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Philippines urges ASEAN and China to address complex issues regarding the South China Sea code

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The ASEAN regional bloc and China need to make progress on the long-standing code of conduct for the South China Sea by addressing critical “milestone issues,” such as its scope and the potential for it to be legally binding, according to the Philippines‘ foreign minister on Saturday.

The South China Sea continues to be a point of contention between China and its neighboring countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Relations between Beijing and Manila, a U.S. ally, have deteriorated significantly, with frequent confrontations raising concerns about the possibility of conflict.

In 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China committed to developing a code of conduct, but it took 15 years to initiate discussions, and progress has been sluggish. In an interview prior to a meeting with his ASEAN counterparts on the Malaysian island of Langkawi, Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo stated that while discussions on the code are progressing, it is crucial to begin addressing the more complex and significant issues.

“It is essential that we focus on topics that have not been thoroughly discussed or negotiated,” Manalo remarked to Reuters. These topics include the code’s scope, its legal binding status, and its implications for third-party nations. He emphasized the goal of creating a code that is both effective and substantive. “We must start tackling these critical issues,” Manalo concluded. “This could be the best approach to advance the negotiations.”

Beijing asserts its sovereignty over a significant portion of the South China Sea, a claim it supports with a fleet of coast guard and fishing militia. Some neighboring countries have accused these forces of aggressive actions that disrupt fishing and energy operations within their exclusive economic zones. China maintains that its activities are lawful within its territory and rejects the 2016 arbitration ruling that deemed its claims to be unfounded under international law.

U.S. INTERESTS REMAIN STRONG

Manalo noted that as President-elect Donald Trump prepares to assume office, there are no indications that the United States will reconsider its involvement in Southeast Asia. “We have not observed any signs of a reduction or significant change,” he stated. “We must wait for the new administration to take charge. However, based on current observations, U.S. interests remain intact.”

He also highlighted that the ongoing civil conflict in military-led Myanmar poses a significant challenge for ASEAN, which has excluded the military leaders from meetings due to their failure to implement the organization’s peace plan. The junta intends to conduct elections this year, but many opponents are either barred from participating or have chosen not to run.

Manalo expressed that it is too early to determine whether ASEAN will set preconditions for recognizing the elections, which he believes should involve broad participation from the populace. “If elections occur without being perceived as inclusive and transparent, it would be challenging for them to gain legitimacy,” he remarked.

Trump claims credit for the Gaza ceasefire; will he succeed in its implementation?

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Protesters outside Israeli Defence Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv call on President-elect Donald Trump to end the war in Gaza.

Donald Trump successfully brokered a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, but the challenges ahead for the President-elect will be unprecedented, as he must enforce this agreement in a region eager to reignite hostilities and face a resolute Hamas.

Analysts suggest that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s recent acceptance of the ceasefire is partly motivated by his desire to establish a positive relationship with Trump, who enjoys significant popularity in Israel.

Trump has indicated a willingness to support Netanyahu on issues such as the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and arms sales. He has appointed Mike Huckabee, a staunch advocate for West Bank annexation who has famously stated that “there is no such thing as a settlement,” as his ambassador to Israel.

During a Senate hearing this week, Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, hinted that the new administration might lift sanctions imposed by the Biden administration last year on Israeli settlers and challenge the International Criminal Court regarding its genocide case against Israel.

William Usher, a former senior Middle East analyst at the CIA, noted in an interview, “I believe one of the reasons Netanyahu agreed to the deal was Trump’s desire for Israel to accept it. It’s likely that Netanyahu is looking for some last-minute concessions from Trump, such as approval for continued settlement expansion.”

The initial stage of the ceasefire is clear-cut and generally well-received in Israel, meaning it will not necessitate significant encouragement from Trump. This phase stipulates that Hamas must release 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel liberating approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.

Trump will take advantage of the compelling visuals of hostages being freed coinciding with his inauguration on January 20. The comparison to Ronald Reagan’s inauguration in 1981, when Iran released embassy hostages, will resonate with the American public.

However, the initial goodwill is expected to diminish after six weeks, as Hamas and Israel will enter discussions for the second phase of the ceasefire.

The negotiations for the second phase are a far more delicate and contentious issue in Israel, as they involve the release of the remaining 65 hostages, including male Israeli soldiers, a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the establishment of a permanent ceasefire.

Hamas and Arab intermediaries are advocating for the release of Marwan Barghouti, a well-known Palestinian leader, during this phase, a demand that Israel strongly opposed during the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner swap.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already facing the loss of one coalition member due to his agreement to the ceasefire, and more may follow if he adheres to the conditions that call for a definitive conclusion to the conflict.

Israeli media has reported that to secure the backing of far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, Netanyahu has committed to maintaining military operations in Gaza.

If Trump aims to maintain stability in the Gaza Strip during his presidency while focusing on his “America First” domestic agenda, alongside resolving the conflict in Ukraine and addressing challenges posed by China, he may face challenges with Netanyahu.

Trump has already expressed frustration over the delays in the ceasefire approval from Israel’s cabinet, suggesting that Hamas reneged on certain aspects of the agreement.

“We shook hands, and we signed certain documents, but it better be done,” Trump stated in a podcast on Thursday. He has taken a proactive role in the ceasefire negotiations, announcing it as “EPIC” ahead of both Arab mediators and the Biden administration.

On Friday, Israel’s security cabinet ratified the agreement.

Arab mediators and regional officials are now questioning how Trump will uphold the ceasefire he has claimed responsibility for. While he has various incentives and pressures at his disposal, each faces limitations due to domestic and international policy considerations.

“Trump will regret owning this deal. It will either fail or succeed under his leadership, and it cannot rely solely on incentives,” remarked Aron David Miller, a former Middle East negotiator for both Republican and Democratic administrations, in an interview.

Trump 2.0

Trump’s return to the White House has already raised expectations in Israel.

A current US intelligence official said that individuals within the security establishment close to Netanyahu are considering the annexation of the Jordan Valley in the occupied West Bank, citing “security concerns.” This move could be strategically aligned with Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the valley.

The Jordan Valley borders the Jordan River, which acts as a boundary between the occupied West Bank and Jordan. This area is known for its fertility and potential for development.

Approximately 90 percent of the valley falls under Area C, indicating it is fully controlled by Israeli security forces, in contrast to Area A, where the Palestinian Authority is responsible for policing and administration.

