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Could a Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey Military Alliance Reshape Regional Deterrence?

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The possibility of a Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey military alliance has re-emerged as regional power dynamics evolve across South Asia and the Middle East. While no formal pact exists, growing defense cooperation and political coordination among the three countries have prompted debate over whether such an alignment could meaningfully alter regional deterrence—particularly between Pakistan and India.

Recent remarks by Türkiye’s foreign minister provide rare official insight into the status of discussions.

Reporter: Does Türkiye want to be part of a regional alliance like the one formed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia?
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan: As of now, there are ongoing talks, but we have not yet signed any agreement.

This statement reflects both interest and restraint, suggesting that while dialogue exists, a binding framework has yet to materialize.

Strategic Rationale Behind the Concept

The appeal of a trilateral alignment lies in complementary national strengths:

  • Saudi Arabia offers financial capacity, energy influence, and diplomatic weight in the Islamic and Arab worlds.
  • Pakistan contributes a large, experienced military, strong airpower, and a credible nuclear deterrent.
  • Turkey brings advanced drone technology, a rapidly expanding defense-industrial base, and modern military R&D capabilities.

Supporters argue that institutionalizing cooperation among these three states could gradually evolve into a broader security framework, potentially attracting interest from countries such as Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco.

For Pakistan, deeper coordination with Ankara and Riyadh could strengthen deterrence by broadening strategic depth and diplomatic signaling, even without formal defense guarantees.

Pakistan’s Role: Conventional Strength and Strategic Deterrence

Pakistan would likely serve as the operational core of any alignment. Its air force remains among the most capable in the region, while its nuclear capability underpins long-term strategic stability in South Asia.

However, Pakistan’s deterrence posture is designed primarily for national defense, not alliance-based security commitments. Any perception of extending deterrence assurances to external partners would raise doctrinal, diplomatic, and legal questions at the international level.

Islamabad must also balance any new alignments with its longstanding strategic partnership with China, ensuring that emerging frameworks do not create conflicting obligations or perceptions.

Saudi Arabia: Influence Without Formal Alliance Obligations

Saudi Arabia is often viewed as the financial anchor of a potential alliance, yet Riyadh’s foreign policy has increasingly emphasized flexibility and diversification rather than rigid military blocs.

Key considerations shaping Saudi caution include:

  • Continued security cooperation with the United States
  • Expanding economic and investment ties with India
  • A preference for regional stability and de-escalation

While Saudi–Pakistan military cooperation—particularly in training, advisory roles, and defense exchanges—has deep historical roots, Riyadh has consistently avoided treaty-based alliances that could draw it into external conflicts.

As a result, Saudi Arabia is more likely to support selective defense cooperation rather than a formal collective defense pact.

Turkey: Active Engagement, Measured Commitments

Among the three, Turkey appears the most openly engaged, as reflected in Foreign Minister Fidan’s confirmation of ongoing talks. Ankara has steadily expanded defense cooperation with Pakistan, particularly in naval platforms, aerospace projects, and unmanned systems.

Turkey’s defense exports and joint R&D initiatives align well with Pakistan’s modernization priorities, offering long-term strategic value beyond short-term military coordination.

Nevertheless, Turkey faces important constraints:

  • NATO membership limits overt bloc formation
  • Economic pressures require balanced diplomacy
  • Managing relations with Europe, the Gulf, and the United States simultaneously

Fidan’s remarks underline that Turkey is exploring options without committing to formal alliance structures.

Prospects for Expansion: Cooperation Over Coalition

Speculation that additional Muslim-majority countries might join a future alliance remains largely aspirational. States such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Jordan, and Qatar generally prefer:

  • Strategic autonomy
  • Non-aligned or multi-aligned foreign policies
  • Issue-based cooperation over permanent military commitments

While expanded participation in joint exercises, defense procurement, or political coordination forums is plausible, a unified military bloc with collective defense obligations appears unlikely.

Implications for India: Strategic Complexity, Not Constraint

Even absent a formal alliance, closer coordination among Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia could add diplomatic and strategic complexity to South Asia’s security environment.

However, claims that such an alignment would fundamentally prevent Indian military action are overstated. India retains:

  • Strong strategic partnerships with the United States, France, Israel, and Russia
  • Growing indigenous defense-industrial capacity
  • Expanding political and economic ties with Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia

New Delhi would likely respond through counter-balancing diplomacy and deeper partnerships, rather than altering its core security doctrine.

Will It Become Reality?

A formal, treaty-based military alliance among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is unlikely in the near future.

What is far more realistic—and already visible—is:

  • Expanded defense cooperation
  • Joint training and military exercises
  • Defense-industrial collaboration
  • Issue-specific political coordination

In effect, a strategic alignment without alliance formalities.

Conclusion

The idea of a Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey military alliance reflects genuine shifts in regional geopolitics, but practical constraints continue to limit its realization. As Türkiye’s foreign minister candidly acknowledged, discussions are underway—but agreements have not been signed.

Rather than the emergence of a rigid military bloc, the more plausible trajectory is incremental, pragmatic cooperation—subtle enough to avoid escalation, yet significant enough to influence regional deterrence over time.

Trump Questions Reza Pahlavi’s Ability to Lead Iran as Protests Pressure Tehran

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U.S. President Donald Trump looks on as he signs an executive order in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington,.

U.S. President Donald Trump has cast doubt on whether Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi could command enough domestic support to lead Iran, even as protests continue to strain the country’s clerical establishment.

Speaking in an exclusive interview with Reuters at the Oval Office on Wednesday, Trump described Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah, as “very nice” but questioned his political viability inside Iran. Trump said Washington has not reached a point where it is prepared to fully back any single opposition figure.

“He seems very nice, but I don’t know how he’d play within his own country,” Trump said. “I don’t know whether or not his country would accept his leadership.”

U.S. Caution on Iran’s Opposition

Trump’s remarks highlight the limits of U.S. support for Iran’s fragmented opposition movement, despite repeated warnings from Washington that it could intervene in support of protesters. Iran has witnessed sustained unrest, with reports of thousands killed during a security crackdown against demonstrations opposing clerical rule.

Reza Pahlavi, 65, has lived outside Iran since before the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew his father. From exile, he has emerged as a prominent voice among some protesters, particularly monarchist groups. However, Iran’s opposition remains deeply divided along ideological and organizational lines and lacks a cohesive structure inside the country.

Sanam Vakil, deputy director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program, echoed Trump’s caution, noting that while Pahlavi has gained visibility, it is difficult to measure his actual support within Iran. “It’s very hard to see how much support he has or how much support any figure has in Iran,” she said.

Possibility of Regime Collapse

Trump said it was possible that Iran’s government could fall under the pressure of ongoing protests but stopped short of predicting an imminent collapse. “Any regime can fail,” he said, describing the current moment as an “interesting period of time” for Iran.

Broader Foreign Policy Comments

During the wide-ranging interview, Trump also addressed other international and domestic issues. He blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for the stalemate in negotiations aimed at ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, saying Russian President Vladimir Putin was “ready to make a deal.”

Asked what was blocking progress, Trump responded: “Zelenskiy.”

Trump dismissed criticism from Republican lawmakers over a Justice Department probe involving Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, insisting party loyalty should outweigh institutional concerns. He also brushed aside warnings from JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon that political pressure on the Federal Reserve could fuel inflation.

Venezuela, Economy, and Davos

Trump confirmed he will meet Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado at the White House on Thursday, marking their first in-person meeting. He described Machado as “a very nice woman” and said discussions would focus on “basics.” Machado won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, though the Nobel Committee has stated the award cannot be transferred despite her public praise of Trump.

The president also defended the strength of the U.S. economy and said he would emphasize strong job numbers and economic performance at the upcoming World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. According to the White House, Trump is scheduled to hold bilateral meetings with the leaders of Switzerland, Poland, and Egypt during the event.

