Fog of Denial: The Rafale Controversy in India Escalates as Western Allies Seek Clarifications

Following a highly embarrassing series of reported aerial losses in the recent conflict with Pakistan, India‘s decision to deny French auditors access to its Rafale fleet has raised significant concerns within the global defense community.

Sources from international defense media and open-source intelligence channels suggest that Dassault Aviation, the French manufacturer of the Rafale fighter jet, sent an investigative audit team to India to assess whether systemic aircraft issues played a role in the alleged shootdowns.

However, reports indicate that the Indian government has obstructed the team’s access to its Rafale squadrons, leading to speculation that New Delhi is concealing deeper operational weaknesses from external examination.

On May 17, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif claimed that his country’s air force had downed six IAF fighters during what has escalated into the most serious military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors in nearly two decades. Earlier statements from Pakistan asserted five additional kills, including three Rafale multirole fighters, one Su-30MKI, and one MiG-29—all reportedly shot down by advanced Chinese-built PL-15E missiles launched from J-10C fighters operated by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

Subsequently, the Prime Minister noted that the sixth Indian fighter aircraft downed was a Mirage 2000, which Pakistan asserts was brought down by PAF fighters during a nighttime operation over Pampore, east of Srinagar, between May 6 and 7. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated, “The much-hyped Rafales have failed catastrophically, and Indian Air Force pilots have proven to be unskilled,” intensifying the psychological and diplomatic aspects of the conflict.

Regional defense sources indicate that the downed aircraft were likely targeted by PAF-operated J-10C or JF-17 Block III fighters, both utilizing the long-range PL-15 BVR missile developed by China’s Airborne Missile Academy.

The J-10C, created by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), represents the forefront of China’s fourth-generation-plus fighter design, while the JF-17 ‘Thunder’—a collaborative effort between CAIG and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)—has become the cost-effective backbone for Islamabad’s multirole air operations.

Reports indicate that some IAF aircraft may have been engaged from standoff distances of up to 182 kilometers, fully leveraging the PL-15’s estimated range of 200–300 km and its AESA radar-guided seeker, which offers a high probability of kill in beyond-visual-range (BVR) scenarios.

The initial air clash between the two rival air forces has been characterized by observers as ‘the largest dogfight of the 21st century,’ involving around 125 fighters from both sides and testing the boundaries of networked warfare, air-to-air missile envelopes, and tactical coordination.

competency of Indian pilots

Analysts believe that PAF’s J-10C fighters may have conducted these engagements while remaining within Pakistani airspace, launching PL-15s at Indian Rafales during the early stages of hostilities, demonstrating a new level of air dominance without infringing on territorial boundaries.

In the background, analysts indicate that India is concerned the French might attribute the reported shortcomings of the Rafale not to the aircraft itself, but rather to the competency of Indian pilots, deficiencies in maintenance, and structural readiness challenges that have affected the Indian Air Force (IAF) for more than a decade.

These concerns are grounded in reality. A critical report from the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, along with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence—published mere months prior to the conflict—verified that the IAF was facing a deficit of 596 pilots, an increase from the 486 reported in 2015. The report also disclosed that efforts to recruit and train an additional 222 pilots between 2016 and 2021 were unsuccessful, exacerbating the IAF’s operational deficiencies.

Further complicating the situation was the inadequate serviceability of India’s Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II trainer fleet, a vital Swiss-built asset for pilot training, with ongoing delays hampering basic readiness. During the Pakistan conflict, the IAF had only 31 operational fighter squadrons—significantly below the 42 squadrons required by Indian military doctrine—leaving the force perilously under-resourced for sustained high-tempo combat.

French defense officials are rightly worried that their aircraft are being unjustly blamed for failures stemming from structural problems within the Indian military framework—especially since Rafales, when utilized correctly with adequate integration, maintenance, and training, have demonstrated their effectiveness in other combat scenarios.

Rafale source code issue

However, the blame has become reciprocal. India, exasperated by persistent limitations, has renewed its public criticism of Dassault’s unwillingness to grant access to the Rafale’s source code—an issue that has persisted since the signing of the $8.7 billion acquisition agreement in 2016. Without this source code, Indian engineers cannot carry out essential software modifications, update mission systems, or incorporate indigenous weaponry without French consent—severely undermining sovereign control over a frontline fighter in a conflict area.

