Iran and Russia have finalized a long-awaited cooperation agreement, solidifying their relationship as both nations confront increasing geopolitical challenges.

The 20-year pact, signed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Friday, enhances military and defense collaboration. It includes a provision ensuring that neither country will permit its territory to be used for actions that could jeopardize the other’s security, nor will they assist any entity that attacks either nation.

Discussions about such an agreement have been ongoing for years, but recent developments have intensified the urgency for its establishment.

For Russia, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has strained its geopolitical influence, while Iran, alongside Moscow, has been dealing with Western sanctions and the repercussions of Israel’s assaults on its regional allies, compounded by the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria earlier this month.

Syria has arguably been a significant factor driving the enhancement of ties, as both nations have lost a crucial ally in al-Assad, diminishing their influence in the broader Middle East.

Ultimately, both Moscow and Tehran have shown a willingness to move beyond their support for al-Assad, having been taken by surprise by the opposition’s advances. They now seem dedicated to fortifying their bilateral relationship.

The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement during Pezeshkian’s official visit to Moscow signifies a notable development.

This agreement not only enhances Russian-Iranian collaboration concerning Ukraine and strategies to circumvent Western sanctions but also supports the North-South Transport Corridor—an initiative promoted by Moscow to streamline trade from Asia to Russia.

This route aims to avoid geopolitical bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal and the Baltic Sea, favoring a land corridor that traverses Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea.

Syria as a catalyst

Before the onset of the Syrian war in 2011, both Moscow and Tehran had established their own strategic alliances with Damascus.

Russia’s partnership was primarily linked to the naval base in Tartous, created in 1971 to extend its influence in the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim airbase, which was constructed in 2015 to support al-Assad against the Syrian opposition. Over time, this airbase has become crucial for Moscow’s operations in Africa.

Conversely, Iran strengthened its ties during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, motivated by a shared opposition to Western intervention in the region. Syria emerged as a vital link to the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah, integral to Iran’s “Shia crescent” and “axis of resistance.”

Iranian and Russian strategic interests aligned in Syria as the conflict evolved, particularly in 2015, when both nations intervened decisively to thwart an opposition victory.

Russia’s military involvement in 2015 helped stabilize President al-Assad’s regime, supported by Iranian-backed militias that were instrumental in shifting the momentum of the war.

“Since then, the relationship between Russia and Iran has broadened,” stated Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, in an interview. “Post-2020, developments in Syria have had a limited effect on Russian-Iranian relations, which have diversified into various new areas.”

These areas encompass military collaboration and an increase in economic partnerships, with Tehran and Moscow striving to circumvent Western sanctions through alternative financial systems and energy agreements. Iran has also emerged as a crucial transit point for Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor, providing an essential trade route to Asia.

The relationship has further strengthened since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, during which Russia has utilized Iranian-supplied drones, motivated by mutual interests in challenging the perceived global dominance of the United States. Both nations are exploring alternatives to the US-led international framework, with Iran perceiving Russia as a key ally in its shift towards the East.

Iran’s accession to the BRICS group of emerging economies in 2023, which already included Russia, can be interpreted as a strategic move towards greater collaboration. BRICS serves as a platform for Iran to pursue membership and align itself with a multipolar economic bloc that resonates with its objectives.

Semenov emphasized that the pursuit of a multipolar world and the need to counter the expansionist ambitions of the United States and the collective West are fundamental to the cooperation between Russia and Iran.

This shared adversarial perspective has fostered a closer relationship between the two nations, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs.

Azizi noted that both countries have made strides to enhance their relationship into a strategic partnership, particularly in military, security, and increasingly economic cooperation, aimed at circumventing sanctions and addressing the adverse effects of Western economic pressures.

Limits to a Russian-Iranian partnership

However, there are limitations to the Russian-Iranian partnership. The cooperation agreement signed recently indicates a strengthening of ties but lacks a mutual defense clause and does not establish a formal alliance, in contrast to the treaty Russia entered into with North Korea last year.

This may highlight the constraints within the Iran-Russia relationship, which have already been evident in Syria, where both nations struggled to find common ground and often undermined each other’s efforts in the reconstruction of the war-torn country.

In 2017, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin asserted that Russia would be the sole nation responsible for the reconstruction of Syria’s energy sector. Meanwhile, Iran, eager to capitalize on the reconstruction opportunities, found itself sidelined by both al-Assad and Moscow, with one Iranian parliament member cautioning that Iran was being “sacrificed.”

The evolving Syrian administration could also highlight differences between Russia and Iran, as Moscow is likely to adopt a more accommodating stance.