China to Build Military Drone Factory in Bangladesh: Strategic Shift in Bay of Bengal Power Balance

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China’s decision to establish a large-scale military drone manufacturing facility in Bangladesh marks a significant turning point in South Asia’s defence-industrial and geopolitical landscape. Valued at Tk608 crore (approximately US$55.3 million), the project embeds Beijing deeper into the Bay of Bengal security architecture, while simultaneously raising strategic concerns in India and beyond .

Approved by Bangladesh’s finance ministry, the government-to-government agreement places the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) as the implementing authority. The project includes technology transfer from China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) International, a major Chinese state-owned defence conglomerate with global expertise in radar systems, electronic warfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) .

What the Drone Factory Will Produce

Although official documents do not specify exact platforms, industry assessments indicate the factory will prioritize production of the Wing Loong II, a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) armed drone often compared to the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper.

The Wing Loong II offers:

  • Up to 32 hours endurance
  • 480 kg payload capacity
  • Precision strike capability using guided munitions
  • Advanced ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) sensors suitable for maritime and border operations .

This capability represents a qualitative leap for the Bangladesh Air Force, enabling persistent maritime surveillance over the Bay of Bengal and enhancing deterrence against grey-zone threats such as illegal fishing, piracy, and covert incursions.

Why the Project Matters Strategically

For China, transferring UAV manufacturing technology—rather than merely exporting finished platforms—anchors long-term defence-industrial dependence and projects influence into a strategically contested maritime region. The move complements China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) footprint in Bangladesh, where ports and transport corridors already offer potential dual-use value .

For Bangladesh, the factory aligns with its Forces Goal 2030 modernisation plan, which prioritises:

  • Indigenous sustainment
  • Reduced lifecycle costs
  • Operational autonomy
  • Integration of airpower into a network-centric battlespace

Domestic production will reduce foreign exchange outflows and allow incremental upgrades tailored to Bangladesh’s operational needs rather than supplier-driven configurations .

India’s Strategic Unease

The project has triggered immediate concern in New Delhi, where policymakers increasingly view Chinese defence cooperation with Bangladesh as part of a broader strategic encirclement of India’s eastern flank. Bangladesh’s proximity to India’s sensitive northeastern corridor amplifies these anxieties.

Indian analysts worry that armed MALE UAVs operating from Bangladeshi territory could enhance surveillance reach and electronic intelligence collection near Indian military installations. These concerns are intensified by CETC’s strengths in sensor fusion, secure datalinks, and electronic warfare, which could make Bangladeshi UAV operations resilient in contested electromagnetic environments .

At the same time, Bangladeshi officials have adopted a cautious public tone. Finance Adviser Salehuddin Ahmed has refrained from detailed comment, signalling Dhaka’s effort to manage regional sensitivities without abandoning its strategic objectives .

A Credibility Gap in Regional Defence Diplomacy

Academic Md Obaidullah of Daffodil International University notes that India’s resistance to Chinese arms sales has not been matched by credible alternatives. Stalled initiatives—such as a US$500 million defence line of credit pledged in 2019—have weakened India’s standing as a defence partner, pushing Dhaka closer to Beijing by default .

This dynamic was evident when Bangladesh selected Chinese-origin JF-17 fighters over India’s Tejas, citing delays and uncompetitive terms rather than ideological alignment.

Beyond Bangladesh: Regional Implications

China already accounts for roughly 11 percent of global Chinese arms exports to Bangladesh (2019–2023). By embedding production capacity locally, Beijing elevates the relationship from transactional arms sales to structural defence-industrial integration, significantly raising the cost for Dhaka should it seek to pivot away in the future .

The factory also opens the possibility of Bangladesh evolving into a regional UAV assembly or export hub, leveraging its strategic geography and competitive labour costs to serve South and Southeast Asian markets.

What Comes Next

Expected to become operational by late 2026, the drone factory’s symbolic weight may rival its physical output. It signals Bangladesh’s assertion of defence sovereignty amid intensifying great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Whether this initiative stabilises the region or accelerates a UAV-centric arms competition will depend less on the drones themselves and more on how India, China, and regional stakeholders choose to respond.

Iran Warns Neighbours Hosting U.S. Troops of Retaliation as Tensions Rise Over Possible U.S. Intervention

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3rd Khordad air defence system, Iran

Iran has issued a stark warning to neighbouring countries hosting United States military forces, saying their territories could become targets if Washington intervenes in Iran amid ongoing protests. The warning, conveyed by a senior Iranian official to Reuters, underscores a sharp escalation in regional tensions as uncertainty grows over potential U.S. action.

According to multiple diplomats, some U.S. personnel have been advised to temporarily leave key military facilities in the Middle East, including the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which serves as the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Diplomats described the move as a “posture change” rather than a full evacuation, noting that there were no visible signs of a large-scale troop withdrawal similar to the one seen before last year’s Iranian missile strikes.

An Israeli official, citing an internal assessment, said U.S. President Donald Trump has decided to intervene in Iran, though the scope and timing of such action remain unclear. Israeli sources also confirmed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security cabinet was briefed on the risks of regime instability in Iran and the possibility of U.S. military involvement. Israel fought a 12-day conflict with Iran last year, with U.S. forces joining toward the end.

The senior Iranian official said Tehran has directly warned countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Qatar that U.S. military bases on their soil would be considered legitimate targets if Washington attacks Iran. Tehran has also urged U.S. allies in the region to restrain Washington and prevent further escalation.

Diplomatic engagement has meanwhile stalled. The Iranian official confirmed that direct contacts between Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff have been suspended, reflecting the deteriorating diplomatic climate. Iranian state media reported that senior Iranian officials, including security chief Ali Larijani, held urgent calls with counterparts in Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey to convey Iran’s position.

Araqchi told UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed that calm currently prevailed inside Iran and that Tehran remained determined to defend its sovereignty against any foreign interference. However, independent verification has been difficult due to an internet blackout inside Iran, which has severely restricted the flow of information.

Key U.S. Military Bases Under Scrutiny

Iran’s warnings have renewed attention on the extensive U.S. military footprint across the Middle East:

  • Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar: The largest U.S. base in the region, hosting around 10,000 troops and serving as CENTCOM’s forward headquarters. A new regional air and missile defence coordination cell was established here earlier this year.
  • Bahrain: Home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, overseeing operations across the Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean.
  • Kuwait: Hosts Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and Camp Buehring, key hubs for U.S. Army operations and deployments into Iraq and Syria.
  • United Arab Emirates: Al Dhafra Air Base near Abu Dhabi supports U.S. Air Force missions, including intelligence and reconnaissance operations.
  • Saudi Arabia: U.S. forces, including Patriot and THAAD air defence systems, are stationed at Prince Sultan Air Base south of Riyadh.
  • Iraq: Ain Al Asad Air Base and Erbil Air Base support U.S. and NATO missions; Ain Al Asad was previously targeted by Iranian missiles in 2020.
  • Jordan: Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base hosts U.S. air expeditionary forces conducting regional missions.
  • Turkey: Incirlik Air Base, jointly operated with Turkey, houses U.S. personnel and nuclear assets and plays a role in regional coalition operations.

Rising Risk of Regional Escalation

With U.S. President Trump publicly encouraging Iranians to continue protesting and declaring that “help is on the way,” Tehran appears determined to raise the costs of any intervention by threatening a broader regional response. Analysts warn that even limited U.S. military action could rapidly widen into a multi-front confrontation, drawing in U.S. allies and destabilizing an already volatile Middle East.

As diplomatic channels narrow and military postures shift, the situation remains highly fluid, with regional capitals bracing for the possibility of further escalation.

