Military Operations and Political Fallout in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: How PTI Shaped a Lasting Narrative

For the past 47 years, two major wars fought in neighboring Afghanistan have turned Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into a launching pad for global power proxies and a focal point of Pakistan’s national security architecture. This unfortunate reality pushed the province into a cycle of intense religious militancy that deviated society from its natural political and social evolution. Particularly after 9/11, violent movements plunged the province’s political traditions, tribal complexities, and state policies into nearly two decades of continuous turmoil.

A critical flaw in the state’s counterterrorism strategy was its overwhelming reliance on military operations while largely ignoring their political consequences. As a result, militarized responses to terrorism proved politically counterproductive. An unending cycle of operations turned Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand, and North and South Waziristan into deep wounds in Pakistan’s collective body.

Between 2008 and 2013, the Awami National Party (ANP) government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assumed political ownership of military operations against militants in Swat and South Waziristan. This decision proved devastating for the party. In retaliation, militant groups unleashed systematic violence against ANP leaders and workers, effectively dismantling a political culture nurtured over nearly a century. While military operations provoked militants into targeting unarmed political workers, they simultaneously restricted civil liberties, undermined social freedoms, and forced mass displacements, turning public anger against the ANP.

At the same time, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leadership was actively mobilizing public opinion against military operations in the tribal areas and opposing U.S. drone strikes. For communities suffering displacement, economic disruption, and constant fear, Imran Khan’s narrative appeared to validate their grievances and offer political relief. This moment marked a decisive shift: a relatively new political party displaced both the seasoned ANP and the entrenched religious forces like JUI, allowing PTI to form the provincial government in 2013.

PTI’s rise was not merely an electoral victory; it represented a profound ideological and cultural shift that marginalized traditional nationalist and religious forces long dominant in Pashtun politics.

A similar pattern emerged in 2015 during Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, when political ownership was placed on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Once again, mass displacement, security checkpoints, economic paralysis, and restrictions on civil freedoms generated public resentment. Although the operation was portrayed as a military success, its political consequences were negative. Already weak in the province, PML-N suffered further political alienation, becoming yet another party to pay the political price of military operations.

Between 2018 and 2022, during Imran Khan’s tenure as prime minister, counterterrorism policy took a dramatic turn. Instead of decisive military action, reconciliation and reintegration were prioritized. Negotiations with the TTP, proposals to mainstream militants, and controversial statements about allowing offices in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa fragmented the national consensus against terrorism. While this narrative temporarily benefited PTI politically, it produced damaging consequences for national security, allowing militant groups to regroup and unleash a renewed wave of violence that claimed the lives of police officers, security personnel, and civilians across the province.

Following his removal from power, Imran Khan reverted to the narrative that had previously served him well: aggressive opposition to military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, sharp criticism of the establishment, and framing state policies as the root cause of public suffering. This discourse successfully obscured PTI’s governance failures and repositioned military operations as the central theme of public debate.

Undeniably, whether through terrorism or counterterrorism operations, the greatest cost has been borne by ordinary citizens. Forced displacement, erosion of civil liberties, violations of fundamental rights, and the breakdown of social structures inflicted collective trauma. Governance paralysis also bred resentment within the civil bureaucracy and police toward federal institutions. In this environment, parties that supported military operations faced public backlash, once again allowing PTI to capitalize politically by opposing such actions.

This leads to a fundamental question: was all this merely coincidental, or part of a deeper strategic design? A pattern emerges in which traditional political parties, religious groups, and nationalist forces were systematically sidelined, while PTI retained its political relevance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Despite apparent tensions between Imran Khan and the establishment, there is little evidence of a serious attempt to politically dismantle PTI as a party. The repeated shifting of political ownership of military operations to the federal government—while leaving PTI positioned to harvest public sympathy at the provincial level—reinforces the perception that PTI’s political presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is being preserved in one form or another.