The Assad regime in Syria has ultimately fallen, marking a conclusion that is both predictable and enlightening.
After more than a decade of armed resistance against the regime, the government crumbled in a mere 11 days.
This collapse, however, was not an isolated incident. It represented the disintegration of a wider network of stakeholders who had tied their fortunes to the regime, only to find themselves caught in its downfall.
It is certain that some parties will attempt to undermine this hard-earned victory, seeking to create division and destabilize the emerging political landscape in Damascus.
A decade ago, at the beginning of the Arab uprisings, Assad’s regime was akin to a junk bond—an overvalued and high-risk liability.
Investors in this detrimental political entity pursued immediate rewards through hollow victories over defenseless civilians and a fragmented, weakened opposition.
Significant miscalculations
By 2015, the Syrian opposition, despite facing challenges, began to reorganize. In northern Syria, a fragile stability emerged from the chaos, leading to the establishment of a tentative order.
The Astana Process in 2017, despite ongoing violations by Russia and Iran, created a fragile ceasefire that provided the opposition with essential time and space to regroup. With support from Turkey, the opposition developed basic governance structures through the transfer of administrative skills and knowledge.
The United States, Russia, and Iran made significant miscalculations by not evolving the Astana agreements and similar initiatives from mere de-escalation frameworks into viable platforms for political resolution.
This failure not only drained the remaining resources of Bashar al-Assad but also enabled the opposition to enhance their strategies and increase their strength.
The various forces supporting Assad, each with their own conflicting interests, inadvertently contributed to his potential downfall.
The geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s actions in Gaza, intensified bombings in Lebanon, the U.S. involvement in northeastern Syria alongside the PKK, and Iran’s miscalculations following Qassem Soleimani’s assassination. These events collectively undermined the stability that had previously upheld Assad’s oppressive regime.
By 2024, the Syrian opposition seized upon these geopolitical changes, making its first significant push toward Damascus in years. Exhausted by decades of authoritarian rule, the Syrian populace united behind the opposition, revealing the regime’s fragility and irrelevance.
The disintegration of Assad’s government not only dismantled the entities that had supported its endurance but also dealt a significant blow to the very essence of minority rule in Syria and the broader region.
Role of PKK
However, not all external actors seem to have grasped this reality.
For instance, the United States has attempted to replicate aspects of Assad’s minority rule in northeastern Syria by collaborating with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Washington has designated as a terrorist organization.
Disguised as a response to the now-defunct Islamic State (IS) threat, the U.S. has backed an unsustainable governance model in a region that is home to less than 20 percent of Syria’s already limited Kurdish population.
This initiative, which covers almost one-third of Syria’s land and its energy assets, is as unviable as the regime led by Assad. The potential for a change in strategy under a Trump administration is unclear, but the chances for gaining legitimacy appear bleak, especially with the exclusion of millions of Arabs, Kurds, and Turks from the process.
A withdrawal of US forces from Syria during a Trump presidency might pave the way for a less violent resolution, although this outcome depends on various unpredictable factors, particularly the actions of the PKK.
On the other hand, ongoing US backing for a PKK autonomous region could extend the conflict.
Nonetheless, this renewed conflict would differ significantly from the previous decade. Maintaining an unpopular regime through military means would likely provoke strong opposition from the local populace.
The presence of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) adds another layer of complexity. The “Syria” in SDF has largely lost its relevance, and the group’s claim to a “democratic” identity has always been questionable. With Arab factions increasingly withdrawing, the group’s effectiveness as a military entity is now severely compromised.
Israel anxious about the prospect of a democratic Syria
Israel, for its part, has grown increasingly anxious about the prospect of a democratic Syria. For Tel Aviv, the rise of democratic movements within or near Palestine poses a risk of revealing the true nature of Israel’s apartheid and ethnocratic governance.
In a region characterized by democratic principles, Israel’s military supremacy and its unmatched support from the West are at risk of becoming unsustainable. This concern—rather than any legitimate threat posed by Assad’s ineffective military—has fueled Israel’s recent escalation of military operations in Syria.
By fostering instability, Tel Aviv aims to postpone the establishment of a stable and democratic Syrian government, believing that ongoing chaos serves its strategic objectives, as it has in the past.
Meanwhile, Russia, preoccupied with its conflict with the West in Ukraine, has diverted its focus from Syria, leaving a trail of devastation from years of misguided efforts.
For Russia to regain its footing, it must develop a coherent strategy for the Middle East that includes a practical approach to Syria in collaboration with Turkey. Without this adjustment, the naval base-centric strategy that has shaped Russia’s policy in Syria will likely result in diminishing returns.
Iran is facing an even greater challenge. By linking its involvement in Syria to Assad’s continued rule, Tehran has incurred significant strategic costs. Its support for Assad’s oppressive regime represents a critical misjudgment.
Had Tehran chosen to support the wave of change that swept through the region in 2011 instead of siding with reactionary forces, the dynamics of the Middle East—and Iran’s position within it—could have transformed significantly.
This short-term approach has transformed into a long-term burden, depleting Iran’s economic and diplomatic resources.
Proactive engagement
For Turkey, the restoration of stability and the mitigation of security threats are of utmost importance following a decade marked by significant expenses.
No regional relationship is as profound as that between Turkey and Syria, which has significantly influenced Ankara’s response to the ongoing conflict.
Throughout the last ten years, Turkey has extended education, healthcare, humanitarian assistance, banking, trade, and various other services to numerous Syrians, competing with those provided under Assad’s regime.
Although these initiatives alone cannot fully reconstruct Syria, they lay an essential groundwork for future rebuilding efforts.
Ankara also views the dismantling of the PKK’s autonomous zone as crucial. The necessary geographic, demographic, and security conditions to maintain such a zone are simply absent.
Turkey’s proactive engagement is vital for establishing a stable and peaceful order in Syria.
For over a decade, Ankara has perceived that regional players have attempted to counter its influence, imposing challenges that have tested its resilience.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s ability to swiftly mobilize expertise and resources is recognized as the most practical means to restore stability.
This strategy not only aligns with Turkey’s geopolitical interests but also contributes to the overarching objective of promoting regional peace.
