In the initial phase of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the Chinese leader strengthened his grip on the world’s largest military by dismantling the influence of powerful generals from opposing factions and appointing allies and loyalists in their place.

Now, a decade later, after implementing significant structural changes within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and filling its upper echelons with his chosen individuals, Xi remains deeply engaged in his ongoing battle against corruption and disloyalty.

Similar to many historical authoritarian leaders, he is increasingly targeting those he once considered loyal supporters.

Recently, Xi removed one of his closest military proteges, a long-time associate responsible for ensuring political loyalty within the PLA and overseeing senior promotions.

Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) chaired by Xi, has been suspended pending an investigation for “serious violations of discipline,” a term often used to refer to corruption and disloyalty.

As the leader of the CMC’s political work department, which manages political indoctrination and personnel decisions, Miao represents the highest-ranking official to be dismissed in Xi’s recent military purge. Since last summer, over a dozen senior officials within China’s defense sector have been removed, including the last two defense ministers appointed to the CMC by Xi.

However, none of them possess the enduring relationship that Miao had with the top leader, which dates back several decades to Xi’s early political endeavors in the coastal province of Fujian.

The investigation into Miao marks a new chapter in an expanding purge that has raised concerns regarding Xi’s capability to eradicate systemic corruption within the military and improve its combat readiness amid increasing geopolitical tensions.

Over the last ten years, Xi has directed a significant transformation of the PLA into a “world-class” military force capable of competing with the US armed forces. A primary objective of this modernization initiative is to prepare China for potential conflict over Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island that Beijing asserts as its territory.

Nevertheless, Miao’s fall from grace reignites concerns—previously highlighted during last summer’s purges—about Xi’s trust in his senior generals who would be tasked with leading military operations, according to Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the Pentagon-funded National Defense University.

“If he is apprehensive that he has appointed individuals who are not entirely loyal to him or his objectives, that would pose a significant issue.”

Analysts suggest that Xi’s removal of a long-time ally reflects a recurring challenge faced by autocrats, including his predecessor Mao Zedong: after eliminating political adversaries, the supreme leader remains vigilant for new threats to their absolute authority—even from within their inner circle.

Corruption at an alarming level

Miao’s association with Xi dates back thirty years. The native of Fujian served as a political officer in the former 31st Group Army from the 1980s until the early 2000s, during which time Xi was advancing his career as a local official and eventually became the provincial governor of Fujian.

“According to reliable sources, Xi frequently visited the 31st Group Army during that period” and is known to have had personal interactions with Miao, stated James Char, a seasoned observer of the PLA and research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Miao’s military trajectory accelerated shortly after Xi assumed power. In 2014, he received a significant promotion to become the political commissar of the PLA Navy, marking a notable transition from a Ground Force career. Three years later, he was elevated again to the Central Military Commission, the highest military authority.

“We cannot identify a more unequivocal supporter of Xi than Miao,” Char remarked. “If Miao is ultimately charged with corruption, it would indicate that Xi himself did not foresee the alarming level of corruption present among PLA elites.”

Over the past 18 months, Xi’s anti-corruption efforts have primarily focused on officials linked to weapon procurement and the Rocket Force, which manages China’s nuclear and conventional missile capabilities. However, Miao’s fall from grace suggests an expansion of this crackdown into new areas, including political operations—described by Xi as the military’s “lifeline”—and the Navy.

“Wherever they investigate, I am confident they will uncover issues and cases. It’s merely a question of which sector they choose to examine,” Char noted.

Loyalists losing trust

The Defense Ministry has not provided any specifics regarding the allegations against Miao.

As the chief political commissar of the PLA, Miao is responsible for ensuring the military’s allegiance to the ruling Communist Party. He oversees promotions within the military, assessing key candidates for their political loyalty—a role he also fulfilled in the Navy.

In previous instances, such positions have been conducive to corruption, particularly in the form of bribery for advancement. Miao’s predecessor, General Zhang Yang, took his own life while facing a disciplinary inquiry related to bribery.

As the competition between the United States and China intensifies, the PLA Navy has experienced a significant surge in the acquisition of warships and other military assets, creating numerous opportunities for corrupt practices, according to Victor Shih, a political science professor at the University of San Diego.

Shih also suggested that another factor contributing to Miao’s fall could be his overt efforts to cultivate a faction within the military.

Xi has consistently cautioned against the emergence of factions within both the party and the military, noting that the only individual permitted to do so is Xi himself, as Shih remarked.

Some analysts perceive Miao as having advocated for several associates within the Navy to receive promotions to critical roles, including Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin and Defense Minister Dong Jun.

The announcement regarding Miao’s investigation followed closely after the Financial Times reported that Dong was under investigation for corruption, as indicated by current and former U.S. officials. The Defense Ministry refuted the claims as “sheer fabrication,” and shortly thereafter, Dong appeared publicly at a security forum.

Wuthnow, an expert at the National Defense University, indicated that Miao’s decline was attributed to a “loss of confidence,” although the underlying causes remain unclear.

In one possible interpretation, Wuthnow suggested that Xi may have perceived Miao as becoming excessively powerful and autonomous, prompting him to eliminate what he regarded as a source of influence that he could not entirely dominate.

“I don’t believe that leaders who are secure in their authority and capability to manage the bureaucracy act in this manner. It seems to me more indicative of weakness, if not paranoia, that he feels compelled to continually disrupt the status quo,” he remarked.

This pattern is recurrent.

Miao’s removal follows closely on the heels of former defense minister Li Shangfu’s ousting from the Central Military Commission (CMC) less than a year ago.

At the start of his unprecedented third term two years ago, Xi had six members in the powerful body, all considered loyalists. Should Miao also be dismissed, it would result in two empty positions.

Shih, a specialist in Chinese elite politics, noted that many dictators, from Joseph Stalin to Mao, have ultimately turned against their own protégés.

“Once all of their genuine rivals are eliminated, a dictator can never think, ‘Now that all threats are gone, I can relax.’ They are always wary of potential new threats, even from those who were once their closest allies. This cycle repeats itself consistently,” he stated.

The dictator is perpetually on the lookout for more nuanced indicators of potential conspiracies against him, stated Shih, the author of “Coalitions of the Weak,” which analyzes Mao’s grip on power during the latter part of his life.

In Mao’s final years, he turned against Lin Biao, his former protégé, who had served as defense minister and was seen as his successor, accusing him of attempting a coup.

“This pattern is likely to intensify as Xi Jinping ages, particularly given that his health is not as strong as it once was. His awareness of possible threats to his authority will sharpen over time,” Shih noted.

Currently, the paramount leader seems resolute in his mission to combat corruption and disloyalty.

Earlier this month, Xi visited the PLA’s Information Support Force accompanied by his four remaining loyalists on the Central Military Commission.

“We must ensure that the troops are completely loyal, entirely pure, and utterly reliable,” Xi emphasized to an audience of attentive officers.