A controversial report from a US think tank suggests that China is not prepared for war, asserting that the primary aim of the ruling Communist Party’s extensive military modernization efforts is to maintain its authority rather than to engage in conflict abroad.

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, Beijing has embarked on a significant military expansion, transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a relatively weak force in Asia to one that is now considered to rival, and in some areas even surpass, the capabilities of the US military, according to analysts.

US defense simulations have consistently indicated that the US, recognized as the world’s most powerful military, would face considerable challenges in confronting the PLA in a conflict near China’s coastline, particularly regarding Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory.

However, a recent report from the RAND Corporation, based in Washington, contends that despite the PLA’s impressive growth, political factors—especially the Communist Party’s need to maintain control over military forces and Chinese society—could hinder the PLA’s effectiveness in combat, particularly against a formidable opponent like the US.

Timothy Heath, a seasoned expert on China at RAND, noted in the report titled “The Chinese military’s doubtful combat readiness” that “the PLA remains fundamentally focused on upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule rather than preparing for war.”

Heath further emphasized that the advancements in China’s military capabilities are primarily aimed at enhancing the legitimacy and appeal of CCP governance, which makes the likelihood of war less probable. He pointed out that one instance of political priorities interfering with military training is the PLA dedicating up to 40% of its training time to political education.

Heath expressed concerns regarding the time investment required to master essential combat skills, suggesting it raises doubts about the PLA’s readiness for modern warfare. He pointed out that PLA units are not only commanded by military officers but also by political commissars, whose emphasis on party loyalty may detract from combat effectiveness.

He noted that this dual command structure could hinder commanders’ ability to respond swiftly and adaptively to unforeseen circumstances. He characterized the likelihood of a conventional war between the US and China as a “remote possibility,” urging Pentagon strategists to consider a broader spectrum of Chinese threats beyond just missiles and bombs.

However, some analysts dismissed his assertions, arguing that Xi has clearly prioritized the military objective of asserting control over Taiwan, even if it requires military action. They indicated that the PLA’s expansion suggests China is preparing for such an eventuality, despite internal governance challenges.

Andrew Erickson, a strategy professor at the US Naval War College, remarked that there are simpler and less risky methods to enhance party security than the extensive military capabilities Xi is actively developing.

John Culver, a former US intelligence officer focused on East Asia, also expressed skepticism about the report’s conclusions. He stated that while war may not be the primary plan, it remains a viable option if circumstances necessitate, and the PLA’s capabilities are robust and continually improving.

Weapons and advancing technology

China has made significant strides in military development since Xi implemented comprehensive reforms a decade ago. The country’s aggressive shipbuilding initiative has resulted in the largest navy in the world, capable of operating further from its coastlines, including from its inaugural overseas military base in Djibouti. Additionally, advancements in stealth technology and hypersonic weaponry, along with the transformation of vast desert areas into missile silo fields, underscore China’s military progress.

Heath raised concerns about the effectiveness of Beijing’s new military arsenal in actual combat situations.

His report highlighted that history has consistently demonstrated that advanced military equipment does not always translate into success on the battlefield, referencing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as a recent example where a better-equipped military has not achieved victory.

Critics of Heath’s analysis argue that it is misguided to assume the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shares the same vulnerabilities.

“Xi has consistently undertaken challenging military reforms aimed at enhancing realistic combat capabilities, imposing some of the most rigorous standards on China’s military,” stated Erickson from the US Naval War College.

He pointed out that China is not only increasing the quantity of its arsenal— with Pentagon estimates suggesting an annual growth of approximately 100 nuclear warheads— but is also advancing its technology, particularly through ambitious hypersonic weapon projects.

The human element

There is widespread agreement that the PLA has significantly improved both the quantity and quality of its weaponry. A prime example is its fleet of warships, particularly the Type 055 destroyer, which many analysts regard as the most formidable surface combatant globally.

The PLA Navy launched its tenth Type 055 last year, with projections of up to six additional vessels in the near future, each requiring a crew of around 300 sailors.

Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, remarked that constructing advanced warships may be less challenging than staffing them. Modern naval vessels require young sailors capable of handling intricate tasks, which necessitates comprehensive training.

“The military can likely integrate individuals from rural areas who may have limited education and train them to become infantry soldiers. However, training someone to operate and maintain the systems in a warship’s combat information center, launch missiles, and ensure their upkeep demands a higher level of expertise,” Koh explained.

At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faces another significant issue: corruption. A Pentagon report from December highlighted that a broad anticorruption initiative within the upper echelons of the Chinese military and government is hindering Xi Jinping’s defense expansion efforts.

“A senior US defense official noted in December that this issue has been recognized as a substantial threat to the political reliability and, ultimately, the operational effectiveness of the PLA,” he stated.

Understanding Chinese military preparedness

When experts discuss the readiness of the Chinese military, attention often shifts to Taiwan. US intelligence assessments indicate that Xi has instructed the PLA to be prepared for a potential invasion of the island by 2027, if deemed necessary.

However, Heath contends that despite this directive from the Chinese leader, he and other senior party officials have not made a significant effort to prepare the Chinese populace for military engagement.

“Chinese leaders have not delivered speeches that glorify war, promote it, or depict it as unavoidable or desirable,” Heath noted, adding that “the Chinese military has yet to release any analysis on how it might occupy and govern Taiwan.”

Some experts warn against interpreting Beijing’s motives through a Western lens, emphasizing that Xi’s definition of success regarding Taiwan remains unclear.

The extent of the pain that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese society could endure to seize the island is known only to those in Beijing, they argue.

“We must consider the possibility of Beijing employing force in a manner that aligns with its political objectives,” Koh stated.

This force could manifest as a blockade aimed at suffocating the island without direct conflict. It might involve sufficient airstrikes to demonstrate to Taipei and its allies that China possesses the advantage in any potential cross-strait confrontation. Alternatively, it could escalate to a full-scale invasion and occupation.

Another possibility is the continuation of Beijing’s persistent political pressure, coupled with the near-constant presence of the PLA around Taiwan, which includes numerous warplanes and naval vessels. Analysts suggest that this strategy has proven effective for the Communist Party thus far.

So, what is the rationale behind the significant investment in new military capabilities?

“China’s military modernization efforts are not intended to facilitate a military takeover of Taiwan. Rather, they are aimed at enabling the PLA to more effectively fulfill its enduring mission of maintaining the authority of the Chinese Communist Party,” Heath noted.

New warships and stealth fighter jets captivate the public’s attention, facilitating societal control, according to him.

Drew Thompson, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, concurred with this observation. “In politics, propaganda takes precedence over military outcomes,” he stated.

However, Koh emphasized that the advancements of the PLA under Xi should not be dismissed as merely a domestic narrative.

“Despite the acknowledged challenges within China and the PLA, I believe no military strategist in the region would regard the PLA as a mere paper tiger,” he remarked.

Thompson also noted that the PLA poses a significant threat to both Taiwan and the United States.

“China has the capability to initiate a conflict and engage in it. The question remains: can they achieve victory? How do we define what victory means?” Thompson inquired.

“Is it a zero-sum game, or is it merely a series of compromises?”