipulate global alliances. While some remain hopeful about innovations—such as new materials, advancements in recycling, or even mining on the moon—skeptics caution that time is limited and China’s control is strong.

Currently, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) represents a testament to American innovation, crafted to excel in the battlefields of the future. However, its operational capabilities are closely linked to a supply chain that extends across the Pacific, where decisions made in Beijing could hinder advancements in Washington.

This situation highlights a long-ignored reality: technology by itself cannot guarantee a secure future. The foundations of warfare must be built on resilience, foresight, and adaptability. Whether the United States can meet this challenge or will once again postpone the essential work of achieving self-sufficiency is still uncertain, a question that will influence not only the NGAD but also the global balance of power for years ahead.