This situation presents a challenge for Trump. While he may attempt to maintain Israel’s position in the ceasefire, he has already addressed the more straightforward issues during his previous term.

The United States acknowledged Israel’s annexation of the occupied Golan Heights and relocated its embassy to Jerusalem.

“This is not the same as Trump 1.0, where he took unilateral actions that had little effect on broader Middle Eastern policies. Those were isolated measures. Trump 2.0 is significantly more complex, as he will face pressure regarding the annexation of the West Bank and support for a potential Iranian nuclear strike,” Miller stated.

Additionally, Trump has shared videos on social media featuring economist Jeffrey Sachs, who criticized Netanyahu as a “deep, dark son of a bitch” for involving the US in “endless wars.”

Transition officials informed that Trump is preparing to intensify sanctions enforcement against Iran, and his usual nominees have adopted a tough stance on the Islamic Republic.

Nevertheless, Trump’s closest advisors have indicated a willingness to negotiate a deal.

Reports suggest that Elon Musk met with Iran’s ambassador to the UN.

Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, mentioned that they aim to address tensions surrounding Tehran’s nuclear program through diplomatic means.

Trump’s Retaliation?

Trump has already removed the Gaza ceasefire from his agenda.

If maintaining Netanyahu’s involvement in the agreement requires the annexation of the occupied West Bank, it could jeopardize his ambition to further the Abraham Accords and secure a Nobel Peace Prize.

“We will persist in promoting PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH across the region, leveraging the momentum from this ceasefire to broaden the Historic Abraham Accords,” Trump stated on Wednesday, referencing the 2020 normalization agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco.

The Biden administration attempted, but ultimately failed, to expand the Abraham Accords by including Saudi Arabia. The attack by Hamas on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, complicated these efforts. Riyadh has indicated that it requires tangible steps toward establishing a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for normalization.

Should Israel proceed with the annexation of significant portions of the occupied West Bank, it would complicate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s commitment. He must consider whether his citizens will accept normalization with a nation he has publicly accused of “genocide.”

Trump’s leverage to ensure Netanyahu’s compliance in the agreement is the same tactic Biden opted not to employ during 15 months of conflict: the suspension of arms transfers.

Analysts suggest that, given Trump’s backing from evangelical Christians and pro-Israel lobbying groups, such a scenario is improbable.

Trump publicly clashed with Netanyahu following the latter’s acknowledgment of Biden’s election win, expressing his discontent by stating, “Fuck him (Netanyahu)” in response to the congratulations extended to his rival.

Currently, Netanyahu must navigate his position as Israel’s prime minister after agreeing to a ceasefire. Far-right minister Ben Gvir has indicated he will resign once the agreement is ratified, while Smotrich has threatened to step down if hostilities do not resume after the initial phase. Should these threats materialize, Netanyahu could be left with a minority government or be compelled to call for new elections.

The ultimate irony for Trump lies in the fact that the agreement he pressured Netanyahu into accepting now jeopardizes his own political future.

Delegation from Taiwan is set to extend its warmest congratulations at Trump’s inauguration

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The leader of Taiwan‘s delegation attending Donald Trump‘s inauguration as U.S. president next week stated on Saturday that he aims to convey the island’s “highest blessings” to the United States. Taiwan, which China considers part of its territory, received significant backing from the previous Trump administration, including the regularization of arms sales that have persisted under President Joe Biden. However, Trump’s campaign remarks about Taiwan needing to pay for its defense caused some concern in Taipei.

Han Kuo-yu, the speaker of Taiwan’s parliament and a prominent member of the opposition Kuomintang party who ran for president in 2020, expressed at Taoyuan airport before departing for Washington that many foreign leaders were also en route despite the forecast of heavy snowfall. “All members of our delegation are bringing this enthusiasm to the United States to represent our 23 million citizens, and we extend our highest blessings to the U.S. presidential team and the American people,” he stated.

Han is joined by a bipartisan group of seven other lawmakers. The Chinese delegation is headed by Vice President Han Zheng, and President Xi Jinping spoke with Trump on Friday, addressing various issues, including Taiwan. Han’s party typically advocates for strong relations and dialogue with China, while denying any pro-Beijing stance. The United States, like most nations, does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan but is legally obligated to provide the island with defensive support.

In recent years, China has intensified its military pressure on Taiwan and has refused to engage with President Lai Ching-te, labeling him a “separatist.” Lai, who disputes China’s claims of sovereignty, has faced rejection of his overtures for dialogue. During a meeting late on Friday with Mike Pence, Trump’s vice president during his first term, Lai emphasized that in light of China’s threats and its growing ties with nations like Russia, democracies must collaborate closely.

Lai expressed to Pence that a strengthened partnership between Taiwan and the United States will enhance their collective ability to uphold global peace and stability.

A Historical Perspective: The Joint Strategy of India and Israel to Target Pakistan’s Nuclear Installations

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In early 1984, reports led Pakistani authorities to believe that India, in collaboration with Israel, had devised a plan to dismantle Pakistan‘s emerging nuclear research facility in Kahuta. It was alleged that India and Israel had instilled fears regarding Pakistan’s development of an “Islamic” bomb, which could potentially be utilized by a Muslim nation or even a terrorist group, posing a threat to global security. Amidst domestic political challenges, this situation represented an unprecedented emergency for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s nuclear program commenced in earnest in 1975, following India’s first nuclear test in Pokhran. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto recruited nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan from the Almelo Uranium Enrichment Facility in the Netherlands, tasking him with initiating a similar nuclear initiative for Pakistan.

Initially, Bhutto assigned Dr. Khan to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), which was then led by Munir Ahmad. However, due to differing viewpoints between Khan and Ahmad, no significant advancements were achieved that year.

The prime minister sought to accelerate progress significantly. In July 1976, Dr. Khan was appointed to an independent role with the responsibility of developing a uranium enrichment program. Bhutto’s declaration during this period still echoes in the halls of authority: “Pakistanis would eat grass but they will make their bomb.” From that point on, Dr. Khan would report directly to the prime minister.

With Bhutto’s strong support, Dr. Khan initiated the establishment of the Engineering Research Laboratories in Kahuta. The project commenced on July 31, 1976, and within five years, it reached completion. On May 1, 1981, in acknowledgment of his contributions, the facility was renamed Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory.

