Chinese Missiles Pose a Risk to U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Upcoming Age of Naval Combat

The strategic dynamics in the Pacific Ocean are shifting, not due to the quantity of aircraft carriers or submarines, but rather because of the increasing stockpile of long-range precision missiles developed by the People’s Republic of China. For the United States Navy, which has historically depended on the unparalleled power projection of its aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs), China’s growing missile capabilities pose a significant and evolving challenge to established beliefs about maritime dominance.

Central to this challenge is China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which seeks to deter or impede U.S. military involvement in the Western Pacific, especially in scenarios related to Taiwan. This strategy relies on missile systems that can target valuable naval assets from considerable distances. The DF-21D and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), often referred to as “carrier killers,” are fundamental to this strategy.

The DF-21D, boasting an estimated range of over 1,500 kilometers, is engineered to engage moving maritime targets—a capability that has historically been difficult to achieve due to the challenges of real-time targeting across vast oceanic areas. China asserts that it has addressed this targeting issue through a combination of satellites, over-the-horizon radar systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that work together in a comprehensive kill chain. While there is ongoing debate about the full operational status of these capabilities, the Pentagon’s most recent China Military Power Report recognizes significant progress in China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities.

On the other hand, the DF-26, which has a range exceeding 4,000 kilometers, allows China to extend its reach deep into the Philippine Sea, posing a threat to U.S. carriers that previously operated from relatively secure distances. Importantly, the DF-26 can be fitted with both conventional and nuclear warheads, which adds complexity to escalation management and crisis stability.

Enhancing these systems are land-attack and anti-ship cruise missile variants like the YJ-18 and YJ-21, which can be launched from various platforms including ships, submarines, and aircraft. The YJ-21, introduced in 2022, is a hypersonic anti-ship missile that reportedly maneuvers at terminal speeds exceeding Mach 10, making it extremely challenging for current shipboard missile defense systems to intercept.

This complex and multi-faceted missile threat has prompted the U.S. Navy to reassess its operational strategies. Historically, aircraft carriers have operated with a protective formation of destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, projecting power through their air wings. However, the range of Chinese missiles now surpasses the operational reach of carrier-based aircraft like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which typically has a strike radius of about 700 kilometers without aerial refueling. Although the introduction of the F-35C, with its stealth capabilities and slightly increased range, helps to address some of this disparity, a significant asymmetry persists: China can launch precision missiles from its coastline, while U.S. carriers must travel thousands of kilometers and operate within striking distance to be effective.

To counter this threat, the United States is hastening the development and deployment of advanced combat systems specifically designed to safeguard high-value naval assets from long-range missile strikes. Leading this effort are sophisticated shipboard missile defense systems, such as the Aegis Combat System, now enhanced with SM-6 missile interceptors. The SM-6, which possesses dual capabilities against both ballistic and cruise missiles, is engineered to intercept threats during the terminal phase of their flight, offering a crucial layer of defense for carrier strike groups. New variants of the SM-6 are being developed to extend engagement ranges and to intercept hypersonic glide vehicles currently in the works.

The U.S. Navy is deploying the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block 2 (ESSM Block 2), a medium-range interceptor featuring active radar homing technology, specifically designed to counter supersonic sea-skimming missiles. Furthermore, enhancements to close-in defense systems are underway, including the SeaRAM and upgraded Phalanx CIWS (Close-In Weapon System), which deliver rapid-response capabilities against threats that breach outer defenses.

In addition to kinetic defenses, the U.S. Navy is making significant investments in electronic warfare (EW) systems, such as the AN/SLQ-32(V)7, as part of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP). These systems are intended to jam or mislead incoming missile seekers, diverting them from U.S. ships. When combined with decoys like the Nulka active offboard decoy and advanced corner reflector systems, these soft-kill strategies provide essential protection when layered with hard-kill options.

A more revolutionary approach involves the use of directed-energy weapons. The U.S. Navy is currently evaluating the HELIOS (High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance) system on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This system is engineered to neutralize drones, small boats, and potentially missiles, marking a significant advancement in shipboard defense technology. While its effectiveness can be limited by atmospheric conditions and power availability, it offers an almost limitless ammunition supply, which is a vital advantage in scenarios involving missile saturation.

In the aerial domain, carrier air wings are starting to incorporate new technologies such as the MQ-25 Stingray aerial refueling drone, which will enhance the operational range of manned strike aircraft, enabling carriers to function at greater distances from potential threats. Looking ahead, the development of sixth-generation aircraft is planned under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which is anticipated to feature stealth capabilities, advanced sensors, and the ability to manage loyal wingman drones designed for both surveillance and strike operations.

At the strategic level, the United States is implementing resilient ground-based systems, including the U.S. Army’s Typhon Mid-Range Capability surface-to-surface missile system, which is designed to launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles from land. This initiative enhances maritime defense from advanced positions in the Pacific. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) framework seeks to consolidate these systems across various military branches and domains, ensuring a cohesive multi-layered defense strategy.

However, China’s expanding missile capabilities introduce a deterrent based on punishment. The presence of precise long-range missiles that can target aircraft carriers before they reach the combat zone compels U.S. strategists to either accept increased risks or reassess the effectiveness of carrier-based power projection in high-stakes conflict situations.

For allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, these advancements pose significant challenges regarding the future of regional security and the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence. The deployment of U.S. carrier strike groups has historically symbolized America’s dedication to safeguarding the Indo-Pacific. If these forces are perceived as increasingly vulnerable, it could undermine U.S. influence in the region—not through direct military defeat, but by fostering the belief that the costs of intervention surpass its strategic advantages.

China’s missile capabilities have transformed the dynamics in the Western Pacific. While they do not render the U.S. Navy obsolete, they have made conventional power projection considerably more perilous and costly. The future of naval warfare will depend not only on fleet size and tonnage but also on the ability to withstand long-range precision attacks. The U.S. is responding with investments in missile defense, directed energy, extended-range aviation, and electronic warfare, but the balance of power will increasingly rely on which side can outpace the other in the ongoing competition between offensive and defensive strategies.