Germany halts the sale of Eurofighter jets to Turkey due to the ongoing political crisis

The German government, under a caretaker coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, has halted the export of around thirty Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets to Turkey, as reported by the German newspaper Handelsblatt, referencing local sources.

This decision stems from concerns regarding the recent detention of Turkish opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu, creating significant repercussions within NATO, the European defense sector, and the complex geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Berlin pointed to İmamoğlu’s arrest, a notable opponent of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who faces corruption allegations that the Turkish opposition deems politically motivated, as a primary reason for the veto. German officials described Erdoğan’s actions as an “attack on Turkish democracy,” asserting that endorsing the arms deal would be inappropriate given the current situation.

This choice, which reverses previous advancements toward the sale, not only threatens Turkey’s military modernization efforts but also puts pressure on the cohesion of the Eurofighter consortium and raises concerns about Ankara’s position within NATO’s southern flank.

The Eurofighter Typhoon, a twin-engine multirole fighter jet, represents a significant achievement in European aerospace engineering, designed to rival the most advanced combat aircraft globally. Developed by a consortium including Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain through companies such as Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo, the Typhoon is recognized as a 4.5-generation fighter known for its agility, sophisticated avionics, and adaptability.

With a maximum speed of Mach 2, a combat radius exceeding 1,800 miles, and the capability to carry a wide range of munitions—including Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and Paveway IV precision-guided bombs—the Typhoon excels in air superiority, ground attack, and reconnaissance operations. Its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and infrared search and track system enhance situational awareness, making it a powerful asset in modern warfare.

Since its introduction in 2003, the Typhoon has been utilized by European air forces in various conflicts, including those in Libya and Syria, demonstrating its effectiveness in high-stakes operations. For Turkey, the acquisition of the Typhoon is viewed as a vital move to enhance its aging air force, especially after being barred from the U.S.-led F-35 program due to its procurement of Russian S-400 air defense systems in 2019.

Turkey’s air force, one of NATO’s largest, heavily depends on a fleet of over 200 F-16 Fighting Falcons, many of which are outdated and in need of modernization or replacement. The exclusion from the F-35 program, a stealth fighter optimized for network-centric warfare, has created a significant gap in Ankara’s capacity to maintain air superiority in contested areas such as the Aegean Sea, where tensions with Greece are ongoing, and the Black Sea, where Russia’s military presence is a concern.

The Eurofighter is positioned to address this gap, providing advanced capabilities to counter modern threats. Without the Typhoon, Turkey finds itself in a challenging predicament. Although its F-16s remain effective, they lack the advanced sensors and stealth technology found in fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 or Russia’s Su-57.

While Turkey has made efforts to upgrade its F-16 fleet with new avionics and weaponry in recent years, these enhancements can only prolong their operational relevance to a certain extent. The German veto thus intensifies the urgency for Turkey’s air force to seek alternatives, a challenge further complicated by geopolitical and technical limitations.

Ankara is in the process of developing its own fifth-generation fighter, the TF-X, now known as Kaan, through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ). Introduced in 2023, the Kaan is designed to compete with advanced aircraft such as the F-35, featuring stealth capabilities, supercruise technology, and domestically developed avionics.

Nevertheless, the program is still several years away from being operational, with estimates indicating that deployment may not occur until the early 2030s. Progress has been hindered by technical difficulties, particularly in engine development and the integration of sophisticated systems, and Turkey’s limited experience in manufacturing advanced fighter jets raises concerns about adhering to these timelines.

Counting on the Kaan as a short-term solution is impractical, leaving Turkey exposed in a region where air superiority is essential. Alternative suppliers, including Russia with its Su-57 and China with the J-20, are not viable options due to Turkey’s NATO membership and the incompatibility of non-Western systems with NATO standards.

For example, the Su-57 has encountered production setbacks and lacks the established combat history of Western aircraft, while the export viability of the J-20 remains unclear. Pursuing Russian or Chinese platforms could also further alienate NATO allies, a situation Ankara has approached with caution since the S-400 controversy.