However, was the facility adequately protected against foreign threats?

It soon became evident that safeguarding Kahuta was a critical concern after the Pakistani government recognized the vulnerability of its most sensitive site.

In 1979, as concerns grew about a potential Indian strike on the Kahuta research facility, Chief Martial Law Administrator General Ziaul Haq consulted Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Anwar Shamim about enhancing security measures. The assessment was disheartening: “The Indian aircraft can reach the facility in three minutes, while the PAF would take eight minutes,” the air chief noted, “[This will] enable the Indians to attack and retreat before the PAF can respond.”

Given Kahuta’s proximity to the Pakistan-India border, it was determined that the most effective deterrent against an Indian assault would be to enhance air defense capabilities and acquire advanced fighter jets and armaments. Should India proceed with an attack on Kahuta, the new aircraft could facilitate a counterstrike against India’s nuclear research facilities in Trombay. The generals concluded that the F-16 Fighting Falcon would be the most appropriate aircraft for this mission.

In typical circumstances, Pakistan may not have acquired these advanced aircraft; however, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan enabled Pakistan to enhance its ties with the United States for its own advantage. As part of the support extended to Pakistan, the U.S. proposed $400 million in aid. General Zia outright dismissed the initial tranche, labeling it as “peanuts” and inadequate in light of the expenses Pakistan was incurring due to the conflict.

The year 1983 commenced with a significant development, as the U.S. began supplying military equipment to Pakistan. Initially, the U.S. offered F-5Es and 5-Gs, which Pakistan declined. Subsequently, the U.S. agreed to sell F-16s, culminating in a deal signed in December 1981 for 40 F-16 fighter jets. The first three F-16s arrived in Pakistan on January 15, 1983.

Concurrently, a new chapter in Indo-Israeli relations was unfolding, marked by extensive cooperation across various sectors. Israel aimed to dismantle Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, similar to its actions in Osiraq, Iraq, in 1981. In their 2007 book, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Conspiracy, investigative journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark reveal that Indian military officials covertly visited Israel in February 1983 to procure equipment designed to neutralize the air defenses at Kahuta.

The agreement reached between India and Israel established a strategic operation: Israel would launch an assault on Kahuta from Indian military bases, with Levy and Clark asserting that Indira Gandhi approved the Israeli-led initiative in March 1984. As tensions escalated, both nations were compelled to withdraw after the US State Department cautioned India that “the US will be responsive if India persists.”

However, this withdrawal was not solely due to American pressure; Pakistan also communicated through various global channels that any Indian strike on its nuclear facility in Kahuta would result in a retaliatory attack on the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay, with the potential for far greater destruction.

Air Marshal M. Anwar Shamim, in his memoirs titled Cutting Edge PAF: A Former Air Chief’s Reminiscences of a Developing Air Force (2010), recounted that while discussions regarding the India-Israel alliance were ongoing, he urged Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan to publicly declare Pakistan’s intent to retaliate if any actions were taken against its nuclear facilities.

During this period, Munir Hussain, who was the secretary of science and technology at the time, warned his Indian counterpart at a scientific conference that India would face catastrophic consequences if it proceeded with such an attack. The Indian delegate responded, “No brother, we know your capability and we will not undertake such a mission.”

Perhaps the most significant communication came from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, stating that Islamabad would target Mumbai if Kahuta were attacked. This threat of retaliation served as a crucial and effective deterrent.

In 1979, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin wrote Margaret Thatcher about the Pakistan’s nuclear program

In the late 1970s, Pakistan recognized that Israel perceived its nuclear program as a significant threat. Concerns about a potential Israeli strike were heightened by specific attacks carried out between 1979 and 1981 against suppliers of AQ Khan in Europe, which the Pakistani government reasonably suspected were orchestrated by the Israeli Mossad. In 1979, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin initiated a letter-writing campaign aimed at persuading Western leaders to take action against Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. One notable letter from May 1979, directed to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and now available in the NPIHP Digital Archive, emphasized that “to the people of Israel this could, one day, become a mortal danger.” Begin warned Thatcher about the implications of Pakistan’s collaboration with Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, highlighting the potential risks to the Middle East and the safety of Israeli citizens if such destructive weapons were to fall into the hands of an authoritarian leader like Qaddafi. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, was unimpressed and viewed Begin’s correspondence as a chance to address Israel’s own nuclear capabilities, reminding the Israeli government of their responsibility in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.

Concerns in Pakistan regarding a potential Israeli assault intensified following Israel’s successful operation against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility on June 7, 1981. The Pakistani leadership interpreted this incident as a clear indication that, while the United States might overlook a covert nuclear initiative like Iraq’s, Israel would not. In his book “Eating Grass,” former Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan elaborates on the apprehensions in Pakistan about a possible coordinated attack by Israel and India on the Kahuta nuclear site during the mid-1980s. Researchers Levy and Scott-Clark note that in 1984, the United States alerted Pakistan to the threat of an Indian-Israeli strike on Kahuta. They cite General K.M. Arif, Pakistan’s vice chief of army staff, who confirmed, “Our friends [the Americans] informed us of the intentions of the Israelis and Indians, and we communicated our response to them…”

The 1984 American alert regarding Pakistan was part of a broader context. Encouraged by Pakistan’s commitment to refrain from nuclear testing, the Reagan administration extended various leniencies towards Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions throughout the 1980s. Or Rabinowitz, in his book, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, Explained how the Reagan administration opted to overlook Pakistan’s nuclear activities.

Israel contemplated initiating preemptive strikes on Pakistan’s nuclear installations

The Israeli military contemplated initiating preemptive strikes on Pakistan’s nuclear installations. The Israeli High Command authorized a plan for the Israeli Air Force to target the nuclear facilities in Kahuta, and the military reportedly constructed a detailed replica of these facilities in the Negev Desert, utilizing satellite imagery for Israeli pilots to conduct practice runs of the attacks. Initially, Israel aimed to execute the strike in collaboration with India; however, this proposal was declined by Delhi, leaving Tel Aviv to navigate the potential political repercussions independently. In the absence of direct Indian backing, Israel sought at least to secure landing and refueling permissions to facilitate the operation from Indian bases, but this request was also denied by Delhi, significantly complicating the Israeli mission.

