East Asia poses the most significant threat to global peace, with potential conflicts here being more intense and larger in scale than any that could arise in the Middle East or Europe.
In contrast to its challenges in Afghanistan and a mixed performance in Ukraine and the Middle East, the Biden administration has established a robust diplomatic legacy in Asia. It has created a network of security alliances aimed at deterring China and has achieved what has long been elusive: a rapprochement, if not a warm friendship, between historical rivals and key U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan.
Significant challenges await Joe Biden’s successor in this region. The magnitude of military forces positioned against one another in the northern Pacific is alarming. China is deepening its alliances with American adversaries, including North Korea and Russia, while making aggressive threats toward Taiwan and asserting stronger territorial claims in the South China Sea. The United States’ actions in other geopolitical arenas, particularly in Ukraine, will have repercussions in East Asia.
Despite the current circumstances, the strategy of the next U.S. administration is constrained by historical tensions. Japan and South Korea, both possessing formidable military capabilities—Japan recently initiating a significant military expansion—are burdened by longstanding disputes from the last century, which render their partnership precarious. It remains uncertain whether this alliance can endure, even as the threats compelling them to unite become increasingly severe.
Beyond the hills surrounding Seoul lies the most militarized area globally. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separates this dynamic capital from a nuclear-armed North Korea, governed by an unpredictable leader, which weighs heavily on the minds of Koreans.
The perspective from Tokyo, just a short flight across the Sea of Japan, is equally concerning these days.
Russian military aircraft have been repeatedly violating the airspace along the country’s northwestern coast, highlighting the ongoing territorial dispute between Tokyo and Moscow over the Kuril Islands, which has persisted for nearly 80 years and leaves both nations in a technical state of war. Additionally, China contests Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands to the south. In a notable first, Chinese military planes entered Japanese airspace in August. Furthermore, in September, Chinese and Russian naval vessels conducted joint exercises near Japanese waters. North Korea also regards Japan as an adversary, occasionally launching missiles over Japanese territory.
Japan is currently confronted by threats from North Korea, Russia, and China, creating a challenging security landscape, as noted by Minoru Kihara, Japan’s former defense minister, in a recent interview in Tokyo. He expressed a heightened sense of urgency given the frequency of these incidents occurring in such a short timeframe.
The conflict in Ukraine has had significant repercussions in Asia. Following Vladimir Putin’s invasion, Xi Jinping provided strong support for him against a united NATO, turning the European conflict into a litmus test for China’s aspirations as a superpower. Kihara emphasized that Japan is closely monitoring the growing alliance between China and Russia. The situation in Ukraine has also strengthened ties between Moscow and North Korea, with Kim Jong Un reportedly dispatching thousands of troops to assist in the conflict in exchange for military technology and other benefits.
” drinking buddies”
The term “drinking buddies” refers to the complex trilateral relationship involving Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, which the United States has worked diligently to cultivate over the years.
Despite being bound by mutual defense treaties that date back more than 70 years and sharing common adversaries, South Korea and Japan have historically maintained a strained relationship. The legacy of Japan’s occupation of Korea during World War II, which included forced labor and sexual exploitation, has left deep scars. Although Japan has issued apologies and provided reparations, the issue remains a sensitive topic, contributing to ongoing political and military tensions.
Retired Admiral Jim Stavridis, who commanded a squadron of guided missile destroyers in the 1990s, recounted that during joint military exercises, it was necessary to keep Japanese and South Korean ships at a distance to avoid conflicts akin to “road rage” on the sea. This situation is reminiscent of a hypothetical scenario where France and Germany remained at odds post-World War II, which would have hindered the establishment of NATO or the European Union.
The Xi era in China has significantly influenced Japan’s perspective on security, with the situation in Ukraine serving as a recent catalyst for change.
Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who resigned this autumn, expanded on a phrase popularized by his foreign minister: “First Ukraine, then Taiwan.” This statement implies that the conflict in Ukraine could foreshadow similar tensions in East Asia, with Kishida noting, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” China, as Russia’s primary ally, is currently the only nation openly contesting the U.S.-led global order and possesses the capability to challenge it.
In response, Japan has announced plans to increase its defense budget from 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP by 2027. Since 2022, the budget has already risen by over 40 percent. Japan’s constitution permits only self-defense, leading to a historical neglect of military capabilities. However, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated a shift in the 2010s, enhancing Japan’s naval strength and modernizing its arsenal. Once the current expansion plans are fully implemented, Japan is projected to become the third-largest defense spender globally, following the U.S. and China, while Germany is scaling back its own defense spending initiatives.
Despite significant expenditures, Kihara, the former defense minister, noted that “China is surpassing Japan in defense budget increases and has four times our resources.” He emphasized the challenges Japan faces in addressing the threat from China independently.
