Crisis to Catastrophe? India’s Struggle with PL-15E and Pakistan’s PL-17 Could Alter Air Power Dynamics

As the focus sharpens on China’s J-10C multirole fighter jet, another entity that is gaining traction among global defense analysts is the PL-15E, China’s export version of the long-range Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missile.

Developed by the China Academy of Missile Airborne (CAMA), the PL-15E has surged into the international limelight following reports that Pakistan Air Force (PAF) J-10C fighters equipped with the missile successfully engaged and shot down three Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafale jets during a high-stakes air combat scenario.

This incident is deemed historic, as it marks the first confirmed downing of a Dassault Rafale—considered one of the most advanced 4.5-generation fighters globally—in actual combat. The collaborative success of the J-10C and PL-15E has reverberated through the global defense sector, reportedly causing a notable decline in the stock value of Dassault Aviation.

Pakistani officials claim that a total of five Indian aircraft were downed—three Rafales, one Su-30MKI, and one Mirage 2000—with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar asserting, “the three Rafales were shot down by J-10C using PL-15E.” India has so far declined to publicly recognize the loss of its aircraft, but IAF senior officer Air Marshal A.K. Bharti made an implicit acknowledgment during a press briefing, stating: “losses are part of combat.”

The PL-15E serves as the export variant of the PL-15—a next-generation long-range BVR missile utilized by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)—and is specifically designed for international customers like Pakistan. A key distinction between the domestic and export models is their effective range: the PL-15E is reported to have a maximum engagement distance of around 145 km, while the indigenous PL-15 used by China’s J-10C, J-20, J-16, and other aircraft boasts a reach of up to 300 km.

Despite its range limitations, the PL-15E still exceeds the reach of numerous older Indian BVR missiles, particularly those currently utilized on the older Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 platforms.

The effectiveness of the PL-15E has ignited discussions within Indian strategic circles, especially as China advances with the deployment of an even more advanced system—the PL-17.

China’s PL-15E missile production line revealed! CCTV documentary showcases China’s fully automated, 24-hour unmanned manufacturing system for the #PL-15E beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. pic.twitter.com/Zv4yIBjEP0

— China Perspective (@China_Fact) May 23, 2025

The PL-17, also known by its developmental name “PL-XX” or “Project 180,” represents China’s next-generation BVR missile, engineered for ultra-long-range engagements of up to 400 km, thereby pushing the boundaries of air-to-air combat.

Launched in recent years, the PL-17 signifies a major advancement in Beijing’s missile technology, designed to neutralize enemy aircraft and airborne assets well beyond visual detection range.

The PL-17 has already begun limited service on China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20 “Mighty Dragon,” and is currently undergoing integration trials with the J-10C multirole platform.

If these trials prove successful, the missile’s compatibility with fourth-generation+ fighters like the J-10C could significantly change regional threat dynamics and export opportunities.

Should Pakistan aim to procure the PL-17, it would likely need to enhance its J-10C’s radar systems—currently outfitted with the KLJ-10A AESA—to a more robust configuration capable of managing mid-course guidance and long-range tracking requirements.

Although originally intended for the J-20’s spacious internal bays, the nearly 6-meter-long PL-17 could potentially be modified for semi-stealth external carriage on upgraded J-10C or even the JF-17 Block III, albeit requiring structural and software adjustments.

The PL-17 features an Inertial Navigation System (INS), GPS/Beidou updates, a high-power AESA radar seeker for terminal guidance, and a mid-course data-link for real-time targeting updates.

This guidance suite allows the missile to track and engage high-value targets even in contested environments filled with electronic countermeasures—a defining characteristic of future warfare.

The PL-17 is designed not just to target fighter aircraft; its kill chain also encompasses vital airborne force multipliers such as AWACS, tanker aircraft, and ISR platforms that operate from stand-off distances. The missile aims at key assets like the E-3 Sentry, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and KC-135 Stratotanker—essential components in any contemporary air campaign—positioning it as a fundamental element of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.

By deploying the PL-17, China can effectively blind, isolate, and undermine the enemy’s aerial C4ISR framework long before hostile aircraft enter contested areas. Its integration with the J-20 enhances China’s growing long-range strike capabilities in critical regions such as the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea—zones where Beijing aims to deter or confront U.S.-led coalition air superiority.

From a doctrinal perspective, the PL-17 signifies a transition towards air denial through precision standoff kills—targeting forward-deployed surveillance and refueling aircraft while compelling adversaries to operate from deeper, less advantageous positions.

Numerous open-source intelligence assessments suggest that the PL-17 has completed full-scale testing and may currently be in low-rate initial production for frontline J-20 units within the PLAAF. Strategic analysts regard this missile as China’s direct response to the forthcoming U.S. AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), which is intended to succeed the aging AMRAAM in counter-stealth missions.

If Islamabad secures access to the PL-17, it would significantly alter the air balance between India and Pakistan, providing Pakistan with long-range engagement capabilities that surpass India’s existing arsenal. The PL-17’s estimated range is nearly twice that of the Meteor missile used on Indian Rafales or the Astra Mk1/2 deployed on Su-30MKI and Tejas fighters, giving Pakistan a clear advantage in beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat.

When integrated into the JF-17 Block III, which already features a digital cockpit, AESA radar (KLJ-7A), and data-link capabilities, the PL-17 could facilitate precision strikes from distances that would undermine India’s ability to retaliate. Aircraft equipped with the PL-17, such as the stealth-capable J-10C or JF-17, could launch “first-shot” attacks before Indian fighters like the Rafale or Su-30MKI even become aware of the threat.

This capability poses a risk to India’s aerial command-and-control systems, particularly high-value support assets like Netra and Phalcon AWACS, IL-78 tankers, and ISR aircraft that are crucial to India’s integrated air defense strategy.

Strategically, Pakistan’s acquisition of the PL-17 would reflect China’s A2/AD strategy, aimed at denying adversaries access to contested areas by systematically eliminating surveillance and coordination assets. In a potential conflict over Kashmir or the Line of Control, PL-17 missiles could allow Pakistan to carry out “stand-off kills” against Indian platforms without breaching international borders, thereby complicating India’s political and military response options.

However, the journey to operationalize this capability is fraught with technical challenges, particularly regarding airframe integration, radar compatibility, and missile datalink synchronization on Pakistani aircraft that were not originally designed for such systems.

Furthermore, the introduction of a Pakistani PL-17 capability could escalate geopolitical tensions with India, possibly leading to a strategic arms response that might involve the rapid development of India’s Astra Mk3, collaboration with Israel on sophisticated air-to-air systems, or an expanded deployment of the Meteor. India may also pursue retrofitting Meteor capabilities onto various fighter aircraft or enhance missile development collaborations with France and Russia to counter Pakistan’s range advantage.

The transfer of the PL-17 to Pakistan would further highlight the growing military partnership between China and Pakistan, solidifying Beijing’s position as Islamabad’s main strategic arms supplier in the context of a changing global landscape.

In conclusion, the arrival of the PL-17 in South Asia would trigger a new chapter in the regional arms race—characterized not just by the platforms themselves, but by the range, accuracy, and destructive power of the missiles they carry.