In 2025, it is anticipated that global conflicts will escalate rather than be settled

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Forecasting the future of international relations is inherently fraught with uncertainty. Historical evidence indicates that even the most assured predictions can prove inaccurate. For example, the Pentagon‘s last publication on ‘Soviet Military Power’ appeared in 1991, coinciding with the dissolution of the USSR. Likewise, a 1988 scenario from the RAND Corporation envisioned a nuclear conflict involving the Soviet Union and Pakistan over Afghanistan in 2004. Despite this, the instinct to foresee future developments is both natural and essential. The following is not a prediction but rather an effort to delineate plausible expectations for the global landscape in 2025.

Ukraine

The initiative by US President Donald Trump to broker a ceasefire along the frontlines in Ukraine is likely to be unsuccessful. The American strategy to “end the war” overlooks Russia‘s security interests and fails to address the fundamental issues at the heart of the conflict. Concurrently, the peace terms proposed by President Vladimir Putin in June 2024 will remain unacceptable to Washington, as they would effectively require Kiev to surrender and signify a strategic loss for the West.

Consequently, hostilities are expected to persist. In reaction to the dismissal of his proposal, a frustrated Trump will likely impose further sanctions on Moscow. However, he will refrain from any significant escalation that could provoke a Russian attack on NATO forces. Despite the strong anti-Russian sentiment, US assistance to Ukraine is anticipated to diminish, placing a greater burden on Western European countries. While the EU may be willing to intervene, the quality and extent of Western support for Ukraine are expected to decline.

On the battlefield, the momentum is likely to continue favoring Russia. Russian military forces are anticipated to drive Ukraine out of critical areas, including Donbass, Zaporozhye, and portions of the Kursk Region. In response, Ukraine will enlist younger, less experienced recruits to attempt to hinder Russia’s progress, although this approach is expected to yield limited results. Additionally, Kiev will increasingly depend on surprise tactics, such as border incursions and symbolic strikes deep within Russian territory, aiming to undermine the morale of the Russian populace.

On the domestic front, the United States and its allies may advocate for elections in Ukraine, seeking to replace Vladimir Zelensky—whose term ended last year—with General Valery Zaluzhny. While this political change could temporarily bolster Kiev’s leadership, it will not resolve the fundamental issues of economic decline and worsening living conditions faced by ordinary Ukrainians.

United States

Even with a peaceful transition of power, Trump’s second term is likely to be marked by ongoing tensions. The threat of assassination attempts will persist. Trump’s foreign policy, which is expected to be more pragmatic than Biden’s ideological approach, will include the following strategies:

  • Maintain NATO’s unity while insisting on increased financial contributions from European allies.
  •  Transfer a significant portion of the financial burden for Ukraine to the European Union.
  • Heighten economic pressure on China, exploiting its vulnerabilities to secure unfavorable trade agreements.

Trump is expected to closely align with Israel, backing its initiatives against Iran. With Tehran already in a weakened state, it will encounter stringent conditions regarding a nuclear agreement, and a refusal could lead to US military action against Iranian nuclear sites.

In 2025, Trump may meet with Putin, but this will not indicate an improvement in US-Russia relations. The rivalry between the two nations is likely to remain profound and persistent. Trump’s approach will focus on maintaining America’s global supremacy, often shifting the responsibilities of US commitments onto allies and partners, which may not serve their best interests.

Western Europe

European countries, cautious about Trump’s potential return, will eventually conform to his leadership. The EU’s reliance on the US for military and political guidance will intensify, even as European economies continue to contribute to the American financial landscape. Over the last thirty years, Western European leaders have evolved from national representatives to components of a transnational political framework centered in Washington. True advocates for national interests, such as Alternative for Germany and France’s Rassemblement National, continue to be sidelined politically.

Russophobia will persist as a unifying element in Western European politics. Contrary to common assumptions, this sentiment is not merely a product of US influence but is actively adopted by EU and UK leaders as a means of fostering unity. The Russian military actions in Ukraine have been portrayed as the initial phase of a perceived Russian effort to “capture Europe.”

In 2025, Germany’s newly formed coalition government will take an even firmer position against Moscow. However, concerns about a direct military confrontation with Russia will dissuade other European nations from sending troops to Ukraine. Instead, Western Europe will brace for a renewed Cold War, increasing military expenditures, ramping up production, and strengthening NATO’s eastern defenses.

Dissent within Europe is expected to be stifled. Political adversaries of the confrontational stance towards Russia will be labeled as “Putin’s useful idiots” or even as direct agents of Moscow. Hungary and Slovakia will continue to diverge in their relations with Russia, but their impact on EU policy will be minimal.

Middle East

Following notable military successes in 2024, Israel, supported by the United States, will seek to solidify its advancements against Iran. The strategy employed by the US and Israel will involve coordinated pressure, including military actions against Iranian proxies such as the Yemeni Houthis, alongside efforts to strengthen relationships with Gulf Arab monarchies under the Abraham Accords.

Although Russia entered into a treaty with Iran in January 2025, this agreement does not compel Moscow to take military action if Tehran is attacked. Therefore, a large-scale conflict in the Middle East involving both Russia and the US is unlikely. Internally, Iran is facing instability as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, now 86 years old, approaches the twilight of his leadership.

Russia’s influence in the Middle East is set to decline as its military presence decreases. Nevertheless, maintaining logistical routes connecting Russia to Africa will continue to be a strategic focus.

East Asia

Tensions between the US and China are anticipated to escalate, driven by American initiatives aimed at containing China’s economic and technological growth. The United States will bolster alliances in Asia, particularly with Taiwan and the Philippines, to counteract Beijing’s influence. While the possibility of armed conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea exists, it is deemed unlikely to occur in 2025.

The partnership between Russia and China is expected to strengthen, although it will not evolve into a formal military alliance. From a Western viewpoint, this collaboration will increasingly appear as an anti-American coalition. Together, Russia and China will work to challenge US global supremacy across geopolitical, military, and economic domains.

Russia’s immediate sphere of influence

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is anticipated to secure another term in January 2025, further solidifying his partnership with Moscow. Concurrently, Russia aims to enhance its relations with Kazakhstan, although the absence of a strong vision for Eurasian integration from Moscow may pose challenges.

The year 2025 is likely to be characterized by strategic volatility, persistent conflicts, and increased geopolitical tensions. Global stability is still a distant goal.

