As Bashar al-Assad‘s regime began to disintegrate in Syria, Iranian officials were taken aback as rebel forces swiftly gained ground across the nation in under two weeks, capturing cities with minimal resistance.

An insider from the Iranian establishment reveals that Tehran was unprepared for the rapid collapse of the Syrian army.

The situation worsened when Hezbollah fighters departed Syria to engage in combat against Israel in Lebanon, leaving their numerous checkpoints along the borders with rebel-controlled areas largely unattended by the Syrian military.

“We were unable to provide any support as the airspace was dominated by Israel,” another source close to the Iranian government stated, alluding to the ongoing Israeli airstrikes in Syria that have targeted Iranian and Hezbollah positions in recent months.

Even on the eve of Assad’s downfall, high-ranking officials urged for the protection of sacred sites and attempted to deploy forces for their defense, but these efforts ultimately failed.

As the rebels neared Damascus on December 7, Iranian state television shifted its narrative, beginning to label the rebels as “armed groups” instead of “terrorists,” a term they had used just a day prior.

Following the collapse of Assad’s defenses, Iranian media circulated a report claiming that Tehran had secured assurances from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the primary rebel faction orchestrating the offensive, that the revered Shia shrines in Syria would remain unharmed.

The leak was intended to address the concerns and pressures from the religious community and supporters of the regime. Iranian officials later confirmed the news.

Dissatisfaction with the regime

Responses within Iran were varied.

One faction, primarily composed of religious individuals and fervent supporters of the Islamic Republic, contends that the regime has not taken sufficient action. They argue that it has been misled by the reformist government of President Masoud Pezeshkian into negotiating with the West and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding Assad.

From their perspective, Assad is a crucial player in Iran’s strategy against extremist militant groups and Israel.

Despite the efforts of the HTS, which was previously associated with al-Qaeda, to present a more moderate stance, the group continues to pose an ideological threat.

Conversely, a considerable segment of Iranian society, particularly reformists, views this situation as a necessary yet beneficial development for Iran, as it disrupts the “axis of resistance,” which has faced significant setbacks in Lebanon and has become a burden, contributing to sanctions and heightened tensions with the United States.

A senior reformist journalist, who preferred to remain unnamed, remarked: “Iran has incurred a substantial cost due to its misguided and religious foreign policy.

“Our strategic depth does not lie in Syria or Lebanon. The Islamic Republic places the Islamic Ummah (nation) above national security and interests,” the journalist stated.

According to our national interests, it is prudent to regard nations such as Israel as competitors rather than adversaries. This perspective could alleviate numerous challenges we face. The recent developments in Syria are advantageous, as they may compel the Islamic Republic to reassess its foreign policy regarding the Ummah to some degree.

The Perspective from Iran

There appear to be slight differences of opinion among Iranian leaders. One faction advocates for continued engagement with HTS and emphasizes maintaining a strong diplomatic presence in Syria, while another faction favors the establishment of new proxy groups within the country.

In this context, a former diplomat remarked: “Iran will pursue its objectives in Syria through multiple avenues. It will monitor the actions of the forthcoming government while simultaneously remaining proactive in its connections with various groups and potential resources to further the aims of the Islamic revolution.”

The second faction argues that the new governing body in Syria fundamentally retains a Sunni extremist ideology, fostering animosity towards Iranians and Shia Muslims. They assert that Tehran should assert its influence through proxy and grassroots organizations that oppose the new regime.

In a public address following Assad’s downfall, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated: “Time will reveal that none of them will fulfill their ambitions, and undoubtedly, the occupied regions of Syria will be reclaimed by the courageous youth of Syria.”

Khamenei further asserted, “The agents of arrogance believe that the Resistance Front has been weakened by the collapse of the Syrian government, which was a supporter of the resistance. However, they are profoundly mistaken, as they fundamentally misunderstand the essence of resistance and the Resistance Front.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi highlighted potential opportunities stemming from the dissatisfaction of certain unnamed nations, likely including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which have expressed criticism towards political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood.

“The current political landscape in Syria allows for various outcomes, particularly as some regional states are quite displeased with recent developments. While I won’t specify which countries, I anticipate that we may witness movements from opposing factions, similar to what has occurred in Libya, Sudan, and Lebanon,” stated Iran’s chief diplomat during a state television interview.

In response to a query regarding the supreme leader’s remarks, an Iranian foreign policy analyst aligned with conservative views commented: “Establishing a Syrian resistance group with an anti-Israeli stance, especially given that Israeli forces occupy Syrian territory, presents a significant opportunity for the Islamic Republic and will contribute to the strategy of enhancing resistance. In a potential scenario reminiscent of Libya, the resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon will be revitalized.”

The analyst referenced the Syrian National Defence Forces (NDF), a paramilitary group formed by Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2012, which originally comprised approximately 100,000 fighters.

However, the analyst noted that the force has been diminished and stripped of resources over the years, likely due to President Assad’s attempts to curtail direct Iranian influence, resulting in a reduction of its membership to around 11,000.

“The pressing question now is: what actions will these individuals take?”

What’s next?

Analysts predict that as Iran’s influence wanes, the West may shift its focus towards groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and subsequently target Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

An international relations professor in Tehran, who requested anonymity, stated, “The rise of rebel forces and armed groups opposing Assad in Syria, supported by Turkey, creates a logistical challenge for Hezbollah in Lebanon and resistance factions in Syria.”

He added, “Hezbollah may struggle to sustain its political dominance in Lebanon, and the situation in Syria is likely to expedite this decline.”

The professor further noted, “As Iran’s network of power in Syria diminishes, it is probable that Lebanon will follow suit,” suggesting that the overarching aim of these developments could be an assault on Iran’s nuclear programme.

However, the source cautioned that any military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities might provide grounds for the Iranian leadership to reconsider its fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons. In this context, the perceived existential threat to Tehran could be used to advocate for lifting the restrictions on nuclear weapon development.