Trump and Erdogan have held a phone conversation regarding the future of the F-35

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President Donald Trump recently engaged in a phone call aimed at addressing the ongoing uncertainty regarding Turkey’s involvement in the F-35 fighter jet program, an issue that has strained their NATO alliance.

This conversation was initiated following a series of diplomatic interactions, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s recent visit to Washington, which aimed to tackle Turkey’s exclusion from the program and seek potential paths for resolution.

While the exact timing of the call has not been revealed, it follows previous outreach from Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, who met with Erdogan to establish a foundation for renewed discussions.

Central to their dialogue was Turkey’s request for either reinstatement in the F-35 program or reimbursement for its $1.4 billion investment, which was cut off when the U.S. removed Turkey from the initiative due to its acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defense system.

Sources from Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense suggest that both leaders expressed a willingness to engage in technical discussions, although no definitive agreements have emerged, leaving future actions uncertain.

This recent communication revives a narrative that began years ago with Turkey’s significant involvement in the F-35 program. Initiated in 1999 as a collaborative project led by Lockheed Martin, the Joint Strike Fighter program welcomed Turkey as an early participant, with a commitment to purchase 100 F-35A conventional takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

Turkish companies, including Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and Aselsan, contributed significantly by producing over 900 components, such as fuselage sections and electronic displays. A notable milestone was reached in June 2018 when the first Turkish F-35 was unveiled in Fort Worth, Texas, during a handover ceremony attended by Turkish officials.

The momentum experienced by Turkey in its defense initiatives came to an abrupt halt in July 2019 when the United States suspended Turkey’s involvement following the acquisition of the S-400 system from Russia. American officials, including then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper, expressed concerns that the Russian system could jeopardize the stealth capabilities of the F-35 by gathering sensitive information, a risk considered unacceptable within NATO.

In the following months, the Pentagon redirected six completed F-35 jets intended for Turkey to the U.S. Air Force and halted the training of Turkish pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, effectively ending Turkey’s immediate prospects for the F-35 program.

This expulsion prompted Turkey to shift its strategic focus, particularly accelerating the development of its indigenous KAAN fighter. Launched under the TF-X initiative in 2016, KAAN was developed as a direct response to the F-35 situation, with the goal of modernizing Turkey’s air force and achieving technological self-sufficiency.

Led by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) with support from Britain’s BAE Systems, the twin-engine stealth fighter successfully completed its first flight last February, lasting 13 minutes at a speed of 230 knots and reaching an altitude of 8,000 feet.

Equipped with General Electric F110 engines, which are already utilized in Turkey’s F-16 fleet, KAAN boasts a streamlined design with radar-evading features and an internal weapons bay capable of accommodating both air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions.

Defense Minister Yaşar Güler has set an ambitious production target of two jets per month by 2029, with a long-term vision of developing a domestically produced engine through TRMotor. While Turkish officials present KAAN as a testament to national resilience, analysts express doubts regarding its operational readiness.

Aerospace analyst Richard Aboulafia points out that although the prototype’s flight was successful, achieving full combat readiness may not occur until the late 2030s due to the challenges associated with avionics integration and engine development.

The global F-35 program has progressed without Turkey’s participation. According to the latest data from Lockheed Martin, over 990 aircraft have been delivered across the A, B, and C variants, serving the U.S. military and allies such as South Korea, Canada, and the Netherlands.

Most of the production occurs in Fort Worth, Texas, with additional support from facilities in Cameri, Italy, and Nagoya, Japan. Meanwhile, Turkey’s six F-35As, numbered 18-0001 to 18-0006, remain in the United States, stored at various bases including Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Originally intended for pilot training, these aircraft were reassigned to the U.S. Air Force under a contract modification worth $862 million, finalized in 2020 after a Senate decision two years prior that prevented their transfer to Turkey.

A report from the Turkish newspaper Aydinlik last year indicated that the U.S. has charged Turkey $30 million for technical support of these jets since 2022, emphasizing the necessity of maintaining their advanced systems even while in storage.

Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Daniel Hernandez confirmed this amount in a statement in February 2024, explaining that the costs include software updates and airframe preservation. However, Turkey has not yet made any payments and continues to demand reimbursement for its initial investment.