Russian, Iranian presidents sign strategic partnership treaty

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian engaged in discussions in Moscow on Friday, prior to the anticipated signing of a strategic partnership treaty that aims to enhance defense collaboration, a development that may raise concerns in the West.

During his inaugural visit to the Kremlin since assuming the presidency last July, Pezeshkian expressed optimism about the potential to finalize an agreement for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran with assistance from Russia.

Putin welcomed Pezeshkian in an impressive Kremlin chamber, where they convened at an elaborately decorated table adorned with the flags of both nations. “We will explore all facets of our cooperation and formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement,” Putin stated. “This has been a long-term effort, and I am delighted that we have reached this stage,” he added, noting that the agreement is expected to enhance trade and economic relations.

Since the onset of the Ukraine conflict, Moscow has strengthened its relationships with Iran and other nations perceived as adversarial to the U.S., including North Korea. It has already established strategic agreements with Pyongyang and its close ally Belarus, as well as a partnership with China. The forthcoming 20-year agreement between Russia and Iran is not anticipated to feature a mutual defense clause similar to those established with Minsk and Pyongyang; however, it is likely to be viewed with apprehension by the West, which regards both nations as negative forces on the global stage.

Moscow and Tehran assert that their growing partnership is not aimed at opposing other nations. Russia has extensively utilized Iranian drones in the conflict in Ukraine, and in September, the United States accused Tehran of supplying short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for deployment against Ukraine, a claim that Tehran refutes.

While the Kremlin has not confirmed the receipt of Iranian missiles, it has acknowledged that its collaboration with Iran encompasses “the most sensitive areas.” Historically, Russia has provided Iran with S-300 air defense missile systems, and there have been reports in Iranian media regarding interest in acquiring more advanced systems like the S-400, as well as advanced Russian fighter jets.

Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow coincides with a period of diminishing Iranian influence in the Middle East, following the rise of Islamist rebels in Syria who have ousted ally Bashar al-Assad, and the significant military actions by Israel against Iran-backed Hamas in Gaza. Additionally, Israel has dealt substantial blows to Hezbollah, which is also supported by Tehran.

Russia is also facing challenges in Syria, where it operates two key military facilities vital to its geopolitical and military presence in the region and Africa, but their future is now uncertain under the new Syrian leadership.

Putin met with Pezeshkian during the BRICS summit in Kazan in October and again at a cultural forum in Turkmenistan that same month. Pezeshkian, who had discussions with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin prior to meeting Putin, is accompanied by his oil minister, and it is expected that they will address Western sanctions on the oil sector and strategies to navigate them. Mishustin noted that both countries are actively working to enhance cooperation in transport, energy, education, tourism, and cultural domains.

Trump stated that he had conversations with China’s Xi regarding trade, fentanyl, and TikTok

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U.S. President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping shake hands before their bilateral meeting during the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump stated on Friday that he had a conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping regarding trade, fentanyl, and TikTok, describing the call as “very beneficial for both China and the United States.”

Russian oil tankers that are still being constructed have been included in the U.S. sanctions

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A bronze seal for the Department of the Treasury is shown at the U.S. Treasury building in Washington, U.S.,

Six oil tankers currently under construction at Russia‘s Zvezda shipyard have been included in the U.S. sanctions announced last week. This marks the first instance where Washington has imposed sanctions on tankers prior to their launch or the transportation of any sanctioned cargo.

The recent sanctions led to an increase in oil prices and a rise in tanker shipping costs, as the outgoing Biden administration aimed to undermine Russia’s oil exports and obstruct Moscow’s efforts to develop its own shipping fleet.

A review by Reuters indicated that the six tankers at Zvezda are part of a broader list of 183 vessels affected by the sanctions. The tankers include the Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Alexander Beggrov, the Alexey Bogolyubov, and three unnamed vessels: Zvezda 131080, Zvezda 131060, and Zvezda 131040.

According to the sanctions documentation, Russia’s Sovcomflot is the purchaser of the Alexander Beggrov and the Alexey Bogolyubov, while Rosneft’s shipping subsidiary, Rosnefteflot, is acquiring the remaining four tankers. Both entities are also subject to U.S. sanctions.

Requests for comments from Rosneft and the shipyard’s representative went unanswered. The ministry of transport and Sovcomflot also declined to provide comments. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control did not respond immediately to inquiries for comment.

These sanctions are aimed at disrupting the so-called “shadow fleet” that Russia has utilized to circumvent a price cap established by the G7 nations in late 2022, which prohibits insurance and shipping services from Western providers for Russian oil sold at prices exceeding $60 per barrel.

Imposing sanctions on ships that are still under construction could complicate Russia’s ability to justify the expenses associated with their completion, according to an industry insider involved in Russian oil trading.

Following the sanctions, Russia is anticipated to experience a tanker shortage for its oil exports, as over 60% of the oil tankers recorded have recently docked at Russian ports, according to shipping data analyzed by Reuters.

This deficit in available vessels for Russian oil has already resulted in a significant increase in global freight rates. Zvezda, founded in 2015, stands as a prominent Russian shipyard and is the sole facility in the country capable of constructing large-capacity oil and gas vessels. This shipyard was also impacted by the U.S. sanctions imposed last week.

France’s Macron calls on Israel to expedite its withdrawal from Lebanon

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French President Emmanuel Macron urged Israel on Friday to expedite its troop withdrawal from southern Lebanon, as the deadline for this pullout approaches in accordance with the ceasefire agreement that concluded last year’s conflict with Hezbollah.

During his visit to Beirut, Macron emphasized the necessity for Lebanon’s military to maintain a complete monopoly on arms and expressed France’s commitment to enhancing the deployment of the Lebanese army in the southern region.

“We require a full withdrawal of the Israeli forces,” Macron stated, standing alongside Lebanon’s newly elected president, Joseph Aoun, who previously served as the commander of the Lebanese military. “We advocate for the strengthening of the Lebanese armed forces and their presence in the southern part of the country,” he added. “The Lebanese armed forces are essential to Lebanon’s sovereignty.”
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Macron is the first foreign leader to visit Beirut following Aoun’s election by the Lebanese parliament on January 9, marking a significant shift in the nation’s power dynamics after the war that considerably weakened Iran-backed Hezbollah. The ceasefire, effective from November 27 and facilitated by the United States and France, mandates the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon within 60 days, alongside the removal of all Hezbollah fighters and weapons from the area.