Azizi pointed out that the implications of al-Assad’s potential downfall for both Russia and Iran will hinge on various factors, including “whether there has been any covert agreement or understanding between Russia and the US, Turkiye, and the former Syrian rebels, as part of a broader deal encompassing Syria and Ukraine.”

He further explained that if Russia can retain its military installations in Syria, even in a diminished role, and if a resolution to the Ukraine conflict is reached following the inauguration of [US President-elect] Donald Trump, Russia might find itself less reliant on Iranian support in both Syria and Ukraine. However, Azizi expressed skepticism about any significant shifts in Iran-Russia relations, citing the “growing depth of cooperation” observed in recent years.

Divergence may also occur in various other domains, particularly regarding nuclear weapons, which the West has accused Iran of pursuing. Officially, Iran’s defense doctrine rejects the development of nuclear arms; however, certain factions within the country have recently advocated for a shift in this stance following Israel’s significant actions against its allies, notably Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Historically, Russia has played a role in Iran’s nuclear initiatives, including the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power facility, but it has often hindered progress during the 2000s and 2010s, leading some Iranian officials to label Russia as an unreliable ally. Additionally, Moscow postponed the delivery of the S-300 missile defense system from 2010 to 2016 due to sanctions imposed on Tehran by Western countries.

“Russia is not inclined to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, as this would disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East to Russia’s detriment. Ideally, Russia prefers Iran to remain under sanctions while it confronts the US and Europe regarding its nuclear ambitions,” stated Armin Montazeri, foreign policy editor at Hammihan Daily in Tehran.

“Should Russia engage in efforts to contain Iran, it would likely demand concessions from the US concerning the Ukraine situation,” Montazeri further noted.

Evolving Alliances in the Middle East

Geopolitical landscapes are subject to change based on real-time developments, as evidenced by the situation in Syria. The absence of strong ideological ties beyond a shared anti-US sentiment could lead to a deterioration of relations between Iran and Russia.

The shifting nature of alliances is illustrated by Turkiye’s stance, which opposes Iran and Russia while simultaneously cooperating with them.

In December 2024, as the Assad regime faced collapse, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Russia met on the sidelines of the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The tripartite meeting was held as part of the Astana process, a diplomatic effort focused on addressing the Syrian conflict, with Russia and Iran acting as guarantors for the regime and Turkiye representing the opposition.

Astana provided a platform for these three nations to collaborate on security objectives in Syria, despite their support for opposing factions. However, throughout much of this process, Turkiye found itself in a relatively weaker position, particularly in light of what was perceived as al-Assad’s effective victory in the conflict.

This dynamic has shifted, as Turkiye’s enduring backing of the former opposition now positions it as a significant player in relation to Iran and Russia, allowing it to exert influence over Damascus.

Omer Ozkizilcik, director of Turkish Studies at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies in Istanbul, noted that this new reality necessitates adaptation from all parties involved.

“Iran, while clearly at a disadvantage, will need to recalibrate its approach and forge some type of relationship with Syria’s new government,” Ozkizilcik stated, highlighting the extensive freedom granted to Iran by the Assad regime to operate within Syrian borders.

Meanwhile, Russia, while aiming to maintain its military presence in Syria, is also diversifying its strategy by engaging more with Libya, where it has established a close relationship with the eastern government in Benghazi, evidenced by multiple flights of Russian cargo planes to its al-Khadim base.

Conversely, Iran appears to be consolidating its position in Iraq, reportedly urging its allies there to cease rocket and drone attacks on Israel, which may have provoked US-Israeli strikes against their positions.

In this context, Iran is likely to strengthen its influence in Iraq, which Montazeri describes as “the last pillars of Iran’s axis of resistance.”

Iraq currently plays a crucial role as a financial asset and a defensive shield for Tehran, which depends on the nation for economic assistance in light of ongoing sanctions.

Seyed Emamian, co-founder of the Governance and Policy think tank in Tehran, noted that Iran has a track record of adjusting to evolving geopolitical circumstances and is likely to endure any shifts while preserving its ties with Russia.

Regardless of the agreements that may arise between Russia and the US after Trump’s inauguration, Iran’s leadership does not anticipate a significant change in Putin’s strategic approach towards Iran.

“Putin is acutely aware of the anti-Russian sentiments prevalent within the US and European institutions,” Emamian stated.

“Over the past three years, Russia has confronted what it views as a fundamental threat from the West … it appears improbable that Putin would jeopardize his long-standing alliances, particularly with those who have demonstrated their loyalty during critical times, such as in Syria and Crimea,” Emamian further remarked.