Examining the details of these Turkish F-35s highlights what Ankara forfeited due to the fallout. Built to the Block 3F standard, they possess full operational capabilities, with software that supports a range of weapons, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile and the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Equipped with Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, these jets generate 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburners, allowing them to exceed speeds of Mach 1.6 and maintain a combat radius of 1,200 miles. Their stealth features are enhanced by a radar-absorbent coating and an airframe designed to minimize detection, along with the AN/APG-81 radar system, which can track targets at long distances.

The cockpit is equipped with a panoramic touchscreen and a helmet-mounted display that projects flight and targeting information, providing pilots with exceptional situational awareness. These systems, designed for compatibility with NATO, would have integrated smoothly with allied networks, strengthening Turkey’s involvement in joint operations. However, this capability has been diminished as the jets are now operated by American crews.

The phone conversation between Erdogan and Trump highlights a larger diplomatic strategy. Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 system, completed in 2019 despite warnings from the U.S., was driven by pressing security concerns due to instability in Syria and Iraq, where missile threats were significant.

With a range of up to 250 miles, the Russian system offered a strong defensive capability, but its introduction raised alarms within NATO about the potential for Russia to use it to analyze Western technology. Attempts to resolve this issue have not succeeded; proposals for Turkey to store the S-400s under U.S. oversight at Incirlik Air Base were met with opposition from Ankara, which regards the system as a matter of national sovereignty.

During Fidan’s visit to Washington, Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland suggested that dismantling the S-400 could pave the way for Turkey’s reinstatement in the F-35 program. Güler expressed optimism about this, indicating that advancements with the KAAN project might encourage the U.S. to consider a compromise. “The Americans recognize that we are making progress,” Güler remarked to reporters, alluding to the leverage gained from Turkey’s domestic developments.

The financial and strategic implications are significant. Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program has cost it an estimated $9 billion in manufacturing revenue, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, while the Pentagon has had to redistribute production responsibilities to other partners.

Congressional attitudes, influenced by the National Defense Authorization Act, are marked by caution, with individuals like Senator Jeanne Shaheen expressing worries about Turkey’s connections to Russia and its position regarding Hamas. Conversely, Kadir Ustun from the SETA Foundation contends that Turkey’s strategic location between Europe and the Middle East renders it essential, advocating for a practical agreement.

The $30 million maintenance fee adds complexity, as Turkey’s refusal to cover this cost reflects deeper grievances over the initial $1.4 billion investment, which it demands be fully reimbursed if the jets remain in the U.S.

Historical context sheds light on the current situation. The rift between the U.S. and Turkey mirrors tensions from the Cold War, such as the 1975 arms embargo following Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus, which was only resolved after extensive negotiations. The current deadlock presents greater risks, particularly as NATO seeks cohesion in the face of Russian aggression and instability in the Middle East.

The introduction of KAAN further complicates matters, potentially decreasing Turkey’s reliance on the F-35, although its development timeline does not align with immediate operational requirements. Aboulafia predicts that even with substantial investment, KAAN will not reach the F-35’s level of readiness for at least 15 years, leaving Turkey dependent on outdated F-16s and F-4s in the meantime—a vulnerability that Erdogan likely discussed with Trump.

The phone call, described by Witkoff as a “transformational” event, suggests a personal rapport that could influence outcomes. Trump’s previous commendations of Erdogan, along with his administration’s focus on negotiation, stand in stark contrast to the sanctions imposed during the Biden administration under CAATSA in December 2020, targeting Turkey’s defense industry.

Upcoming technical discussions are set to evaluate this situation, with Turkey advocating for either the delivery of the jets or a financial exit strategy. The U.S. faces the challenge of maintaining alliance unity while addressing security needs, a balancing act further complicated by domestic political factors. Reintegrating Turkey into the program would necessitate a shift in production and navigating congressional obstacles, a process that Hernandez described as “feasible but complex” during his presentation.

As the situation evolves, the six F-35s currently stored in the U.S. represent the critical stakes involved. Funded by taxpayers, their future—whether they will be piloted by Turkish personnel, sold to other nations, or remain in American facilities—remains uncertain.

Erdogan’s demand for sovereignty conflicts with NATO’s collective principles, yet both parties recognize the importance of repairing their relationship. Güler’s team is optimistic, pointing to Trump’s willingness as a potential opportunity, while Nuland’s stipulations indicate a more stringent approach. At this moment, the phone conversation serves as a cautious initial move, with its results likely to reshape Turkey’s military direction and its role within the Western alliance.