Dassault’s Rafale Production Rate vs. Global Demand: Why India’s 114-Jet Order Could Stretch Deliveries to 2036

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Rafale Marine [Rafale M] fighter

In 2025, French aerospace manufacturer Dassault Aviation delivered a record 26 Rafale fighter jets, surpassing its previous year’s output and demonstrating steady growth in production capacity. However, with a backlog totaling around 220 Rafale aircraft at the end of 2025, the company faces a substantial challenge to keep pace with global demand, especially if a large Indian order of about 114 jets materializes.

Current Production and Backlog

In 2025, Dassault Aviation delivered 26 Rafale jets—15 for export customers and 11 for the French Air and Space Force—up from 21 Rafales delivered in 2024. Despite this increased output, the company’s backlog of 220 Rafales remains high, reflecting strong international demand from existing and new customers.

At the current production rate—roughly two jets per month—the existing backlog represents nearly a decade of work for Dassault, even before accounting for potential new orders.

India’s Potential Mega Order

New Delhi is reportedly in advanced discussions to procure 114 additional Rafale fighter jets to modernize the Indian Air Force under a planned defense acquisition program. If this order is finalized and added to the current schedule, the backlog could swell to around 334 aircraft, extending the timeline for deliveries well into the late 2030s unless production is increased significantly.

Currently, India has already signed multiple Rafale deals with France, including a $7.4 billion deal for 26 Rafales for its navy, expected to be delivered by 2030.

Production Ramp-Up Plans

Dassault has indicated plans to increase its Rafale production rate in the coming years. Reports suggest the company aims to eventually build up to three to four aircraft per month, with even higher rates possible as investment and supply chain capacity improve.

This strategic ramp-up is essential given the aircraft’s growing popularity. Since the start of the program, more than 533 Rafales have been ordered worldwide by France and several export customers, with hundreds still pending delivery.

Demand Outpacing Supply

Despite efforts to scale production, demand continues to outpace supply. Export contracts from countries such as Egypt, Qatar, Greece, Croatia, the UAE, Indonesia, and Serbia have helped expand Rafale’s global footprint, yet also placed strain on Dassault’s manufacturing line.

To meet both existing backlog and potential large orders like India’s, Dassault and its partners will need to significantly boost industrial capacity, streamline supply chains, and potentially establish localized production or assembly facilities. Recent industry discussions have even floated the idea of expanding production outside France to keep up with demand.

Conclusion

At its current pace of around 26 Rafales delivered annually, Dassault Aviation could take over a decade to clear the existing backlog, even before fulfilling potential mega-orders like India’s 114 jets. Unless production is accelerated substantially, key customers could face delivery timelines stretching into the mid-2030s. The coming years will be pivotal for Dassault as it balances delivery commitments with ambitious plans to ramp up output.

Iran Finds Little Support From China as Protests Grow and Economy Slips Further

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Iranian President Masoud Peshkeshian shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting in Beijing.

As nationwide protests persist and economic pressures deepen, Iran is discovering that its much-touted strategic partnership with China offers far less support than Tehran once anticipated. A recent Wall Street Journal report highlights how Beijing has largely stayed on the sidelines, even as Iran grapples with inflation, currency depreciation, and rising public discontent.

Iran’s economic crisis has become increasingly visible. The Iranian rial has lost significant value, inflation remains elevated, and purchasing power has eroded across large segments of society. These conditions have fueled recurring street protests, driven primarily by economic hardship, unemployment, and frustration with governance. Despite these pressures, Tehran has received no meaningful economic bailout or political backing from Beijing.

This cautious Chinese approach contrasts sharply with expectations created after Iran and China signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement in 2021. Iranian officials promoted the deal as a strategic breakthrough that would unlock billions of dollars in Chinese investment across energy, infrastructure, and transportation. Years later, however, most promised projects remain unrealized or limited in scope.

The reasons are largely strategic. China continues to prioritize stable relations with the United States, the European Union, and energy-rich Gulf states. Deeply engaging with Iran—particularly during a period of unrest—would expose Chinese firms and financial institutions to secondary U.S. sanctions. As a result, Beijing has restricted its engagement to low-profile oil imports and selective trade arrangements that minimize political and legal risk.

Crucially, the Iran–China relationship is not a formal alliance. It is transactional and interest-based, rather than ideological. China benefits from discounted Iranian oil and regional leverage, but it has little incentive to underwrite Iran’s economy or intervene diplomatically during moments of internal crisis. When domestic protests rise or fiscal pressures intensify, Beijing’s support remains limited and carefully calibrated.

For Iran, this reality underscores the limits of its “Look East” strategy. Reliance on China as a counterweight to Western sanctions has not translated into economic stabilization or diplomatic protection. With Beijing unwilling to step in decisively, Tehran faces mounting pressure to manage its economic and social challenges largely on its own.

As protests continue and economic indicators remain fragile, the gap between Iran’s expectations of China and the actual scope of Chinese support is becoming increasingly clear—reshaping assumptions in both the Middle East and Western capitals about the true resilience of the Iran–China partnership.

Indian Army Chief Pushes for Rocket–Missile Force, Citing Pakistan and China

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India’s Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi has publicly argued for the establishment of a dedicated rocket–missile force, saying evolving battlefield realities now require closer integration of rockets and missiles to achieve strategic and operational impact.

Speaking about India’s future force structure, General Dwivedi said rockets and missiles have become increasingly intertwined in modern warfare, noting that both systems can deliver decisive effects when employed together. He described the creation of a rocket–missile force as “the need of the hour.”

Regional Drivers: Pakistan and China

The Indian Army chief explicitly linked the proposal to regional developments, pointing out that Pakistan has already established a rocket force and that China has long operated a dedicated missile-centric force structure.

According to defence analysts, these references underline New Delhi’s concern about maintaining credible deterrence and conventional strike options in a region where long-range precision fires are becoming central to military planning.

Expanding Rocket Ranges

General Dwivedi highlighted recent progress in India’s rocket artillery capabilities, stating that the Pinaka system has been tested successfully to a range of 120 kilometres. He added that additional contracts have already been signed to explore extended ranges of up to 150 kilometres.

Looking further ahead, he said India is examining the possibility of increasing rocket ranges to between 300 and 450 kilometres, signalling a major expansion in stand-off strike capability.

Missiles as Part of the Same Strike Ecosystem

In his remarks, the army chief also referenced India’s existing missile programmes, underscoring that rockets and missiles should be viewed as part of a single strike ecosystem rather than separate domains.

Military planners note that such integration would allow the Indian Army to deliver rapid, precise, and scalable firepower across different ranges, bridging the gap between traditional artillery and strategic missile forces.

Shift in Indian Army Doctrine

The statement reflects a broader doctrinal shift within the Indian Army toward long-range precision fires, networked targeting, and deterrence by denial. A dedicated rocket–missile force would centralise command, improve coordination, and potentially mirror structures already adopted by regional rivals.

While no timeline or organisational details were announced, the remarks suggest that discussions on restructuring India’s long-range firepower capabilities are gaining momentum at the highest levels of military leadership.

Regional Implications

Analysts say the proposal could have significant implications for South Asian strategic stability, particularly if India accelerates development of longer-range rocket systems. Any move toward a formal rocket–missile force is likely to be closely watched in Islamabad and Beijing, given the existing security dynamics in the region.

Pakistan’s 2025 FARA Filing Outlines Security, Trade and Economic Agenda for Resetting U.S. Relations

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A lobbying disclosure filed in Washington in May 2025 under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) outlines Pakistan’s proposed framework for renewing bilateral relations with the United States, focusing on counter-terrorism cooperation, trade and investment, financial modernization, and regional geopolitics.

The filing was submitted by Squire Patton Boggs, which states that it is acting as a registered agent on behalf of the Pakistan government. The materials were received by the U.S. Department of Justice’s FARA Registration Unit on May 15, 2025 .

Outreach to U.S. Officials

The document includes correspondence from Paul W. Jones, now an adviser at Squire Patton Boggs, to a U.S. State Department official. In the email, the firm explicitly acknowledges its status as a registered foreign agent and seeks feedback on a one-page outline titled “A Renewed Pakistan–United States Relationship” .