Lithuania plans to raise its defence budget to 5-6% of GDP due to security threats from Russia

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Lithuania has declared its intention to raise defence spending to between 5% and 6% of GDP starting in 2026, a move prompted by concerns over potential Russian aggression in the region, as stated by President Gitanas Nausėda on Friday.

The decision, described as “historic,” was made by the State Defence Council and aims to achieve this spending level from 2026 to 2030.

Nausėda emphasized the ongoing risk of Russian military action, noting that while it is not immediate, there is a need for enhanced defence and deterrence efforts. He highlighted the importance of allocating more resources to these initiatives during a press conference in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.

Currently, Lithuania, a member of both NATO and the EU, allocates just over 3% of its GDP to defence. Achieving the 5% target would position Lithuania as the NATO member with the highest defence spending relative to GDP, surpassing Poland, which currently spends over 4% and is expected to near 5% by year-end.

This announcement follows remarks from US President-elect Donald Trump, who recently urged NATO allies to increase their defence expenditures to 5% of GDP, a target that no member currently meets, up from the existing 2% guideline.

Nigerians express outrage over yet another fatal airstrike targeting civilians

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In Tungar Kara, a town in northwestern Nigeria, residents expressed their support and offered prayers for local vigilantes preparing to confront an armed gang in a nearby forest last Saturday. However, before the vigilantes could embark on their mission, an airstrike conducted by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) struck the town. While the NAF claimed the strike was aimed at the armed group, local residents reported that 15 civilians, including members of the vigilante group and innocent bystanders, lost their lives.

The military has increasingly resorted to aerial attacks in response to the escalating threat posed by armed criminal gangs, referred to as bandits, in Nigeria’s northwest and central regions. These gangs are notorious for killing villagers and executing mass kidnappings. However, this military campaign is reportedly inflicting significant harm on Nigerian civilians and diminishing their support for the armed forces, according to residents and analysts.

Salihu Usman, a vigilante responsible for safeguarding the town, recounted his experience during the airstrike. He was praying when he heard a jet overhead, followed by a deafening explosion that left him injured on the ground.

“Now, whenever I see a military aircraft flying during the day, I perceive it as a threat to my life,” Usman stated, describing severe injuries, including a partially ripped open stomach and various lacerations. “Bandits kill us, and the military bombed us from the sky.” The NAF has not responded to inquiries from Reuters but issued a statement on Monday denying any intention to target civilians and promising to investigate the airstrike on Tungar Kara, located in the remote Zamfara state.

Haliru Attahiru, a 30-year-old farmer, expressed skepticism regarding the airstrike, asserting that it could not have been an accident. “How is it possible to bomb a town while ignoring the forest where the bandits are located?” he remarked during a phone interview with Reuters.

In December, an airstrike in the neighboring Sokoto state resulted in the deaths of 10 individuals, an incident the state governor described as a tragic error targeting civilians. This event is part of a troubling trend of lethal aerial assaults by the military, which have led to civilian casualties, a topic highlighted in a special report by Reuters in June 2023.

Oluwole Ojewale, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, noted, “If the community realizes that they are not being protected from the bandits and are instead becoming collateral damage due to the air force’s operations, their support for the military will likely diminish.”

Usman, who narrowly escaped a similar situation, has decided not to return to his vigilante group. He now harbors distrust towards the military and questions the legitimacy of the airstrike, stating, “I even suspect they may have colluded to harm us,” as he conveyed to Reuters.

Germany’s Scholz expects U.S. support for Ukraine to continue under Trump

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German Chancellor Olaf Scholz

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on Friday that he does not anticipate the United States will cease military assistance to Ukraine following the inauguration of President-elect Donald Trump on January 20. During a press conference in Berlin, Scholz mentioned that he has had two conversations with Trump since the election and emphasized the ongoing “intensive” diplomatic discussions between the two parties.

“We can therefore be optimistic that the collaboration between Europe and the United States will continue to thrive in the future, particularly regarding support for Ukraine,” he remarked.

“As such, I do not foresee the U.S. halting its support for Ukraine’s defense.”

Hamas is expected to release its first group of hostages under the Gaza ceasefire agreement, according to Israel

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Supporters and family members of hostages kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas, hold lit torches during a protest ahead of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Hamas is anticipated to release the first hostages as part of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza on Sunday, according to a statement from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s office on Friday. If the ceasefire is successfully implemented, it would bring an end to the ongoing conflict that has devastated much of densely populated Gaza, resulting in over 46,000 fatalities and displacing the majority of the enclave’s pre-war population of 2.3 million, as reported by local authorities.

The Israeli cabinet is scheduled to convene to provide final approval for the ceasefire agreement with Hamas and the subsequent release of hostages, following concerns that the implementation of the accord might face delays.

Meanwhile, in Gaza, Israeli airstrikes continued unabated, with the Civil Emergency Service reporting on Friday that at least 101 individuals, including 58 women and children, have lost their lives since the announcement of the deal.

Amid visible divisions among ministers, Israel postponed meetings that were anticipated on Thursday, during which the cabinet was expected to vote on the agreement, attributing the delay to Hamas. Hamas has expressed its commitment to the deal.

However, in the early hours of Friday, Netanyahu’s office indicated that approval was imminent, with the restricted security cabinet set to meet before a full cabinet session later to ratify the agreement. “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was informed by the negotiating team that agreements have been reached on a deal to release the hostages,” his office stated.

Russia is alarmed by the potential involvement of British military forces in Ukraine under a new century-long agreement

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Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov

Russia expressed concern on Friday regarding the potential deployment of British military assets in Ukraine as part of a new century-long partnership agreement between Kyiv and London. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov addressed inquiries about the possibility of the UK establishing military bases in Ukraine, following the announcement made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

Peskov remarked, “As Britain is a NATO member, the expansion of its military infrastructure towards our borders is certainly a significant concern. We will need to further assess the implications of this development.” During discussions in Kyiv on Thursday, Zelenskiy mentioned his conversation with Starmer about Ukraine’s interest in having Western peacekeeping forces deployed in the country if the conflict with Russia were to conclude.

