The swift collapse of Assad regime in Damascus took Ankara somewhat by surprise, although it was not entirely unexpected. The Syrian military had shown minimal resistance, and high-ranking Turkish officials had long regarded Assad’s fall as a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the speed of the Syrian government’s disintegration was unforeseen.

Recently, Turkish officials had only authorized a constrained operation by Syrian opposition groups affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to apply pressure on Assad and his Iranian backers. However, they did not foresee the abrupt takeover of Aleppo. This operation was primarily motivated by the ongoing assaults from Syrian government forces on civilian areas in Idlib, which consistently pushed residents toward the Turkish border.

The circumstances were also favorable; Russia was distracted by its conflict in Ukraine, while Hezbollah and Iran were preoccupied with Israel. Furthermore, the United States was undergoing a transition, with President-elect Donald Trump poised to assume office in a month. Ankara was contemplating a limited operation to secure the strategically significant area of Tal Rifaat as HTS initiated its offensive.

What started as a modest operation rapidly transformed into a large-scale campaign, leading to the capture of entire cities within just 11 days. This turn of events has established Ankara as the preeminent power in Syria.

Since the onset of the offensive, Turkey has consistently advocated for dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces, highlighting the importance of maintaining the state’s institutional integrity.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, commonly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, has so far upheld the Syrian government’s administrative structure, including its prime minister and state institutions, while committing to respect all religious groups. He has made gestures towards Russia and permitted Christians and other minorities to remain in cities without harm.

A crucial role for Turkey

Khaled Khoja, the former president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, asserts that Turkey has been instrumental since the beginning of the operation.

“It’s a very sterile revolution, so to say,” Khoja remarked to media. “From the initiation of the operation to local implementations, Turkey’s influence is apparent at every stage.”

In October, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan notably stated that “there would be soon good news” that would enhance the security of Turkey’s southern borders.

Khoja acknowledges the adept efforts of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and other high-ranking officials in successfully involving Russia in the new dynamics of Syria.

He observes that numerous actions taken by Jolani—such as the formation of a transitional government and the advocacy for national peace and reconciliation—reflect ideas that the Syrian opposition has been discussing in workshops with Russian officials for several years.

“Khoja commented that while Jolani operates independently, this initiative clearly indicates a strategic planner working behind the scenes.”

For an extended period, Turkey has sought to moderate HTS, using its influence to control the group. Analysts point out that Jolani’s previously hardline position has gradually softened since the 2017 Astana Agreement, which marked the entry of Turkish forces into Idlib to uphold a ceasefire.

A regional analyst at the SETA think tank in Ankara, stresses that Turkey has incurred significant costs over the years for being the sole regional nation to consistently support the Syrian opposition, both politically and economically.

He identifies two primary objectives for Ankara in Syria: to promote reconciliation among the various Syrian armed opposition factions operating from Idlib to Deir Ezzor and to aid in the formation of an interim government that encompasses all political groups in the country.

He points out that Turkey has already established a governance framework in northern Syria following its military operations against the Islamic State and Kurdish forces.

This framework comprises the Syrian Interim Government, the Syrian National Army, local governance through assemblies, and a cohesive local economy.

He is of the opinion that Turkey can impart its experience to a transitional government in Syria following Assad’s regime. Turkish state institutions are anticipated to play a crucial role in aiding this transitional government shortly.

“Preserving existing institutions is vital, Turkey needs to create a framework to facilitate this process by offering technical expertise and addressing urgent requirements.”

Focus on the SDF

Turk analyst further emphasizes that a transitional government centered in Damascus will need to address critical challenges, including access to energy resources, water supplies, and agricultural lands. He points out that many of these resources are under the control of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria, which has significantly weakened Assad’s authority.

Khoja proposes that HTS might engage in negotiations with the SDF, predominantly composed of Kurdish forces, to secure access to resources like fuel from oil fields near Deir Ezzor.

Turk analyst remarked that Turkey would not accept SDF dominance in key towns within predominantly Arab regions. He indicated that Ankara might consider military actions in the near future to eliminate the SDF, which it views as a terrorist organization due to its connections with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), from border areas, contingent on the prevailing political situation.

A significant challenge facing Turkey is the repatriation of over 3 million Syrian refugees currently living within its territory. Turk analyst estimates that around 55 percent of these individuals originate from the Aleppo area, known for its industrial activities. Recently, Syrian authorities have reported the reopening of factories in Aleppo.

“Logistical routes linking regions such as Tal Rifaat, Gaziantep in Turkey, and Aleppo have been established, promoting economic integration,” analyst stated. “This development could draw investment aimed at facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. However, it is unrealistic to anticipate that all refugees will come back. Some families, having adapted to life in Turkey and learned the language, may opt to remain.”

The process of refugee return is expected to be gradual, shaped by socio-economic conditions and security considerations. A secure environment must be established first, followed by efforts in reconstruction and rehabilitation. Turkey is likely to take a prominent role in coordinating these initiatives.

The remaining Syrian refugees in Turkey mainly come from areas such as Hama, Homs, and Manbij, which were taken by rebel forces during recent conflicts.

There is a widespread agreement that Syria will need significant reconstruction. Khoja points out that estimates from 2017 indicated the necessity to rebuild 2 million homes and restore essential infrastructure, with projected costs reaching as high as $360 billion.

Analysts believes that the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Gulf nations are expected to be major contributors during this reconstruction phase, with Ankara overseeing and leading the efforts.