The communication also requests engagement on U.S. policy perspectives, including discussion related to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Security and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

Security cooperation is a central theme of the filing. The document states that Pakistan is prepared to “double down” on counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States.

It specifically references Pakistan’s role in arresting and expelling to the U.S. the individual responsible for the Abbey Gate ISIS attack, which killed 13 American soldiers. The filing notes that this action was publicly acknowledged by U.S. President Donald Trump in a March 2025 address to a joint session of Congress .

The document further states that Pakistan is prepared to:

  • Do more with the United States against ISIS
  • Assist in retrieving U.S. military weapons and equipment left behind in Afghanistan that are now being used to destabilize Pakistan
  • Seek greater U.S. collaboration against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which the 2025 U.S. DNI Annual Threat Assessment cited as a potential threat

No claims beyond these statements appear in the filing.

Trade, Investment and Market Access

On the economic front, the filing emphasizes Pakistan’s recognition of fair global trade and its willingness to help balance trade with the United States.

It states that Pakistan is prepared to:

  • Purchase significantly more U.S. exports, including agricultural and energy products
  • Lower tariffs on U.S. goods
  • Facilitate large U.S. investments through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), jointly chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister and army chief

The document notes that Pakistan’s goods trade surplus with the U.S. is under US$3 billion, arguing that trade could be quickly balanced .

Critical Minerals and Strategic Resources

The filing highlights Pakistan’s extensive reserves of copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements, describing them as valued in the trillions of dollars.

Pakistan proposes a bilateral critical minerals agreement with the United States, framing it as beneficial to U.S. national security and Pakistan’s economic development, particularly in the context of strategic supply chains .

Financial Modernization and Reform

Pakistan’s largely cash-based economy is described as “poised for digitization,” offering opportunities for U.S. fintech and broadband companies.

The filing references:

  • Commitments to taxation, energy, and state-owned enterprise reforms
  • Improvements in Pakistan’s macroeconomic outlook
  • A recent sovereign credit rating upgrade discussed during Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb’s April 2025 visit to Washington

Geopolitical Positioning

Politically, the document stresses that Pakistan seeks a bilateral relationship with the United States that stands on its own merits, not dependent on U.S. relations with neighboring countries.

It states that Pakistan’s relationship with China does not inhibit offering economic and counter-terrorism opportunities to the U.S., and that U.S.–India relations should not constrain stronger U.S.–Pakistan ties. The filing also references Pakistan’s actions against Iranian-backed terrorist separatists and calls for further coordination with Washington .

Why the Filing Matters

FARA filings are disclosure documents and do not imply misconduct. However, they provide a rare, official record of how foreign governments present their priorities to U.S. policymakers.

This 2025 filing offers a detailed snapshot of Pakistan’s strategic messaging in Washington at a time of shifting regional security dynamics and evolving U.S. global priorities.

Trump’s Hard-Power Doctrine Jolts Global Order, Leaving Allies Uneasy and Rivals Alert

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President Donald Trump speaks at an event to sign the Laken Riley Act, legislation requiring the detention of immigrants living in the U.S. illegally who are accused of theft, at the White House, in Washington, U.S.

President Donald Trump has launched the new year with a series of aggressive foreign policy moves that are reverberating across the globe, unsettling allies and emboldening rivals while challenging the rules-based international order the United States helped build after World War II.

In recent weeks, Trump has overseen the removal of Venezuela’s leadership, openly vowed to control the country’s vast oil reserves, and warned that other Latin American states could face similar military action. He has also revived talk of annexing Greenland, even suggesting force could be used, while cautioning Iran that U.S. strikes remain an option.

A Return to Raw Power Politics

Trump’s actions signal a return to overt power politics and spheres of influence, a concept many believed had faded from modern diplomacy. Analysts say his approach reflects a reworked version of the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine—sometimes described by critics as a “Donroe Doctrine”—prioritizing U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

“Everyone expected Trump to return with bluster,” said Brett Bruen, a former Obama-era foreign policy adviser. “But this bulldozing of the pillars that have long undergirded international stability is happening at an alarming pace.”

Trump has already demonstrated a willingness to use military force, including the June bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and a January strike that precipitated regime change in Venezuela. Despite campaigning on avoiding new wars under an “America First” banner, he has signaled readiness for further interventions, particularly in Latin America.

Allies Uneasy, Rivals Watching Closely

The shift has left many U.S. allies scrambling to adjust. European leaders, already anxious about Washington’s long-term commitment to defending Ukraine against Russia, have reacted sharply to Trump’s focus on Greenland—an autonomous territory of Denmark, a fellow NATO member.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned of a “breakdown of values,” cautioning against a world order devolving into what he described as a “den of robbers.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has said that any U.S. attempt to seize Greenland would spell the end of the transatlantic alliance.

In response to Washington’s posture, some European officials have floated the idea of NATO deployments in the Arctic, while accelerating efforts to strengthen Europe’s own defence industry as a hedge against unpredictable U.S. policy.

Asia and Latin America React

Trump’s actions have also stirred unease in Asia. Japanese and South Korean lawmakers warned that the use of force in Venezuela could normalize changing the status quo through military power. Some Japanese politicians have even publicly questioned whether long-term reliance on U.S. security guarantees remains viable.

In Latin America, reactions have been more muted, reflecting political and economic dependence on Washington. Mexico criticized the use of force but stopped short of escalating the dispute, while Brazil and other regional powers are reportedly weighing closer ties with China to balance U.S. pressure.

Oil, Influence, and Accusations of Neo-Imperialism

Trump’s emphasis on Venezuela’s oil reserves has fueled accusations of neo-imperialism. While Washington has left parts of the existing power structure intact, U.S. officials have pressed for preferential access for American companies—an approach critics say undermines international norms on sovereignty.

The White House has defended the strategy as a necessary restoration of American influence, arguing that rivals in Beijing, Moscow, Havana, and Tehran have taken note of U.S. resolve.

Alexander Gray, a former Trump adviser now at the Atlantic Council, said the Venezuela operation is likely the opening move in a broader reassessment of U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

Implications for the Global Order

Experts warn that Trump’s disregard for international legal frameworks could encourage Russia and China to pursue more coercive actions against their neighbors. Russian commentators have openly framed the Venezuela episode as proof that international law has been supplanted by force.

Chinese analysts, meanwhile, note that Trump’s acceptance of great-power spheres of influence could indirectly benefit Beijing, particularly in disputes over Taiwan and influence in the Global South.

What Comes Next

Trump has signaled that his assertive posture may extend beyond the Western Hemisphere. Even as fallout from Venezuela continues, he has threatened possible military action in Iran amid mass protests challenging clerical rule.

“We may have to act,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, underscoring a presidency increasingly defined by the use—or threat—of unilateral power.

As governments worldwide recalibrate, a central question remains: whether Trump’s reshaping of U.S. foreign policy marks a temporary rupture or a lasting transformation of the global order.

China Rejects Indian Objections, Defends CPEC and Pakistan Border Agreement

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Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning

China on Monday firmly rejected Indian media claims questioning border issues and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), stating that the territory where infrastructure development is taking place “belongs to China” and that Beijing is fully within its rights to carry out construction on its own land.

Responding to questions from Indian outlets, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said there was “nothing wrong” with China undertaking infrastructure projects in the area, stressing that such activities fall entirely under China’s sovereignty.

1960s China–Pakistan Boundary Agreement Reaffirmed

Mao Ning recalled that China and Pakistan signed a formal boundary agreement in the 1960s, under which the border between the two countries was mutually agreed and demarcated. She described the settlement as a legitimate exercise of sovereign rights by two independent states, emphasizing that it remains legally valid.

Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that the agreement was concluded through negotiations and mutual consent, and that it provides a clear legal framework governing the China-Pakistan border.

CPEC Framed as Economic, Not Political

Addressing criticism of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Mao said the initiative is an economic cooperation project aimed at promoting regional development, improving connectivity, and enhancing the livelihoods of local populations.

She stressed that CPEC focuses on infrastructure, energy, and trade, and should not be politicized. According to Beijing, the corridor is designed to benefit Pakistan’s economy while supporting regional integration under China’s broader connectivity initiatives.

China’s Position on Kashmir Unchanged

Mao also clarified that neither the China-Pakistan boundary agreement nor CPEC affects China’s long-standing position on the Kashmir dispute. She said Beijing’s stance remains consistent and unchanged, underlining that CPEC does not prejudice claims or positions related to Kashmir.

China has traditionally maintained that the Kashmir issue is a historical dispute that should be resolved peacefully through dialogue between the parties concerned, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.

Background: India’s Objections

India has repeatedly objected to CPEC projects, arguing that parts of the corridor pass through territory it claims. India maintains that infrastructure activity in these areas violates its sovereignty, a position China and Pakistan have consistently rejected.

Beijing’s latest comments reflect its continued diplomatic backing for Pakistan and its refusal to accept Indian objections to China-Pakistan bilateral arrangements.

Strategic Significance

Analysts note that China’s firm language signals a desire to insulate CPEC from regional disputes and to prevent external actors from influencing bilateral economic cooperation with Pakistan. The statement also comes amid heightened geopolitical competition in South Asia and growing scrutiny of major infrastructure projects.

For Islamabad, China’s reiteration of support reinforces the political and strategic foundations of CPEC, which remains a flagship component of Pakistan-China relations.

Iran Cripples Starlink Nationwide, Setting a Global Precedent in Information Warfare

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Starlink logo is seen on a smartphone in front of displayed Ukrainian flag in this illustration.

Iran has effectively disabled Starlink satellite internet across large parts of the country, marking a historic escalation in state-led information warfare and setting a global precedent for the vulnerability of commercial satellite networks during internal political crises.

The shutdown unfolded as anti-government protests intensified across Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, and more than 190 cities. On January 8, 2026, Iranian authorities activated a coordinated digital suppression campaign that combined a nationwide terrestrial internet blackout with advanced electronic warfare measures aimed specifically at satellite-based connectivity.

Unprecedented Scale of Digital Suppression

Iranian digital-rights expert Amir Rashidi, Director of Digital Rights and Security at the Miaan Group, described the operation as unprecedented.

“I have been monitoring internet access in Iran for 20 years, and I have never seen anything like this,” Rashidi said, underscoring the scale and sophistication of the attack.

Independent technical analysis revealed that Iranian jamming operations initially disrupted around 30 percent of Starlink traffic. Within hours, disruption levels surged beyond 80 percent, rendering satellite connectivity unreliable and fragmented, particularly in protest-heavy urban areas.

First Verified National-Scale Starlink Disruption

This marks the first confirmed case of a nation-state successfully neutralising Starlink at a national level during an internal political crisis, challenging the long-held assumption that low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations guarantee uncontrollable access to information.

Engineers described the resulting connectivity as a “patchwork” of intermittent access—partial functionality in some rural areas, but near-total blackouts in major cities—indicating targeted, precision jamming rather than indiscriminate shutdowns.

How Iran Disabled Satellite Internet

Security analysts say Iran relied on military-grade electronic warfare systems, flooding GPS frequencies with high-power interference. This prevented Starlink terminals from accurately determining their position, a requirement for locking onto fast-moving satellites.

By disrupting GPS timing, geolocation, and beam-forming synchronisation, Iranian systems severed satellite links without requiring cooperation from SpaceX or Starlink operators.

These techniques mirror electronic warfare capabilities Iran has previously used against drones and precision-guided munitions, including during its 2025 confrontation with Israel, now repurposed for domestic population control.

Economic Impact of Iran’s Internet Blackout

The digital shutdown has imposed heavy economic costs. According to Simon Migliano, head of research at Top10VPN, Iran is losing approximately US$1.56 million per hour due to internet disruption.

With connectivity reduced to roughly one percent of normal levels, small businesses, online payments, logistics platforms, and digital services have been disproportionately affected—deepening strain on an economy already under sanctions and inflationary pressure.

Despite the losses, authorities selectively maintained access for government and security institutions, revealing a calculated strategy to preserve regime functionality while paralysing civil society.

Why Starlink Became a Security Target

Starlink had emerged as a critical tool for Iranian protesters. Thousands of smuggled terminals allowed activists to bypass state-controlled networks, livestream crackdowns, coordinate demonstrations, and transmit footage to international audiences.

During earlier shutdowns in 2022 and 2025, Starlink exposed the limits of Iran’s traditional internet “kill switch,” convincing security planners that satellite connectivity represented a structural vulnerability rather than a manageable nuisance.

By January 2026, neutralising Starlink had become a strategic priority aimed at collapsing the final layer of protest resilience.

Global Implications for Satellite Security

Iran’s success has sent shockwaves through global defence and technology communities. The operation demonstrates that commercial satellite networks are not immune to state-level electronic warfare, blurring the line between civilian infrastructure and military targets.

For countries increasingly reliant on satellite internet—whether for civilian communications, disaster response, or military command and control—the Iranian precedent raises urgent questions about resilience in contested electromagnetic environments.

Western governments, including the United States, have voiced support for digital freedom in Iran, but the episode highlights a growing gap between political intent and the technical ability to protect satellite connectivity from hostile interference.

A New Era of Digital Sovereignty

Iran’s nationwide Starlink disruption redefines digital sovereignty as control over the electromagnetic spectrum rather than regulation or legislation alone. It signals a future where information dominance depends not only on bandwidth and coverage, but on a state’s capacity to deny, disrupt, or control access at scale.

As authoritarian governments study Iran’s approach, the assumption that space-based internet guarantees freedom of information is rapidly eroding—reshaping the strategic calculus of both protest movements and military planners worldwide.

Indonesia’s Defence Minister Meets Pakistan’s Army Chief, Pledges Expanded Defence Cooperation

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Indonesia’s Defence Minister, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (Retd), on Monday called on Syed Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), at the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, underscoring growing defence engagement between Pakistan and Indonesia.

According to the Inter-Services Public Relations, the meeting focused on issues of mutual interest, evolving regional and global security dynamics, and the exploration of concrete avenues to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation.


Discussions highlighted the importance of strengthening institutional linkages between the armed forces of both countries, expanding professional military education and training exchanges, and deepening collaboration in the defence industrial sector. Officials noted that such cooperation is increasingly relevant as both countries face complex security challenges ranging from terrorism and maritime security to emerging non-traditional threats.

The Indonesian defence minister praised the professionalism of the Pakistan Armed Forces and acknowledged their sacrifices in the fight against terrorism. He also expressed Jakarta’s strong desire to broaden defence ties with Pakistan across multiple domains, including training, joint exercises, defence production, and technology cooperation.

Pakistan and Indonesia share a long history of friendly relations rooted in common values, shared perspectives on regional stability, and cooperation within multilateral forums. Defence ties between the two countries have steadily expanded in recent years, with Pakistan emerging as a key defence partner for Indonesia, particularly in the areas of military training and defence exports.

Defence analysts note that Pakistan’s growing defence industrial base—including aircraft, naval platforms, and land systems—offers Indonesia cost-effective options for military modernisation, while Indonesia’s experience in maritime security and archipelagic defence presents opportunities for knowledge-sharing and joint initiatives.

During the meeting, Field Marshal Asim Munir reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to building a strong, enduring, and forward-looking defence relationship with Indonesia. He emphasised that cooperation would continue to be guided by mutual respect, shared strategic interests, and a common desire to contribute to regional and global peace and stability.