When asked about the UK’s potential contribution of troops, Starmer indicated in an interview with Sky News that he had engaged in discussions with Zelenskiy and other allies, affirming that Britain would “play our full part.” Peskov also conveyed Moscow’s unfavorable stance regarding British collaboration with Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, which he referred to as Russia’s “internal sea.” The Azov Sea is bordered by southwestern Russia, regions of southern Ukraine currently under Russian control, and the Crimean peninsula, which was annexed by Moscow from Ukraine in 2014.

Ukraine’s air force intercepted and destroyed 33 Russian drones overnight

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Firefighters work at a site of a building damaged during a Russian drone strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv region, Ukraine.

Ukrainian air defense forces successfully intercepted 33 out of 50 drones launched by Russia overnight, according to a statement from the air force on Friday. The report indicated that 9 drones were “lost,” referring to Ukraine‘s electronic warfare tactics that redirected some Russian drones, while one drone veered off towards Romania.

The military noted that hostile attack drones struck facilities in the Odesa region, and the debris from downed enemy drones caused damage to buildings belonging to institutions, private businesses, and residences in the Kharkiv, Cherkasy, and Kyiv regions, as communicated via the Telegram messaging platform.

Additionally, port infrastructure in the Danube region was targeted during the assault. A regional official from Kyiv reported that a child sustained injuries due to falling debris from the intercepted drones during the incident.

Russia claims to have regained 63.2% of the territory previously seized by Ukraine in the Kursk region

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Russian military forces have reclaimed 63.2% of the territory that was previously taken by Ukraine in the Kursk region of western Russia, according to a statement from the Russian defense ministry released on Friday.

The ministry reported that Russia successfully regained control of four settlements during the initial two weeks of January. Ukrainian forces launched an unexpected incursion across the border on August 6 of the previous year, capturing a significant area that provides Kyiv with a strategic advantage in any future negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict.

Philippine Navy conducts drills close to contested shoal during ongoing tensions with China

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The Philippine Navy announced on Friday that its vessels were conducting exercises near a disputed shoal in the South China Sea, following an agreement between Manila and Beijing to explore avenues for cooperation despite ongoing tensions.

The drills, centered around the Scarborough Shoal—one of the most contentious regions in Asia—aimed to bolster the navy’s ability to protect what it identifies as Philippine waters and maintain the nation’s territorial integrity, according to a navy statement.

Characterized as a “routine unilateral exercise,” the operation involved the Antonio Luna frigate along with two additional patrol ships within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The exercises are scheduled to occur from January 17 to 19.

These drills coincide with ongoing radio challenges from the Philippine Coast Guard regarding the presence of China’s largest coast guard vessel at the shoal, which the Philippines claims is conducting illegal patrols within its EEZ.

The coast guard emphasized in a statement late Thursday that if China is genuinely interested in reducing tensions and building mutual trust and cooperation, it must acknowledge the Philippines’ sovereign rights within its exclusive economic zone.

As of Friday, China’s embassy in Manila had not provided a response to requests for comment. China’s extensive territorial claims in this vital maritime trade route overlap with the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

A ruling from an international arbitral tribunal in 2016 determined that Beijing’s claims, which rely on historical maps, lack legal foundation under international law, a verdict that China rejects.

In the 10th round of discussions held on Thursday as part of a bilateral framework aimed at addressing South China Sea concerns, both China and the Philippines agreed to enhance communication and strengthen dialogue, while also addressing recent confrontations between them.

Additionally, they committed to promoting cooperation between their coast guards and in marine scientific research, while emphasizing the importance of resolving disputes through peaceful means.

Global conflicts emerge as the primary threat as the elite convenes in Davos amidst a divided world

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People walk next to the logo of World Economic Forum (WEF) on the first day of the annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland,.

Armed conflict has emerged as the foremost risk for 2025, according to a survey released by the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Wednesday. This finding underscores the increasing global fragmentation as government and business leaders prepare for their annual meeting in Davos next week.

Nearly 25% of over 900 experts from academia, business, and policy-making identified conflict, including wars and terrorism, as the most significant threat to economic growth in the coming year.

Extreme weather, which was the primary concern in 2024, ranks as the second most pressing danger. WEF Managing Director Mirek Dusek emphasized in a statement accompanying the report that in a world characterized by growing divides and interconnected risks, global leaders face a critical choice: to promote collaboration and resilience or to confront escalating instability. “The stakes have never been higher,” he stated.

The WEF event is set to commence on January 20, with Donald Trump, who will be inaugurated as the 47th president of the United States, scheduled to address the gathering virtually on January 23. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is also expected to attend and deliver a speech on January 21, as confirmed by WEF organizers.

Advisers to Trump have acknowledged that the conflict in Ukraine may take months or longer to resolve, presenting a stark contrast to his commitment to negotiate a peace deal on his first day in office, as reported by Reuters.

Other notable global leaders attending the Davos meeting include European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang. The gathering will also focus on the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the ongoing crisis in Syria, and the potential escalation of conflicts in the Middle East, according to WEF President and CEO Borge Brende.

Negotiators were finalizing the last aspects of a potential ceasefire in Gaza on Wednesday, following extensive discussions in Qatar. According to a recent survey, the threat of misinformation and disinformation was identified as the most significant global risk for the next two years, maintaining the same ranking as in 2024.

Over a decade-long perspective, environmental threats were highlighted as the primary concern among experts. The survey indicated that extreme weather events ranked as the foremost long-term global risk, followed by biodiversity loss, critical alterations to Earth’s systems, and a depletion of natural resources.

Last year, global temperatures surpassed 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels for the first time, bringing the world closer to violating the commitments made by governments under the 2015 Paris climate agreement.

The survey defines a global risk as a situation that could adversely impact a substantial portion of global GDP, population, or natural resources. Experts were consulted in September and October. A significant majority of respondents, 64%, anticipate that a multipolar and fragmented global order will continue.

Iranian president has arrived in Moscow to sign a treaty with Putin, according to TASS

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Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during a plenary session in the outreach/BRICS Plus format at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Moscow on Friday to engage in discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and to finalize a strategic partnership treaty between the two nations, as reported by Russia’s TASS state news agency.

This marks Pezeshkian’s inaugural visit to the Kremlin since he assumed the presidency last July, following the tragic death of his predecessor in a helicopter accident. During his meeting with Putin, the agenda will center on enhancing bilateral relations and addressing international matters prior to the treaty’s signing.

