Several factors influence the relationship between Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, who are scheduled to meet on Wednesday in Russia during the BRICS summit, an event that has piqued Turkey’s interest as a NATO member.

CAUTIOUS ADMIRATION

The dynamics between the Turkish and Russian leaders, both of whom have been in power for an extended period, can be strained at times. However, they have consistently resisted U.S. influence and have each played distinct roles in various military conflicts spanning the South Caucasus, Syria, and North Africa.

Erdogan has characterized his relationship with Putin as one founded on “joint understanding, mutual trust, and respect.” In turn, Putin has referred to Erdogan as a “strong leader” and a “reliable” partner, although he has acknowledged that dealing with him has not always been straightforward.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the two nations, both bordering the Black Sea, have enhanced their collaboration in areas such as trade, tourism, and energy, despite Turkey’s opposition to Moscow’s actions and its provision of attack drones to Kyiv.

As military powerhouse Russia and regional power Turkey have supported opposing factions in conflicts in Syria and Libya, their positions have not always aligned, particularly in the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In Syria, Putin has supported President Bashar al-Assad, while Erdogan has backed rebel forces. To prevent direct confrontation in early 2020, they negotiated a series of ceasefire agreements following the deaths of 34 Turkish soldiers in an airstrike in Idlib, where Russian aircraft were conducting patrols.

In 2019, Turkey caused significant concern among its NATO allies by acquiring Russian S-400 missile systems, which the Western defense alliance had warned were incompatible with its existing systems and posed a security threat. In retaliation, the United States imposed sanctions on Turkey’s defense sector and removed the country from the F-35 fighter jet program, in which it was both a manufacturer and a purchaser. Although Ankara has not activated the S-400 systems since that time, it maintains that they are operational and ready for use.

ENERGY, ELECTIONS, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES

Following the surge in energy prices triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Turkey found itself in a precarious position as it relies heavily on energy imports. The Turkish economy was already struggling due to a currency crisis that exacerbated inflation and drained foreign exchange reserves. Russia, Turkey’s primary gas supplier, provided crucial support by allowing the country to postpone payments for gas imports until 2024, a concession that reportedly covered up to $4 billion in obligations. This arrangement enabled Turkish authorities to preserve sufficient reserves to stabilize the lira ahead of the May 2023 elections, which President Erdogan won by a narrow margin. However, following the election, the currency experienced further declines.

In the lead-up to the election, Erdogan’s opponent accused Russia of meddling in Turkey’s domestic politics, claiming to possess evidence—though none was disclosed—that suggested Russian involvement in the dissemination of “deep-fake” online content. Both the Kremlin and Erdogan rejected these claims and continued to enhance energy collaboration, particularly at Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which was constructed by Russia’s nuclear energy agency, Rosatom. The plant’s inauguration has faced delays due to Germany withholding essential components. In 2022, President Putin proposed establishing a Russian “gas hub” in Turkey to facilitate the rerouting of gas exports, especially after European nations reduced imports due to the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey is currently in negotiations regarding this proposal and may utilize its extensive gas infrastructure to position itself as an alternative supplier to countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Moldova, with which it finalized separate agreements in 2023.

SANCTIONS, TRADE, AND OLIGARCHS

Turkey has taken a stance against sanctions imposed on Russia, welcoming Russian tourists and migrants, including oligarchs looking for secure locations for their yachts and investments. Currently, Russians are the leading foreign purchasers of real estate in Turkey.

Bilateral trade has surged to unprecedented levels, with Turkish exports to Russia increasing by 17% to reach $11 billion in 2023, as reported by the Turkish Statistics Institute.

Ankara has been criticized by Western nations for allegedly allowing Russia to acquire military-related supplies, such as chips and semiconductors, through its territory and that of the United States. In response, several Turkish entities have faced sanctions from European countries, with further measures being threatened.

The Turkish government has maintained that no goods passing through its territory are utilized in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. Earlier this year, Turkish exporters to Russia encountered difficulties with payments, prompting the Kremlin to acknowledge that Turkish banks were imposing stricter regulations on Russian clients, and it has been collaborating with Turkey to identify mutually beneficial solutions.

DIPLOMACY

Turkey has maintained strong relationships with both Kyiv and Moscow, facilitating discussions between the two in 2022 and establishing itself as a key mediator for future peace negotiations. Since the onset of the conflict, Putin and Erdogan have engaged in numerous phone calls and meetings, providing the Russian president with a platform alongside a NATO leader and offering NATO a dependable communication channel to Moscow.

Erdogan’s diplomatic strategy reflects a careful balance between Russia and NATO; he has expressed support for Ukraine’s aspirations to join the military alliance while postponing Sweden’s membership application. Turkey’s diplomatic efforts and its control over the straits linking the Black Sea to global markets have positioned it at the forefront of an agreement involving Russia, Ukraine, and the United Nations, aimed at ensuring safe passage for Ukrainian agricultural exports and facilitating increased Russian exports.

The United Nations recognized Erdogan’s significant role in co-brokering the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which was credited with alleviating global hunger by enabling exports from two major global producers. However, in July 2023, Putin withdrew from the agreement, despite Turkey’s appeals to both parties, citing challenges related to Russian food and fertilizer exports and concerns regarding the destinations of Ukrainian grain.

In recent months, Turkey has expressed interest in joining the BRICS group, which initially included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and has since expanded to incorporate Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara views BRICS as a means to enhance economic collaboration with its member states, rather than as a substitute for its Western alliances and NATO membership. Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake remarked in June that while he hoped Turkey would refrain from joining BRICS, such a decision would not alter its alignment with the West.