The engagement reflects Pakistan’s broader defence diplomacy efforts aimed at strengthening ties with key partners in Southeast Asia, while Indonesia continues to diversify its defence partnerships amid shifting regional security dynamics.

Germany’s Arctic Sentry Plan Highlights NATO Strains as U.S. Hardens Arctic Posture

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NATO logo and flag

Germany is preparing to initiate a new NATO joint mission known as “Arctic Sentry,” aimed at monitoring and protecting security interests in the Arctic, including Greenland, according to Bloomberg. The proposal comes at a time of growing strategic uncertainty within the alliance, marked by increasingly assertive U.S. rhetoric and visible disagreements among NATO members over burden-sharing and escalation risks.

The mission would be modeled on NATO’s Baltic Sentry, which focuses on surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. German officials see the Arctic as the next frontline where climate change, resource access, and great-power competition are converging rapidly.

U.S. Threats and a Hardening Strategic Tone

The timing of Germany’s initiative is notable. Washington has recently issued sharper warnings about defending Western interests in the Arctic, including explicit references to military readiness and deterrence against Russia and China. U.S. officials have framed the Arctic as a core national security priority, citing threats to undersea cables, early-warning systems, and emerging sea lanes.

These statements have unsettled some European allies, who fear that an increasingly confrontational U.S. posture could drag NATO into escalatory dynamics in a region traditionally managed through low-tension governance frameworks. Several diplomats privately acknowledge concerns that U.S. pressure is narrowing Europe’s strategic autonomy within the alliance.

Greenland’s Rising Strategic Value

Greenland’s importance has grown sharply due to its location between North America and Europe and its role in missile warning, space surveillance, and Arctic logistics. The United States maintains a long-standing military presence there, making the territory central to U.S. homeland defense.

However, Washington’s repeated public emphasis on Greenland’s strategic value—combined with past U.S. political statements questioning European stewardship of Arctic security—has amplified sensitivities among European NATO members, particularly Denmark and Germany.

UK, France, and the Push for a European Role

British officials are reportedly negotiating with counterparts in France and Germany on the possible deployment of troops, naval vessels, and aviation assets to Greenland as part of Arctic Sentry. These discussions reflect a broader European effort to assert a more coordinated role in Arctic security rather than relying solely on U.S.-led initiatives.

For London and Paris, participation would reinforce their status as key European military actors, while for Berlin it would mark another step away from its traditionally restrained defense posture.

NATO Unity Under Strain

While NATO officials publicly emphasize unity, the Arctic debate has exposed underlying fractures within the alliance. Some members support a stronger, permanent NATO footprint in the High North, while others favor limited, surveillance-focused missions to avoid provoking Russia.

Germany’s Arctic Sentry proposal appears designed as a compromise—structured, multinational, and defensive—seeking to institutionalize NATO’s presence without committing to permanent force deployment. Still, analysts note that even limited missions can become politically contentious if U.S. strategy shifts toward coercive signaling.

Russia and China Watching Closely

Any NATO expansion in the Arctic is expected to be closely monitored by Russia, which considers the region central to its nuclear deterrent and economic future. China, though not an Arctic state, has declared itself a “near-Arctic stakeholder” and has expanded scientific and commercial activity in the region.

European officials argue that failing to coordinate Arctic security now would leave NATO reacting later under far worse conditions—possibly on U.S. terms alone.

Strategic Implications

Arctic Sentry highlights a deeper challenge facing NATO: balancing deterrence with alliance cohesion. As the United States adopts a more openly confrontational tone, European allies are increasingly seeking structured, multilateral frameworks that prevent unilateral escalation while still addressing real security risks.

Whether Arctic Sentry becomes a symbol of renewed NATO coordination—or another arena of internal disagreement—will depend on how Washington, Berlin, and other allies reconcile their diverging threat perceptions in the High North.

China Confirms First Combat Victory of Export J-10CE Fighter, Boosting Global Market Appeal

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Pakistani Air Force's Chengdu J-10C fighter

China has officially confirmed that its export-oriented J-10CE multirole fighter jet achieved its first combat success in May, shooting down multiple opposing aircraft during aerial combat without suffering any losses. The confirmation marks a significant milestone for China’s defence aviation industry and is expected to boost the aircraft’s credibility on the global arms market.

The announcement was made by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which oversees China’s military-industrial development and arms exports. While the agency did not disclose the location of the engagement or the identities of the opposing aircraft, it described the encounter as a real-world validation of the J-10CE’s combat effectiveness.


The J-10CE is the export variant of China’s J-10C, a single-engine, fourth-plus-generation fighter equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern electronic warfare systems, and compatibility with advanced beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. Beijing has promoted the aircraft as a cost-effective alternative to Western fighters, combining modern sensors and weapons with comparatively lower acquisition and operating costs.

Chinese analysts say the confirmed combat performance strengthens Beijing’s claim that the J-10CE is not merely a theoretical or parade-ground platform, but a mature system capable of surviving and prevailing in contested air combat environments. Unlike test flights or exercises, real combat engagements are widely viewed in the global arms market as the most credible measure of a fighter’s effectiveness.

The announcement comes amid intensifying competition in the international fighter jet market, where combat-proven platforms often enjoy a decisive advantage in export campaigns. Aircraft such as the F-16, Rafale, and Su-35 have historically leveraged combat records to secure foreign sales, and China appears keen to position the J-10CE in a similar category.

Although Beijing has not released operational details, defence observers note that a “no-loss” outcome suggests effective integration of sensors, pilot training, command-and-control support, and missile performance. It also indicates that the aircraft was likely employed within a broader air defence or air combat network rather than operating in isolation.

The confirmation is expected to enhance the J-10CE’s appeal among countries seeking to modernize their air forces without relying on Western suppliers or navigating political restrictions attached to U.S. or European defence exports. China has increasingly marketed the J-10CE to regions including South Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, where demand for advanced but affordable combat aircraft remains strong.

From Beijing’s perspective, the announcement also serves a strategic signalling purpose. By publicly acknowledging combat success, China underscores the growing maturity of its aerospace industry and its ability to field—and export—systems capable of performing under real combat conditions.

At the same time, analysts caution that the lack of detailed disclosure leaves unanswered questions about the operational context, the quality of the adversary aircraft, and the broader strategic circumstances of the engagement. Even so, the confirmation alone represents a notable shift in China’s messaging, moving from theoretical capability claims to asserted battlefield results.

Iran Keeps U.S. Channels Open as Trump Weighs Military and Diplomatic Options Amid Protests

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Iran said on Monday that it is keeping diplomatic communication channels open with the United States, even as President Donald Trump considers possible responses to a violent crackdown on nationwide protests—one of the most serious challenges to clerical rule since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Trump said on Sunday that Washington may meet Iranian officials and that he is in contact with opposition figures, while simultaneously increasing pressure on Tehran. He warned that the United States could take action, including military steps, in response to violence against protesters.

Iranian authorities confirmed that direct communication remains active between Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff, with messages exchanged when necessary. Tehran also continues to rely on Switzerland as a traditional intermediary.


Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson said that while ideas have been exchanged, contradictory signals from Washington raise doubts about U.S. seriousness. Araqchi, speaking to foreign diplomats in Tehran, said Iran is prepared for war but remains open to dialogue, underscoring what officials describe as Tehran’s long-standing willingness to negotiate.

The unrest, which began on December 28 over soaring prices and economic hardship, has since evolved into open calls for the downfall of Iran’s clerical leadership. Rights group HRANA said it has verified the deaths of 490 protesters and 48 security personnel, with more than 10,600 arrests. Iranian authorities have not released official figures, and independent verification has been hindered by an internet blackout imposed since Thursday.

Trump said Iran had reached out to negotiate over its nuclear programme, months after United States and Israel bombed Iranian nuclear sites during a 12-day conflict in June. Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, Trump said a meeting was being arranged but warned that the U.S. might act before talks take place.