South Korea emerges as a natural ally for Japan. Prime Minister Kishida expressed a willingness to strengthen ties, recognizing the necessity of allies to counter China’s influence. This shift was facilitated by the presidential election in March 2022, shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, which resulted in Yoon Suk Yeol assuming the presidency in Seoul.
In South Korea, political power alternates between left and right every five to ten years. The left typically advocates for reconciliation with North Korea and harbors animosity towards Japan. In contrast, Yoon, representing the right, adopted a more assertive stance and brought with him a genuine appreciation for Japan, rooted in his father’s experiences studying and teaching there.
Yoon had his first opportunity to engage with Kishida at the NATO summit in Madrid in July of that year. A former Korean official present at the meeting recalled, “Yoon embraced him,” which surprised Kishida. While Yoon is known for his outgoing nature, Kishida is more reserved. “Asian leaders typically don’t embrace unless they are communists,” the official noted.
What began as an awkward encounter evolved into a camaraderie that the former official described as akin to “drinking buddies.”
The United States had been seeking such an opportunity for years. Kurt Campbell, the deputy secretary of State, advocated for a strategy of rapprochement from Washington. This led to numerous trilateral meetings where the U.S. took a step back, allowing the other parties to engage in dialogue, as noted by Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo.
The situation is complex. Meetings between Korean and Japanese ministers on a one-on-one basis are quite rare. In fact, Korea’s defense minister had not visited Tokyo for 15 years prior to this July. If the Japanese defense chief travels to Seoul next year as scheduled, it will mark the first such visit in nine years. The United States is required to act as a mediator and advisor for both nations.
“History is history, brother,” Emanuel remarked. “It evokes strong emotions and influences psychological perspectives.”
He further noted, “The U.S. plays a crucial role in maintaining stability.”
During Japan’s G7 summit in Hiroshima in May 2023, Washington advocated for Korea’s inclusion. At the event, Yoon and Kishida, accompanied by their spouses, visited a memorial honoring the Korean victims of the 1945 atomic bombing, marking a significant moment and creating a memorable image.
The peak of the diplomatic engagement occurred during the Camp David summit in August of the previous year. Leaders Yoon, Kishida, and Biden celebrated the dawn of a new era and unveiled several agreements, including initiatives for missile data sharing and a significant military exercise. A senior official from the administration in Washington, who preferred to remain unnamed, remarked, “This is a moment that requires full commitment in the region.”
Emanuel emphasized, “When there is trust in us and in the president, the expectation is to exceed the minimum requirements. They ventured beyond their usual limits. In a world rife with conflict and resentment, history has the potential to influence the present and future. Camp David demonstrated that dialogue and diplomacy can shape what lies ahead.”
Emanuel further stated, “The objective now is to embed this approach into the very fabric of governmental operations.”
Partners, not allies
The reality is that this rapprochement is far from being finalized. Leaders in Seoul and Tokyo express a cautious outlook at best.
“I’m quite pessimistic,” remarked a senior Japanese official who requested anonymity to discuss the situation. The Koreans “oscillate between extremes.” Yoon’s critics have labeled him a traitor to Japan, heavily scrutinizing him over the rapprochement.
Another official from the foreign ministry in Tokyo recalled visits to Seoul leading up to the Camp David summit. “During negotiations, they would express their anger over historical grievances, and once the meeting concluded, they would say, ‘no hard feelings, let’s go for drinks’,” this official noted. “The following day, the cycle would repeat. It’s a reflection of the domestic political pressures they face.”
In Korea, this issue transcends mere partisan politics. Distrust is deeply rooted and spans generations.
While Korea has consented to joint naval and aerial exercises, Japanese forces are not welcome on Korean territory. “We prefer to have them stationed elsewhere,” quipped a senior Korean official.
When asked if Japan could be considered an ally, this official hesitated before responding, “I don’t think so. Partner is sufficient.”
The ongoing contentious issues revolve around Korean demands for reparations and additional apologies. The Japanese maintain that these matters have already been resolved and prefer to avoid Korea’s complicated internal politics.
The situation is complex. Korea’s enthusiasm for the rapprochement may wane with President Yoon’s exit from office. However, Japan’s own political landscape is similarly burdened by historical issues, which complicates its ability to forge stronger ties with Korea and other Asian nations wary of China’s ascent.
Japan’s resurgence in defense policy in the 21st century stands in stark contrast to its former wartime ally, Germany. However, there exists another, less flattering comparison. Ian Buruma, in his book “Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan,” notes that many elements that once drew the Japanese to Germany—such as Prussian authoritarianism, romantic nationalism, and pseudo-scientific racial theories—have persisted in Japan while becoming outdated in Germany.