India spent $288 million per Rafale, and they don’t even have access to the source code.🤣

These Indians also claim they can “extract the software” from the burnt out wreckage of a PL-15 missile.

Yet, they can’t even access the core functions of their own Rafale jets. pic.twitter.com/KTdbFkO1QX

— Zhao DaShuai 东北进修🇨🇳 (@zhao_dashuai) May 24, 2025

This lack of access has evolved into more than just a technical complaint; it has transformed into a strategic disadvantage. Critics within Indian defense circles contend that this raises a larger issue regarding whether Western arms suppliers are genuine partners or merely vendors safeguarding proprietary systems at the expense of India’s operational independence. Adding a geopolitical edge to the controversy, Chinese commentators have seized the chance to deride New Delhi’s situation.

After the conflict, during which at least one largely intact PL-15 air-to-air missile was reportedly retrieved by India following an engagement with Pakistan’s Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighters, Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomats took to social media to ridicule the Indian Air Force. “India spent $288 million per Rafale, and they don’t even have access to the source code,” one Chinese official posted on X. “These Indians also assert they can ‘extract the software’ from the charred remains of a PL-15 missile. Yet, they can’t even access the core functionalities of their own Rafale jets?

‼️India’s 🇮🇳 Rafale Dream Faces Digital Roadblock — Pakistan’s🇵🇰 Strategic Edge Highlighted.

India’s desperation for high-end military technology has once again been exposed, as France continues to refuse access to the Rafale fighter jet’s source code, despite persistent… pic.twitter.com/W8yQdjUstd

— Defense Intelligence (@DI313_) May 25, 2025

Although the remark was sharp, it highlighted a changing strategic environment where systems built in China are not only competitive in operations but, in certain instances, surpass their Western counterparts in combat situations. The PL-15, which is said to have been involved in several Rafale shootdowns, stands as China’s leading beyond-visual-range missile, utilizing AESA radar with a projected range of over 200 km. Integrated into Pakistan’s J-10C—an aircraft developed with significant Chinese technical collaboration—the PL-15 provides the Pakistan Air Force with a considerable advantage in first-strike capabilities against Indian aircraft that still depend on older Meteor and MICA systems.

For India, the prospect that Chinese-manufactured jets and missiles could outperform Western-supplied Rafales in combat is not only embarrassing but also poses a strategic threat. For many years, India’s defense procurement strategy has been based on the belief that advanced Western systems would offer a qualitative superiority over adversaries that rely on Chinese and Russian technology. This assumption is now facing a critical reassessment.

Even if the Rafales were not destroyed, the fact that Dassault attempted to conduct an investigation—and that India obstructed it—highlights the growing trust deficit between the manufacturer and the end-user.

This rift has also taken on a political dimension. Opposition parties in India have capitalized on the Rafale issue to revive claims of procurement irregularities, asserting that the aircraft’s combat shortcomings are indicative of deeper flaws in the acquisition process. The Ministry of Defence is now confronted with a troubling reality: the conflict with Pakistan has revealed the Indian Air Force’s fragile readiness, procurement weaknesses, and insufficient operational depth.

High-level discussions are now underway regarding whether future acquisitions should prioritize strengthening domestic capabilities—through local development and technology transfer—rather than depending on Western suppliers who are hesitant to cede control over essential systems.

worldwide ramifications

Beyond India, the ramifications of the war are felt worldwide. For Pakistan, the operational capability of its J-10C fighters equipped with PL-15s signifies a monumental change in regional deterrence, affirming a procurement strategy based on strategic collaboration with Beijing.

For China, the effectiveness of the PL-15 serves as a clear validation of its arms export strategy—affordable, integrated, and increasingly deadly. Meanwhile, for Western aerospace leaders like Dassault, the repercussions are profoundly detrimental. The Rafale, previously promoted as a top-tier multirole platform adept at countering fourth- and fifth-generation threats, now faces scrutiny—not only from adversaries but also from its own clients.

Ultimately, regardless of whether India’s shortcomings were due to training deficiencies, inadequate maintenance, or inherent limitations of the Rafale, the strategic outcome is clear. India did not achieve air superiority in a conflict it thought it was technologically equipped to win.

Consequently, New Delhi must confront a troubling question: was it outclassed by Pakistan’s Chinese-manufactured systems, or was it outwitted by its own excessive confidence and dependence on foreign technology? In any case, India’s airpower strategy requires a significant overhaul.