A U.S. official said Trump was due to meet senior advisers to review options, which reportedly include military strikes, cyber operations, expanded sanctions, and online support for anti-government voices. Analysts caution that military action could be highly risky, as key Iranian military and security installations are located near densely populated areas.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf warned Washington against what he called a miscalculation, saying any attack on Iran would make U.S. bases, ships, and Israeli territory legitimate targets.

Despite the strong rhetoric, Iran remains weakened by last year’s conflict and by setbacks suffered by regional allies such as Hezbollah since the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel. Senior Iranian military commanders were also killed during the June war, reducing Tehran’s regional leverage.

Iranian authorities accused the U.S. and Israel of fomenting unrest and called for nationwide rallies condemning what they described as terrorist actions. State television broadcast large funeral processions for slain security personnel and pro-government demonstrations across several cities.

Araqchi said the situation inside Iran is under control, blaming what he described as terrorist elements for escalating violence in an attempt to invite foreign intervention. Authorities declared three days of national mourning for those killed, whom state media described as martyrs.

While protests have exposed deep public resentment—particularly toward the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose economic interests span oil, construction, and telecommunications—analysts remain sceptical about the likelihood of regime collapse.

Former U.S. diplomat and Iran expert Alan Eyre said the establishment is likely to survive the unrest, though significantly weakened, noting the continued cohesion of Iran’s elite and the absence of an organised opposition.

China’s J-20A and J-20S Signal a Shift Toward Sensor-Centric, Command-Driven Airpower

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The public unveiling of China’s upgraded J-20A and twin-seat J-20S stealth fighters on the 15th anniversary of the J-20’s maiden flight marks more than a routine modernization milestone. It reflects a deliberate recalibration of China’s fifth-generation airpower doctrine, combining technological refinement with strategic signalling aimed at reshaping air dominance narratives in the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese official media confirmed that the aircraft made their first public appearance during China’s V-Day military parade on September 3, 2025. The formation—one J-20S, two J-20As, and two baseline J-20s flying in an arrow-shaped echelon—was itself a message, underscoring the emphasis of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force on integrated stealth mass rather than individual platform performance.

From Deterrence Symbol to Doctrine-Driving Platform

China Central Television described the J-20A as an upgraded variant designed to serve as a spearhead for future air combat operations. This framing implicitly confirms that the J-20 family has transitioned from an early deterrence asset into a mature, doctrine-shaping combat system.

The “A” designation signals that the aircraft is no longer experimental. Instead, it represents a platform entering a sustained modernization cycle aligned with evolving operational concepts, including long-range interception, persistent presence, and networked warfare.

Aerodynamic Refinement and Supercruise Priorities

Military analyst Zhang Xuefeng emphasized that the J-20A’s visible airframe changes are functional rather than cosmetic. A raised section at the junction between the canopy and fuselage smooths airflow, reducing drag and minimizing separation during high-speed flight.

According to Zhang, this refinement directly supports sustained supersonic cruise, placing the J-20A firmly within the global fifth-generation trend where endurance at speed matters more than short-range maneuverability. The smoother canopy-fuselage blending also reflects a shift away from pilot-centric visibility toward aerodynamic efficiency and systems integration.

Internal Growth, Range, and Strategic Flexibility

Beyond aerodynamics, the raised rear canopy section introduces valuable internal volume. Zhang noted that this space can accommodate new equipment, additional fuel, or future systems, directly linking airframe geometry to combat radius and endurance.

In the vast Indo-Pacific battlespace—defined by long distances and contested access—such internal growth capacity translates into strategic flexibility rather than marginal performance gains. It also enables the integration of advanced electronic warfare modules, improved cooling architectures, and power-hungry sensors without compromising low observability.

Sensor-Centric Cockpit and Doctrinal Shift

Military commentator Fu Qianshao highlighted that the J-20A’s evolution extends well beyond its exterior. He argued that the aircraft must have received comprehensive internal upgrades, including avionics and sensors, to justify its new designation.

Fu pointed out that reduced reliance on traditional pilot line-of-sight visibility indicates a deeper doctrinal shift. In modern air combat, fused sensor data, distributed networks, and beyond-visual-range engagements have eclipsed the naked eye as the primary source of situational awareness.

This allows cockpit geometry to be optimized for stealth, structural efficiency, and systems integration rather than human visual constraints, reinforcing the aircraft’s role as a sensor-driven combat node.

Propulsion, Weight Growth, and Sustained Performance

Structural and systems upgrades inevitably introduce additional weight, raising questions about propulsion performance. Fu acknowledged this trade-off but suggested that the J-20A could be equipped with more powerful engines to offset mass growth.

Enhanced propulsion would not only preserve supercruise capability but potentially extend it—improving acceleration, missile kinematics, and survivability in high-threat environments. Increased onboard power generation would also support advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and future high-energy applications.

This balance between mass, power, and endurance suggests an effort to avoid the performance stagnation that has historically constrained some stealth platforms.

J-20S: Command, Control, and Manned–Unmanned Teaming

The introduction of the twin-seat J-20S represents a significant expansion of the J-20 family. China becomes the first country to field a fifth-generation stealth fighter explicitly optimized for tactical command, control, and manned–unmanned teaming roles.

State media described the J-20S as possessing strong medium- and long-range air superiority capabilities, precision strike potential, advanced electronic warfare functions, and enhanced situational awareness. Zhang characterized the aircraft as capable of forward tactical command, likening it to a “playmaker” that orchestrates engagements rather than merely executing them.

This positions the J-20S as a key node in a broader kill-web architecture, integrating manned fighters, unmanned systems, and off-board sensors across domains.

Conclusion: A Long-Term Air Superiority System

Taken together, the debut of the J-20A and J-20S confirms that China is no longer treating the J-20 as a transitional or symbolic capability. Instead, it is being refined into a long-term air superiority system optimized for endurance, information dominance, and high-intensity operations in a sensor-saturated battlespace.

The emphasis on aerodynamic efficiency, internal growth, propulsion upgrades, and command-centric roles reflects a clear intent: to shape engagement conditions before kinetic contact occurs and to contest air dominance on China’s terms across the Western Pacific.

Why the Absence of U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Middle East Is Reshaping Deterrence as Iran Faces Internal Crisis

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A crew member works on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier during an earlier maritime exercise in the Philippine Sea.

The complete absence of United States Navy aircraft carrier strike groups from the Middle East in early January 2026 marks a rare and strategically significant shift in American power projection. According to the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) News Fleet and Marine Tracker, no U.S. carrier was operating within the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility as of January 5—an unusual development in one of the world’s most volatile security regions.

This gap in carrier presence comes at a particularly sensitive moment, as Iran experiences its most serious internal unrest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Nationwide protests, triggered by economic collapse, hyperinflation, and political repression, have evolved into open challenges to regime authority, raising the risk of miscalculation between Tehran and Washington.

President Donald J. Trump has publicly linked potential U.S. military involvement to the Iranian regime’s use of lethal force against protesters. On January 9, he warned that if Iranian authorities begin killing civilians “as they have in the past,” the United States would intervene. Such rhetoric carries heightened significance given the absence of forward-deployed carrier-based airpower, traditionally a cornerstone of U.S. crisis response.

Why Carrier Strike Groups Matter

Carrier strike groups are not symbolic deployments. They function as self-contained combat ecosystems, capable of sustained air operations, electronic warfare, maritime security, and precision strikes without reliance on host-nation bases. For decades, continuous or near-continuous carrier presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea underpinned U.S. deterrence against Iran, allowing Washington to manage escalation while limiting exposure of fixed regional bases.

The current absence constrains U.S. response options. It compresses decision-making timelines and increases reliance on land-based forces that are both politically sensitive and more vulnerable to Iran’s expanding missile, drone, and proxy capabilities. This shift reflects not a routine deployment cycle, but a deeper structural strain between U.S. global commitments and finite naval capacity.