Additionally, the recent German decision has highlighted divisions within the Eurofighter consortium, a partnership that has historically balanced national interests with shared objectives. The United Kingdom and Spain, motivated by economic incentives, have advocated for the deal, with BAE Systems and Airbus poised to benefit significantly from the projected $5 billion contract.

Italy has also shown support for the export, albeit in a less outspoken manner. Germany’s veto, stemming from its stringent arms export regulations, has frustrated its allies, who perceive the decision as prioritizing domestic political considerations over industrial and strategic interests.

According to Handelsblatt, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, currently in a caretaker role following the collapse of the coalition government, had previously sought to alleviate concerns regarding the sale during private discussions with Erdoğan.

As recently as October 2024, Scholz defended the arms exports to Turkey, asserting, “Turkey is a member of NATO, and therefore there are decisions from us that lead to concrete deliveries,” as reported by aero.de. The sudden change in stance, prompted by İmamoğlu’s arrest, has reversed months of progress and underscored the vulnerability of the consortium’s decision-making process, which necessitates unanimous consent for exports.

Germany’s arms export policy has historically complicated international agreements. In 2018, Berlin enacted a partial embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to its involvement in the Yemen conflict, which delayed Eurofighter deliveries and strained relations with the UK and France.

Similar restrictions have been placed on Turkey, particularly following the failed coup attempt in 2016, when Germany rejected 11 arms deals in 2017, as reported by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The current veto reflects Berlin’s sensitivity to human rights and democratic regression, issues that have long influenced its relationship with Ankara.

Critics argue that Germany’s position could weaken NATO unity, especially at a time when Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East necessitate a cohesive response. Conversely, supporters maintain that providing Erdoğan’s government with advanced weaponry could further entrench authoritarianism, a sentiment echoed in Berlin’s characterization of the İmamoğlu arrest as a “political conspiracy,” according to Handelsblatt.

The consequences of the veto reach beyond Turkey, influencing NATO’s strategic framework and the power dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey serves as a crucial component of the alliance’s southern defense, hosting essential bases such as İncirlik and maintaining a significant military presence in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus region.

A diminished Turkish air force could hinder NATO’s capacity to exert influence in these areas, especially against Russian-supported forces in Syria or Iranian-aligned groups in Iraq. In the Aegean Sea, as Greece enhances its air force with French Rafale jets and U.S. F-35s, Turkey’s failure to modernize its fleet could disrupt the regional equilibrium.

Greece’s Rafale, a 4.5-generation fighter akin to the Typhoon, features sophisticated radar and long-range missile capabilities, providing Athens with a strategic advantage in potential conflicts. The F-35, known for its stealth and advanced sensor integration, further exacerbates this disparity. Without access to modern fighter aircraft, Turkey may find it challenging to counter Greek assertiveness or uphold its claims over contested maritime territories.

Historically, Turkey’s air force has been instrumental in regional conflicts. During the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turkish F-100 Super Sabres and F-104 Starfighters offered air support for ground operations, establishing a presence on the island.

In recent years, Turkish F-16s have targeted Kurdish militias in Syria and Iraq, showcasing Ankara’s readiness to utilize air power to influence regional developments. The introduction of the Eurofighter would have bolstered these capabilities, allowing for precision strikes and air superiority in contested areas.

Its absence compels Turkey to depend on older aircraft, which may limit its operational agility and deterrent effectiveness. This is particularly alarming in Syria, where Russian Su-35s and S-400 systems present a direct threat, and in Libya, where Turkish air support has been vital for the government based in Tripoli.

The veto also carries significant implications for Turkey’s internal politics. Erdoğan, known for his adept political strategies, may use the German decision to galvanize nationalist feelings, framing Turkey as a victim of Western hypocrisy.

This approach has been effective in previous conflicts, such as the S-400 issue, where Erdoğan depicted U.S. sanctions as an infringement on Turkey’s sovereignty. By presenting Germany’s veto as a consequence of Turkey’s pursuit of an independent course, Erdoğan could divert attention from pressing domestic issues, including economic difficulties and the İmamoğlu situation.