Buruma further observes that no Japanese leader has ever publicly apologized for historical transgressions in the manner that Willy Brandt did in the Warsaw ghetto.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has dominated Japanese politics for nearly all of the past six decades and is likely to maintain its influence despite recent electoral setbacks, has a prominent nationalist faction. Each morning, trucks equipped with loudspeakers and flags deliver nationalist rhetoric outside LDP headquarters.
These historical grievances might have been resolved long ago. The United States shares some responsibility for this situation, having opted to allow the Japanese emperor to retain his position as head of state in exchange for renouncing his divine right to rule, thereby permitting Japan’s military to retain its flags and symbols. In contrast, Germany underwent a thorough denazification process.
The Yasukuni Shrine, located in central Tokyo near the imperial palace, commemorates Japan’s war dead, including 14 individuals convicted of war crimes during World War II. The shrine features a large museum that presents Japan’s wartime history with a sense of reverence, showcasing models of kamikaze aircraft and submarines. The exhibits suggest that Japan was engaged in a struggle against Western imperialism in Asia, akin to a Berlin museum that would display Nazi flags and honor Nazi leaders.
When an LDP politician visits Yasukuni Shrine, it provides an opportunity for Koreans and Chinese to voice their grievances. On August 15, the 79th anniversary of Japan’s surrender, Defense Minister Kihara made the visit. He expressed no remorse, stating that “those who had sacrificed should be given tribute” and noted that his own family members worship there. He remarked, “It is unfortunate that this has been politicized.”
Avoid labeling it as an Asian NATO
These two neighboring countries, despite their awkward relationship, rely on each other, and it is crucial for America that they find common ground to effectively respond to the challenges posed by China.
The security concerns in the region are likely to intensify. Should Beijing follow through on its threats and succeed, the fall of Taiwan would represent a significant economic and political setback for the U.S., potentially destabilizing the entire Asian landscape. Furthermore, the resurgence of Russia in the area and the escalating threat from North Korea add to the complexity. Meanwhile, the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to unfold, with its outcome potentially influenced by events in the U.S. on Tuesday.
The diplomatic efforts by the Biden administration over the past few years in East Asia aim to establish a robust military presence and foster interconnected alliances, akin to a regional version of NATO, with China positioned similarly to the former Soviet Union. However, it cannot be labeled as NATO, as countries like South Korea prefer not to formalize alliances with Japan. For Japan to resemble Germany, it would need to assume an equal partnership with the United States and other nations.
The United States is not prepared to revisit the postwar security arrangement that has kept Japan in a state of limited military development. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba previously contemplated the idea of an Asian NATO and the potential revision of the status of forces agreement with the U.S., but he quickly retracted this notion shortly after taking office in late September.
U.S. officials consider these political matters to be distractions. Nevertheless, significant changes are already underway. The region has been increasing its military spending, surpassing Europe in defense expenditures a decade ago. As defense budgets rise, Japan faces challenges due to its declining population, which restricts its capacity to expand its military personnel. The funding is being allocated towards acquiring hundreds of American long-range Tomahawk missiles, advanced missile defense systems, and unmanned defense technologies. According to Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration, Japan’s navy could play a crucial role in effective deterrence regarding Taiwan. Japan is also keen on developing weapons collaboratively with the U.S. and training its forces in the United States.
Earlier this year, the United States elevated the commander of its forces in Japan from a two-star to a three-star general and committed to establishing a new command and control center. Emanuel described this initiative as “the largest change in our force structure” and “the most significant action we have taken here in 60 years.”
Additional incremental steps are being considered. The three nations are discussing the establishment of some foundational elements for their trilateral relationship, potentially including a secretariat, though this would not equate to a revival of NATO.
The wartime history in East Asia appears to resonate more strongly and is more pertinent to future dynamics than that of Europe. Naturally, Beijing capitalizes on this sentiment. The Chinese government has successfully instilled animosity toward Japan in younger generations. A tragic incident occurred in September when a 10-year-old Japanese boy was fatally stabbed while walking to school in Shanghai, coinciding with the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China, marking yet another attack on Japanese individuals in the region.
Beijing possesses additional leverage against both South Korea and Japan, as both nations are significantly intertwined with China economically. This economic connection has been utilized by Beijing to exert pressure on them.
Despite the United States’ desire to strengthen its relationships with these countries, Japan and South Korea are likely to prioritize their reliance on Washington for assurances regarding American influence and commitment to their respective security.
“Beijing aims to convey the message that the U.S. is incapable of supporting its treaty allies in the region, while also sending a warning to Taiwan, attempting to depict the U.S. as a superficial ally,” Pottinger stated. “Xi has convinced himself that America is in an irreversible decline, believing that China and its allies will create a world filled with disorder.”
