Russia and China, two vast neighboring nations occupying the largest expanse of land in Asia, share a multifaceted historical relationship marked by both competition and practical collaboration. Since the conclusion of World War II, their relationship has fluctuated significantly, heavily influenced by external factors.

In response to the West’s coercive tactics—such as urging Russia to launch a military operation in Ukraine—Moscow has increasingly found common ground with Beijing. This alignment is particularly significant in light of the rising tensions between the US and China in the Western Pacific, prompting considerations regarding the implications for India, which maintains strategic alliances with both Moscow and Washington.

Russia, China Historical context

The historical rivalry between Russia and China dates back to the 17th century, characterized by territorial conflicts over Siberia. The dynamics underwent a significant transformation in the 20th century, particularly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, which received support from the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War. However, ideological differences soon emerged. Mao Zedong’s discontent with Nikita Khrushchev’s policies and the Soviet Union’s relations with India heightened tensions, leading to the Sino-Soviet split and military clashes along the border in the late 1960s.

In 1979, China launched an invasion of Vietnam, a Soviet ally, resulting in skirmishes between the two powers during 1979-80. Additionally, China provided support to the Mujahedin in their fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

A thaw in relations began under Deng Xiaoping, paving the way for renewed diplomatic and economic connections following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This subsequent rapprochement has fostered a strategic partnership that increasingly influences regional geopolitics.

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, despite existing tensions related to trade imbalances, intellectual property issues concerning defense technologies, and China’s growing ambitions in Central Asia—an area historically influenced by Russia—Moscow and Beijing managed to forge several significant agreements during the first decade. These agreements addressed various cooperative efforts and resolved outstanding border disputes. In 1996, both nations released a joint communiqué that committed to establishing an “equal and reliable partnership,” indicating that their relationship had evolved into a strategic partnership, particularly in light of the emerging competition with Washington.

The eastward expansion of NATO, led by the United States, has notably reinforced the strategic alliance between China and Russia. The potential for Ukraine to join NATO may have been viewed by Russia as a “Cuba moment,” reminiscent of Cold War anxieties. As NATO rallied in support of Kiev, Moscow found itself increasingly aligned with Beijing, a shift that could ultimately undermine its own strategic interests. The growing trade relationship between Russia and China is not coincidental; it aligns closely with the tightening of U.S. sanctions on Russia and the rising tensions of the U.S.-China trade conflict, illustrating a complex web of geopolitical dynamics.

At the core of the Sino-Russian partnership is a shared interest in Russia’s abundant natural resources and China’s significant investments. However, Moscow harbors concerns about becoming overly dependent on China, often described as becoming a “junior partner.” This apprehension has prompted Russia to pursue additional investments from nations such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India, aiming to create a strategic balance against its reliance on China.

The US-China Relationship

The relationship between Washington and Beijing has been characterized by significant complexities since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, which initially led the US to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government. Tensions intensified during the Cold War, particularly after the Korean War and the Vietnam War, as both China and the Soviet Union opposed US interests.

Following China’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities in 1964, the US contemplated pre-emptive strikes to disrupt its nuclear ambitions. Observing the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and China’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, US officials determined that China posed a greater threat than the Soviet Union.

In an effort to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift, President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, part of Ping Pong Diplomacy, represented a crucial turning point, paving the way for increased dialogue and trade. Although the US recognized the One-China policy, significant disagreements persisted, particularly regarding China’s requests for advanced technology, which were frequently denied.

The tenure of President Ronald Reagan marked a decline in US-China relations, as his strong anti-communist stance reignited various contentious issues, including the Taiwan question. Tensions were further exacerbated by President Barack Obama’s Asia-Pacific defense strategy, perceived as an attempt to isolate China.

During his presidency, Donald Trump adopted a more confrontational approach towards China, imposing substantial tariffs on Chinese imports and initiating a significant trade conflict. His administration also provided South Korea with the THAAD missile-defense system. Under President Joe Biden, military presence in Asia has continued to grow, with a focus on strengthening military ties with India through the Quad alliance. Biden was overheard during a summit in Wilmington, Delaware, expressing concerns to his Quad partners about China’s aggressive behavior in regions such as the South China Sea, indicating that it is “testing us all across the region.”

Implications for India

India finds itself at a pivotal moment as it navigates its relationships with both Russia and China. The evolving partnership between Russia and China presents a situation that India must closely observe and strategically address, as it aims to protect its national interests within a swiftly changing geopolitical environment.

Although Russia has been a longstanding ally, the strengthening of ties between Moscow and Beijing introduces considerable strategic challenges for India. New Delhi views these developments with caution, particularly in light of its own border disputes and tensions with China. The Indian government has frequently voiced its apprehensions regarding China’s increased military activities in the disputed South China Sea.

As a result, India is compelled to reevaluate its diplomatic strategy, weighing its historical connections with Russia against the backdrop of a more assertive China.

Historically, the Soviet Union transitioned its alliances from China to India following the Sino-Soviet split. During the 1962 Sino-India conflict, the USSR aligned itself diplomatically with communist China, which led India to seek closer ties with the United States. However, after the mid-1960s Sino-Soviet split, the Soviets cultivated a friendship with India, providing open support during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. They effectively deterred both the US and China through military and diplomatic means, utilizing their veto power at the UN Security Council.

India’s dependence on Russia for military equipment is significant, making their partnership essential. This connection is expected to remain strong for at least the next thirty years. Additionally, India has benefited from Russian technological assistance in the fields of nuclear energy and space exploration.

The country has significantly increased its oil imports from Russia, resulting in record levels of bilateral trade. Recently, Moscow officials acknowledged that India has become Russia’s second-largest trading partner, following China. India continues to be a vital defense market for Russia, which is keen to preserve this relationship.

The Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping, initially proposed by former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s to foster dialogue and cooperation among these three influential Asian nations, is currently dormant. Nevertheless, it still serves as a platform for diplomatic engagement. Russia may have subtly facilitated the recent improvement in Sino-Indian relations, nearly four and a half years after the two nations’ military confrontation in the Galwan Valley along the poorly defined Line of Actual Control.

In the long run, it could benefit New Delhi if Russia were to distance itself from China. While India may not currently possess the geopolitical influence to effect this change, its power is on the rise. Moscow would also find it advantageous to have New Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

With the largest population globally, surpassing China, India is on track to become the third-largest economy. Russia would require India’s support to balance against China.

Despite external pressures regarding the Ukraine conflict, India has upheld a stance of neutrality. New Delhi’s commitment to strategic autonomy is contributing to a stable international balance, a fact that Moscow is likely to appreciate.