On the other hand, the opposition has capitalized on the arrest to accuse Erdoğan of undermining democracy, a claim that resonates with Western nations. Although the German veto aims to express disapproval, it may unintentionally bolster Erdoğan’s power by providing him with a foreign adversary to criticize.

For the Eurofighter consortium, the veto highlights the difficulties of reconciling national interests in a competitive global arms landscape. The Typhoon faces tough competition from the U.S. F-35, which has garnered orders from more than a dozen nations, and France’s Rafale, which has secured contracts in Greece, Egypt, and India.

Losing the Turkish contract could weaken the consortium’s standing, especially as it aims to prolong the Typhoon’s production beyond 2030. Airbus has cautioned that without new orders, its Manching facility in Germany could face closure, a concern voiced by 3,000 workers during a rally in 2023, as reported by Flug Revue.

The UK has taken the initiative in discussions with Turkey and may advocate for changes to the consortium’s export regulations, which could diminish Germany’s ability to veto. This development would represent a notable transformation in European defense collaboration, affecting future initiatives such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS).

The wider arms market is also impacted. The U.S. recently approved F-16 sales to Turkey in early 2024, presenting an opportunity to strengthen its influence in Ankara, although Washington remains cautious about Turkey’s connections with Russia.

France, looking to take advantage of Turkey’s situation, might propose the Rafale as an alternative option. However, the aircraft’s high price and Turkey’s tense relationship with Paris make this scenario unlikely. Meanwhile, Russia and China, as potential suppliers, face challenges related to NATO interoperability and associated political risks.

The global fighter jet market is becoming increasingly competitive, with South Korea’s KF-21 and India’s AMCA entering the scene, yet none provide Turkey with a feasible short-term solution. The Typhoon’s combination of performance, availability, and compatibility with NATO requirements makes it particularly well-suited to Turkey’s needs, highlighting the significance of Germany’s veto as a major obstacle.

From NATO’s standpoint, the veto poses a risk of alienating a crucial ally at a pivotal moment. Turkey’s strategic position, linking Europe and the Middle East, is vital for countering Russian influence and safeguarding energy routes.

However, ongoing Western rejections—first the exclusion from the F-35 program and now the Eurofighter veto—could drive Ankara towards a more independent or non-aligned approach. While Turkey is unlikely to sever ties with NATO, strengthening relations with Moscow or Beijing could complicate the dynamics within the alliance.

The acquisition of the S-400 has already strained relations, leading to U.S. sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Further discord could undermine NATO’s unity, especially as it confronts challenges posed by an assertive Russia and a rising China.

Germany’s veto also highlights wider trends in European arms export policies. Berlin’s focus on human rights often conflicts with the more pragmatic stances of its allies, as evidenced by tensions surrounding arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Although Germany’s position may appeal to its domestic audience, it risks losing market opportunities to competitors like the U.S. and France, which have less stringent export regulations. The success of the Eurofighter relies on a unified approach, and Germany’s ongoing vetoes could diminish trust among its consortium partners.

The UK, having secured Typhoon sales to Qatar and Oman, may pursue greater independence in future agreements, potentially leading to fragmentation within the European defense sector.

Looking forward, the veto places Turkey, NATO, and the Eurofighter consortium at a pivotal juncture. Ankara must now consider its options: intensify its commitment to the Kaan, explore alternatives with the UK and Spain, or turn to less dependable suppliers.

The consortium is under pressure to address its internal conflicts, while NATO faces the challenging task of maintaining Turkey’s involvement without supporting Erdoğan’s domestic agenda. Germany’s principled decision may lead to unforeseen repercussions, potentially undermining a crucial ally and destabilizing an already volatile region.

The future remains unclear, heavily reliant on whether Berlin’s interim government or its future counterpart will reassess its position. Is it possible that a change in German policy could rescue the agreement, or has the veto initiated a series of events that will alter NATO’s southern border? Only time will reveal the outcome, but the stakes are exceptionally high.