In the wake of the Ukraine conflict, Russia has strengthened its relationships with Iran and other nations perceived as adversarial to the U.S., including North Korea. It has established strategic agreements with Pyongyang, its close ally Belarus, and has a partnership with China.

The 20-year agreement between Russia and Iran, which encompasses provisions for enhanced defense collaboration, is likely to raise concerns in the West, which views both nations as negative forces on the global stage.

Both Moscow and Tehran assert that their deepening relationship is not aimed at opposing other countries. Russia has extensively utilized Iranian drones in the Ukraine conflict, and the U.S. accused Tehran in September of supplying short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for deployment against Ukraine, a claim that Tehran refutes. While the Kremlin has not confirmed the receipt of Iranian missiles, it has acknowledged that its collaboration with Iran spans “the most sensitive areas.”

Putin engaged with Pezeshkian during a BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, in October, as well as at a cultural forum in Turkmenistan later that month. Pezeshkian is in Moscow with his oil minister, and discussions are expected to focus on the impact of Western sanctions on the oil sector.

Challenges in resolving the India-China border dispute continue despite an agreement

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This week, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Indian Army, stated that India “does not anticipate any disarmament” during the winter months. He further indicated that the relationship between India and China remains characterized by “a certain degree of confrontation,” describing the border situation as “stable yet sensitive.” Despite a border agreement reached in October of the previous year, analysts suggest that deep-seated mistrust and divergent strategic objectives will complicate any efforts to resolve the ongoing issues.

During his Senate confirmation hearing on January 15, Senator Marco Rubio, nominated by President-elect Donald Trump for the position of Secretary of State, pledged to maintain geopolitical competition with China, labeling it “the most powerful, most dangerous, and near-peer adversary we have.” For India, a key strategic ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, the threat posed by Beijing is immediate.

Border Tensions

The unresolved border disputes between China and India have historically fueled tensions, culminating in the 1962 war and various skirmishes over the last sixty years.

The Indian government reported that the status quo along the Sino-Indian border shifted in June 2020 when Chinese forces crossed into Indian territory at several points, resulting in violent confrontations in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayas. This incident led to the deaths of twenty Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese soldiers, marking the first fatalities on the Sino-Indian border in 45 years.

Both nations mobilized thousands of troops armed with heavy weaponry to strengthen their positions, resulting in a prolonged and tense standoff that persisted for over four years.

“The situation is relatively stable, yet not normal”

On October 21 of the previous year, India and China reached an agreement to disengage at two sites, Depsang and Demchok, within the eastern Ladakh region along the extensive 2,100-mile border.

This agreement emerged from four years of rigorous negotiations between the two nations, culminating in the successful disengagement at all points of contention.

Ashok Kantha, who served as India’s ambassador to China from 2014 to 2016 and participated in discussions regarding the border, echoed the sentiments of the Indian army chief, stating, “this is not a normal situation.”

He remarked to VOA in New Delhi that while the disengagement has led to a degree of stability and both sides are exercising greater caution in their patrols, the situation has not reverted to normalcy. Thus, it remains relatively stable, but not normal.

Shortly after the border agreement was signed last October, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi engaged in discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Both leaders underscored the significance of maintaining peace in the border area and committed to enhancing stability in their bilateral relations.

In December, the two countries convened their first special representatives meeting on the border dispute in five years. Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval visited Beijing to confer with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, where they emphasized the necessity of “effective border management” while seeking “fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solutions.”

The minutes from the meeting on the Chinese side emphasized the importance of mending relations in key areas such as trade, cross-border interactions, and cultural exchanges.

A lack of trust contributes to uncertainty in addressing border disputes.

Analysts, however, contend that the border issue will continue to be a significant factor in the overall relationship, with its resolution complicated by mutual distrust.

Daniel S. Markey, a senior adviser for South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, asserts that the recent warming of relations does not indicate that “the two sides have regained a deeper trust in each other,” noting that from a geopolitical standpoint, they remain “very wary of each other.”

Dr. Jabin Thomas Jacob, an associate professor at Shiv Nadar University in New Delhi, points out that there is “a high level of distrust in India regarding China’s intentions.”

“Although China has previously signed bilateral agreements, they have often been ignored or violated over time,” he stated in an interview.

Beijing has consistently accused India of breaching bilateral agreements while asserting its claim over contested territories.

India’s three-step approach

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the two nations entered into a series of agreements aimed at peacefully resolving border disputes.

In its discussions with China, the Indian government has adopted a three-step approach to address the border issue: disengagement, de-escalation, and the removal of provocations.

Disengagement entails withdrawing troops while resuming border patrols; de-escalation involves pulling back soldiers from points of contention; and the final step focuses on eliminating triggers, where both parties agree on troop and weapon deployments or jointly decide to withdraw forces entirely.

Disengagement has only been successfully implemented in a limited number of areas, while in other regions, buffer zones have been created as a provisional solution.

Kanta, a former Indian ambassador to China, asserts that these buffer zones “align with our actual control” and “represent a shift in the status quo.”

Jacob from Shiv Nadar University concurs.

“The standoff in various locations has only been temporarily addressed through a buffer zone arrangement without any patrolling. This situation cannot be sustained for India, as it implies that China is achieving its goals through inappropriate actions,” he remarked.

Markey from the US Institute of Peace emphasized that although India typically follows a three-step approach, China appears to be “more flexible in its stance.”

“Beijing may have different preferences for the new normal at the border and is, in my opinion, unlikely to agree to India’s conditions for eliminating incentives,” he noted.

China’s strategic considerations

Ambassador Kanta suggests that the divergence in perspectives arises from Beijing’s strategic aim of asserting its “dominance in the region,” which conflicts with India’s goal of promoting multipolarity in Asia and globally.

“China perceives India merely as a regional power. It is unwilling to grant India any special status. Previously, they were more mindful of our sensitivities, but that is no longer the case,” he stated.

He further mentioned that India’s strengthening relationship with the United States has also provoked Beijing.

“China increasingly interprets its relationship with India through the lens of strategic rivalry with the United States.”

Markey asserts that China’s gray zone operations along the Indian border align with its overall strategy in the region, which encompasses the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific maritime area.

He anticipates that China will not alter its approach moving forward. “The leadership in Beijing continues to recognize the strategic and political advantages of exerting pressure on India at the border,” he noted.