For America’s allies in Asia, the looming prospect of Donald Trump‘s return to the White House is particularly concerning at this juncture.

China has been actively modernizing its military capabilities and nuclear stockpile, while also becoming more assertive in its territorial claims in the South China Sea and regarding Taiwan. Meanwhile, North Korea has intensified its aggressive rhetoric and its pursuit of nuclear program. Both nations have deepened their cooperation with Russia amid its ongoing conflict in Ukraine, thereby connecting the instability in Asia to the fractured peace in Europe.

For many years, the United States has provided security assurances to its regional allies, maintaining a significant presence of active-duty troops in the area—more than in any other part of the world. Thousands of American soldiers are stationed at extensive bases in treaty allies South Korea and Japan, and the US is committed to supporting countries like the Philippines and Australia in the event of an attack.

These nations are now bracing for an American leader who has criticized what he perceives as the complacency of US allies regarding defense spending, shown a tendency to align with authoritarian leaders, and advocated for an “America first” stance in international relations.

US-aligned leaders in Asia are grappling with numerous uncertainties regarding Trump, as noted by regional observers.

Will he demand higher defense expenditures that allies may struggle to meet? Is there a risk he could take drastic measures to withdraw US forces if those demands are not satisfied? Might he strike deals with leaders such as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, or Russia’s Vladimir Putin that could compromise the interests of US allies?

Conversely, could he potentially reinforce US alliances and adopt a more confrontational stance against America’s adversaries?

Amid this uncertainty, leaders throughout the region are actively seeking to establish robust relationships with the unpredictable incoming US president, who is known for tying foreign policy decisions to personal connections.

Many are cautiously observing President-elect Trump’s proposal to impose 10% tariffs on all imports and potentially over 60% on goods from China, actions that could lead to significant economic repercussions throughout Asia.

As Trump’s inauguration in January approaches, Asian governments are grappling with critical questions regarding how he will navigate U.S. security alliances with both allies and adversaries, particularly in times of crisis.

‘Indispensable power?’

Following World War II, the United States established a network of alliances globally to act as a strong deterrent against future global conflicts. A key objective was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by placing various nations under the protective umbrella of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Many in Washington and throughout Asia believe that these alliances in the Asia-Pacific region have become increasingly vital as tensions rise among nations.

China has strengthened its security partnerships with Russia, a NATO adversary, and has been accused of supporting Moscow’s military efforts by purchasing Russian exports and supplying essential dual-use goods for its defense capabilities. Additionally, Beijing has intensified its threats against Taiwan, the self-governing democracy it claims as its own and has pledged to seize, if necessary, through force.

In the South China Sea, the China Coast Guard has recently engaged in aggressive actions against Philippine vessels, using water cannons and even axes, despite a significant international ruling that rejected its claims over much of this strategically important waterway.

North Korea has intensified its threats against South Korea and the United States while conducting weapons tests. According to US officials, it is also providing support to Russia’s military efforts through the supply of ammunition, missiles, and, in a significant recent development, soldiers.

As Trump re-enters a more complicated global landscape compared to the beginning of his first term eight years ago, analysts in Asia note that his primary focus seems to be on increasing economic pressure on China rather than addressing regional security concerns.

Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program in Sydney, remarked that Trump’s main priority is predominantly centered on the economic relationship with China, emphasizing the need for the United States to maintain its economic competitiveness. However, there is little indication that he is significantly invested in the military or strategic dynamics in East Asia.

Roggeveen further stated that the evidence suggests a different direction. While Trump advocates for a robust military to protect the United States, he does not seem to embrace the notion of America as an essential power with a distinct global security responsibility.

The new administration and its advisors have consistently raised doubts about the benefits of US alliances and questioned the justification for American lives and resources being committed to overseas conflicts.

Earlier this year, Trump surprised European leaders by suggesting that he would permit Russia to act freely against any NATO member that fails to meet the defense spending requirements set by the US-led alliance.

As the election approached, Trump shifted his attention to Asia, asserting in a Bloomberg News interview that, if elected, South Korea would be required to pay $10 billion annually to host US troops—approximately eight times the amount recently agreed upon by Seoul and Washington.

South Korea currently allocates over 2% of its gross domestic product to defense, a figure regarded by the United States as a standard for its allies. In the last ten years, the nation has also covered 90% of the expenses associated with the expansion of Camp Humphreys, the largest US military base overseas.

However, comments made by Trump have raised concerns in Seoul regarding the potential for renegotiation of cost-sharing agreements for US troops. This is particularly significant given the five-year agreement established earlier this year, which will increase Seoul’s defense spending by 8.3% in 2026 compared to the previous year. Some analysts warn that a failed renegotiation could lead to a decision by Trump to reduce or withdraw US forces, which are crucial for countering threats from North Korea.

Such developments, along with a growing perception of diminishing US commitment, might drive Seoul to consider developing its own nuclear capabilities. Experts caution that this could initiate a troubling trend, encouraging other middle powers to pursue similar paths.

