After thirteen years of civil conflict, the armed opposition coalition Hayat Tahrir al-Sham successfully seized control of Damascus on December 8, prompting the long-standing leader Bashar al-Assad to seek refuge in Russia. Global powers aimed to carefully dismantle Assad’s stringent regime to prevent regional unrest and ensure Israel’s security, a process that relied heavily on the intricate coordination among these powers. Following the establishment of the Framework Agreement between Russia and the United States in 2014, which occurred 30 months into the Syrian civil war and focused on the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, discussions regarding Assad’s future began to emerge in Israel.

At that juncture, General Yair Golan of the Israeli Northern Command forecasted that the Syrian president would retain his position for several more years, despite having lost overall control of the nation. He noted that prior to the uprising, Syria was perceived as a formidable adversary, with potential risks of an attack on Israel in retaliation for anticipated U.S. airstrikes following the use of chemical agents against political opponents in the outskirts of Damascus. However, after Syria relinquished its chemical arsenal under the Framework Agreement, it ceased to be a significant threat to Israel.

It is important to recall that on August 21, 2013, the Syrian government deployed poison gas against opposition factions in the suburbs of Damascus, resulting in the deaths of over 1,400 civilians. In response to this chemical attack, the United States threatened military action against Syrian targets, leading to a framework agreement brokered by Russian President Putin in September 2013. This agreement facilitated the disposal of 1,290 metric tons of lethal chemical weapons by Syria in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea by June 2014.

The developments during the initial three years of the Syrian conflict culminated in a pivotal moment for Bashar al-Assad. Analysts from the West note that in December 2015, the UN Security Council reaffirmed the 2012 Geneva Communiqué through Resolution 2254. Kofi Annan, who was then the joint UN and League of Arab States special envoy for Syria, led an action group that comprised the foreign ministers from the United States, France, Britain, Russia, China, Turkey, Iraq, Qatar, and Kuwait, along with the European Union’s foreign policy chief and the secretaries-general of the UN and LAS. The action group’s concluding discussions provided a framework for power transfer in Syria; however, global leaders failed to put these plans into action.

The UN Secretary-General and his special envoy for Syria, should promptly travel to Damascus to put the Geneva Communiqué and Resolution 2254 into effect. Their primary objective should be to form a transitional governing body that encompasses various factions to prevent further fragmentation. If Syria descends into chaos once more, external forces may provoke minor conflicts among rival groups, as evidenced by recent events in Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia.

It appears that the United States, having learned from the consequences of regime change in Iraq, is apprehensive about the abrupt removal of Bashar al-Assad. President-elect Trump has indicated that successes in the Middle East could be reversed, potentially heightening threats to Israel’s security. He also suggested that the emergence of ISIS, a multifaceted organization, might serve as a catalyst for social change within Islam. Trump remarked that Afghanistan did not represent a global threat due to a negotiated withdrawal, but a sudden exit of Russian forces from Syria could lead to catastrophic outcomes.

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is undergoing significant transformation following Iran’s withdrawal from the Arab sphere and the dismantling of militant factions such as Hezbollah. In Syria, there is a palpable sense of optimism following the downfall of Assad, reminiscent of the atmosphere in Iraq two decades ago when American forces removed Saddam Hussein from power. However, unlike the situation in Iraq, where the restoration of governmental authority has remained elusive since Saddam’s ousting, Iraqis are now exercising caution and are acutely aware of potential future developments. This wariness is compounded by the fact that the current leadership of the Syrian opposition includes individuals who previously engaged in violent campaigns against pro-American Iraqis during the insurgency against foreign military presence.

Iraq’s Shiite militias, which once rallied behind Bashar al-Assad at Iran’s behest, have since withdrawn, prompting the Iraqi government to recall its diplomats from Damascus and concentrate on internal stability. While many experts draw parallels between Iraq and Syria, noting their shared histories of external interference under the Baath Party and their diverse demographics, there remain significant concerns in Iraq. These include the lack of transitional justice, delays in establishing a new constitution, and the ongoing need to confront the legacy of Saddam Hussein.

Similarly, the abrupt end of one of the Middle East’s most oppressive regimes was met with enthusiasm by millions of Syrians, both domestically and abroad. The Baathist regime, which has dominated Syria since 1963 and has been particularly tyrannical under the Assad family for the last fifty years, not only depleted the Syrian military but also transformed it into a tool for Iran’s regional ambitions. However, the real challenges for Syrians are just beginning. While opposition groups may possess some governance experience, they lack the necessary skills for fostering reconciliation among the various social classes within the country.

Hayat Tahrir, the primary opposition faction, governs the northern border province of Idlib, where over three million Syrians reside under its administration. While it is a formidable military entity, its jihadist origins and significant al-Qaeda heritage hinder its ability to adapt to the varied political and social dynamics of Syrian society. Fortunately, its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Golani, is aware of this limitation. The US-aligned Kurdish forces and various Turkish-backed Sunni Arab militia groups, which played a role in the downfall of the Assad regime and maintain their own territories in northern Syria, will now need to demonstrate political and ideological adaptability to incorporate al-Golani into a comprehensive transitional government.

Although it will be challenging for global powers to mitigate Islamist influence in the governance framework in Damascus, their participation in the political dialogue and the organization of general elections within a year, along with Turkey’s influence, could lead to a moderation of these groups. Any outcome from this situation is likely to be an improvement over Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The West will continue to focus on Syria, not only to combat the resurgence of the Islamic State but also to ensure Syria acts as a guarantor of Israel’s security and to limit Russian influence in the Middle East.

Russia’s Hmeimim air base and Tartus naval base are crucial to its military presence in the region. As the only refueling station for Russia in the Mediterranean, Tartus serves as a strategic military hub and poses a concern for NATO’s southern flank, as these bases in Syria supply resources to Russia’s Africa Corps across the continent. While Russia also maintains bases in Libya that support the Africa Corps, its logistical capabilities would be significantly constrained if the Syrian bases were lost. Consequently, after moderating its stance, Moscow is actively seeking to engage with the leadership of Hayat Tahrir for discussions to ensure continued access to these vital bases.

Currently, the HTS is signaling positively to global powers in its pursuit of international legitimacy. However, this unprecedented split has raised questions about the future of Iran’s religious authority. Following the protracted war with Iraq in the late 1980s and the uncertain leadership transition after Ruhollah Khomeini’s death, the current leadership prioritizes its own survival above all else. Amid a persistent atmosphere of insecurity, Iranian leaders are apprehensive about the threats posed by their existing regime. They are acutely aware that their citizens aspire to see the theocracy’s prisons opened, similar to the current situation in Syria.

In an unexpected turn, the rapid decline of Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East has emerged as a significant development, signaling the potential emergence of a new Middle East. This shift could potentially quell the sectarian conflicts not only in Lebanon, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia but also extend from Afghanistan to Pakistan.