The situation has become increasingly complex for South Korea in its dealings with Trump. Recently, lawmakers voted to impeach President Yoon Suk Yeol following his unexpected declaration of martial law, and shortly thereafter, they also voted to impeach acting president Han Duck-soo. The nation now faces a prolonged period of political instability, which observers believe is critical to address, especially in fostering strong leader-to-leader relationships.

Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security based in Seoul, emphasized that the primary challenge lies in the ability of Seoul and Washington to communicate effectively.

This communication is crucial to prevent “devastating consequences and surprises” within the US-South Korea alliance, which could arise from the harsh rhetoric previously employed by Trump against allies, she noted.

In Japan, analysts have expressed concerns regarding Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s capabilities in comparison to the late Shinzo Abe, who was recognized for his adeptness in engaging with the former president during his initial term.

As a key American ally in Asia, Japan is expected to highlight its significant shifts in defense strategy since Trump’s last administration.

Tokyo has moved away from the pacifist constitution established by the US after World War II, committing in 2022 to increase defense spending to approximately 2% of its GDP by 2027 and to procure American cruise missiles.

Countries across the region are also observing whether the Trump administration will continue the efforts initiated under Biden to create a “lattice work” of interconnected US partnerships in Asia, which is part of the administration’s strategy to “invest, align, compete” in response to Beijing.

Biden strengthened the Quad security alliance, which includes India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, and established the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US, aimed at providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. Additionally, he facilitated significant enhancements in Japan’s security collaboration with South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.

In contrast, Trump, characterized by his unpredictable approach during his presidency, could either maintain, alter, or intensify these alliances. Meanwhile, America’s Asian partners are likely to seek ways to mitigate any potential reduction in US support.

“The United States is no longer a constant in international relations; it has become a variable,” remarked Murata Koji, a political science professor at Doshisha University in Japan.

“This necessitates that we broaden our security efforts beyond the United States,” he added, emphasizing Tokyo’s need to strengthen its ties with Europe over mutual concerns.

China is closely monitoring these developments.

Nevertheless, experts in the region generally believe that significant shifts in the US military presence under Trump are unlikely, particularly regarding troop reductions or the dissolution of alliance agreements, especially in light of the American focus on the challenges posed by China.

“Geopolitical realities will compel him to maintain a military presence in the region. I envision a scenario more focused on renegotiation rather than outright withdrawal,” stated Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Countries are not only weighing the potential drawbacks of Trump’s possible return, Koh noted, but are also influenced by perceptions in Asia regarding Biden’s indecisiveness on Ukraine, which complicates matters for the beleaguered nation.

“With Trump potentially back in office, there may be a renewed sense of optimism that he will approach crises with more decisiveness than Biden,” he remarked.

Nonetheless, there are apprehensions that an anticipated aggressive economic stance towards China could exacerbate communication breakdowns between the US and Chinese military forces, increasing the likelihood of confrontation. Additionally, if new American tariffs adversely affect US allies, they might find themselves increasingly dependent on the world’s second-largest economy.

Conversely, Trump has also expressed some willingness to engage with China, suggesting in recent remarks to CNBC that he views certain elements of his post-pandemic policy on China as “overreaching.”

The issue of Trump’s approach to Taiwan is significant, as it is often viewed as a potential catalyst for conflict between the US and China.

An ‘insurance company’

President Biden has consistently moved away from the traditional American stance of ambiguity, explicitly stating that the US would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese invasion. He also authorized military aid for Taiwan for the first time as Beijing increased its military activities in the region.

In contrast, the president-elect has seemingly weakened US-Taiwan relations, suggesting in a Bloomberg interview that Washington functions merely as an “insurance company” for Taiwan and asserting that the island should compensate the US for its defense. In an October interview with the Wall Street Journal, he indicated that he would impose tariffs ranging from 150% to 200% if China were to invade Taiwan.

However, the response of the Trump administration in such a scenario remains uncertain. Trump’s selection for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, is a strong supporter of Taiwan, while his vice presidential choice, JD Vance, has expressed concerns that providing air defense systems to Ukraine could diminish the US’s capacity to support Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack.

This perspective has raised alarms among observers in Asia.

Many in the region believe that Trump’s approach to the Ukraine conflict will convey an important message to Russia’s allies, including China, Iran, and North Korea—nations that some in Washington worry could form a perilous alliance. These apprehensions are particularly pronounced regarding China, which is likely monitoring the situation as it contemplates its own ambitions concerning Taiwan.

Trump has claimed he could resolve the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” and has advocated for an “immediate ceasefire and negotiations,” a stance that aligns with Beijing’s official position on the conflict, which has drawn criticism from the US and its allies for allegedly favoring Russia.

“I know Vladimir well. This is his time to act. China can help. The world is waiting!” Trump stated in a recent post on his social media platform, Truth Social.

The implications of this rhetoric could have far-reaching effects for Asia.

“If Russia is perceived to emerge victorious from this situation, it will solidify the relationship between Russia and China,” remarked Robert Ward, director of geo-economics and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the UK.

“Xi Jinping will be closely observing how credible Western deterrence is, how reliable NATO is, and how willing the West is to engage in a conflict—issues that are intrinsically linked to Taiwan.”