Where the Carriers Have Gone

The redistribution of U.S. naval power is driven by competing priorities. The USS Gerald R. Ford, the Navy’s most advanced aircraft carrier, has been deployed to the Caribbean under Operation Southern Spear, supporting U.S.-led operations following the January 3, 2026 capture of Venezuela’s former leader Nicolás Maduro.

At the same time, the USS Abraham Lincoln is operating in the Indo-Pacific, patrolling the Philippine Sea and South China Sea amid rising Chinese naval assertiveness. Other carriers remain tied to forward-deployed commitments in Japan or are undergoing maintenance and decommissioning preparation, limiting surge capacity.

As a result, the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea are currently without organic carrier-based airpower—a condition not seen in more than two years and a sharp departure from the sustained carrier presence maintained after the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel.

Strategic and Operational Risks

From a force-planning perspective, the carrier gap reflects prioritization of near-peer competition in the Indo-Pacific and hemispheric contingencies over Middle Eastern crisis response. However, this recalibration intersects dangerously with Iran’s domestic instability.

Without carriers in theatre, U.S. military options against Iran become riskier and more visible. Redeploying a carrier from the Indo-Pacific would take days and would be immediately detected through open-source intelligence, eliminating strategic surprise and giving Iran time to disperse assets and activate air defenses.

Washington would instead rely on land-based bombers and fighters operating from bases such as Diego Garcia or Al Udeid in Qatar—assets that lack the persistence, flexibility, and survivability of carrier-based aviation and remain exposed to missile and drone attacks.

Iran’s Internal Crisis and Escalation Dynamics

Iran’s unrest has intensified rapidly since late December 2025. Protests initially sparked by the collapse of the rial and inflation exceeding 40 percent have expanded into nationwide demonstrations demanding regime change. By mid-January, reported casualties exceeded 100, despite internet shutdowns and mass arrests.

Strikes by oil workers and reports of defections among lower-ranking security personnel have further threatened regime cohesion. In this environment, any U.S. military action would likely be interpreted in Tehran as an existential threat rather than limited coercion, increasing the risk of an unrestrained response.

Iran retains significant retaliatory capabilities, including thousands of ballistic missiles, armed drones, naval assets capable of disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, and a network of regional proxies. Without carrier strike groups, defending U.S. bases, shipping, and energy infrastructure becomes more challenging.

Global and Economic Implications

The strategic implications extend well beyond the Middle East. Any disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—which carries roughly 20 percent of global oil supplies—could trigger sharp spikes in energy prices, destabilizing global markets.

Energy-importing economies in Asia would be particularly vulnerable, facing higher import costs, currency pressure, and inflationary stress. Geopolitically, the carrier vacuum also creates space for Russia and China to deepen their engagement with Tehran through diplomatic, intelligence, and military cooperation.

A Strategic Inflection Point

The absence of U.S. carrier strike groups in the Middle East reflects a broader strategic realignment under President Trump, emphasizing the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere over sustained Middle Eastern presence. While this posture may reduce the likelihood of immediate escalation, it also erodes long-standing deterrence assumptions built on visible U.S. naval dominance.

As Iran’s internal crisis deepens and global naval resources remain stretched, the Middle East has become a testing ground for the limits of American maritime power in an era of simultaneous crises—where perception, timing, and miscalculation carry increasingly high stakes.

Zojila Tunnel: A Pakistan-Focused Security View of Kashmir–Ladakh Connectivity

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India’s nearly 9-kilometer Zojila Tunnel under the Zojila Pass is designed to keep the Kashmir–Ladakh road open year-round. While framed as a civilian logistics fix, the project carries security implications that Pakistan must assess carefully, given the tunnel’s proximity to sensitive sectors near the Line of Control (LoC) and historic flashpoints such as Kargil.

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What Changes—and What Does Not

What changes:

  • Seasonal disruption is reduced. Ground movement between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh becomes more predictable.
  • Logistics continuity improves. Fuel, rations, and routine rotations can proceed without winter shutdowns.

What does not:

  • Force balance remains constrained by terrain. High altitude, narrow approaches, and weather still limit rapid massing.
  • Geopolitical fundamentals are unchanged. Infrastructure alone does not alter deterrence dynamics or political disputes.

Pakistan’s Security Perspective

From Pakistan’s viewpoint, the tunnel’s relevance is logistical, not transformational.

1) Western Sector Logistics

The tunnel primarily stabilizes India’s ground supply reliability toward Kargil-adjacent areas during winter. This:

  • Reduces reliance on airlift in cold months
  • Improves predictability of routine movements
    It does not by itself enable sudden large-scale offensives, which would still face terrain, surveillance, and escalation constraints.

2) Early-Warning and Transparency

Because the tunnel supports steady, routine traffic, it may actually increase observability of patterns over time. Persistent movement tends to produce regular signatures, aiding monitoring rather than masking activity.

3) Limited Crisis Acceleration

In crises, mobilization speed depends on multiple corridors, staging areas, and weather windows. A single tunnel lowers winter friction but does not remove bottlenecks across the broader mountain network.

LoC Stability and Risk Management

Historically, winter closures reduced accidental encounters by limiting movement. Year-round access:

  • Increases day-to-day activity
  • Raises the importance of communication mechanisms and confidence-building measures to prevent miscalculation

For Pakistan, this underscores the need to maintain de-escalation channels and calibrated responses rather than mirror infrastructure races.

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China Factor—Indirect, Not Direct

While Ladakh also relates to India–China tensions, the Zojila corridor:

  • Serves the western axis more than eastern Ladakh
  • Has indirect effects on overall posture by improving sustainment, not deployment scale

Pakistan’s assessment should therefore remain sector-specific, avoiding overgeneralization.

Net Assessment

  • Operational effect: Smoother winter logistics for India on the Kashmir–Ladakh road.
  • Strategic effect: Incremental, not decisive.
  • Risk profile: Manageable with monitoring, transparency, and crisis-management tools.

In short, the tunnel reduces uncertainty created by weather, but it does not rewrite the strategic map.

Conclusion

From a Pakistan-focused security lens, the Zojila Tunnel is best seen as a logistics stabilizer rather than a game-changer. It modestly improves year-round sustainment on a sensitive route, while leaving broader balances, deterrence, and escalation thresholds largely intact.

Prudent policy lies in measured assessment, enhanced monitoring, and sustained diplomatic and military communication—rather than alarmism.

Pakistan, US Begin Inspired Gambit–2026 Counter-Terrorism Exercise at NCTC Pabbi

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The 13th Pakistan–United States bilateral joint exercise, Inspired Gambit–2026, commenced on January 9, 2026, at the National Counter Terrorism Centre, according to a press release issued by Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR).

The two-week-long exercise is being conducted in the counter-terrorism (CT) domain and involves professional contingents from the Pakistan Army and the United States Army.

Officials from both sides attended the opening ceremony, marking the formal start of the annual bilateral engagement.

Focus on Urban Warfare and Counter-Terrorism Operations

Inspired Gambit–2026 is designed to enhance mutual understanding, interoperability, and operational coordination between the two forces through the exchange of counter-terrorism experiences.

Key focus areas of the exercise include:

  • Urban warfare and close-quarter battle techniques
  • Advanced marksmanship and room-clearing drills
  • Joint planning and execution of CT operations
  • Understanding operational doctrines and best practices

The training aims to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures required to operate effectively in complex and high-threat counter-terrorism environments.

Strategic Importance of NCTC Pabbi

The National Counter Terrorism Centre at Pabbi is Pakistan Army’s premier CT training facility, established after years of operational experience in countering militancy. It regularly hosts international military delegations and joint exercises, reflecting Pakistan’s recognized expertise in counter-terrorism operations.

Holding Inspired Gambit–2026 at NCTC underscores Pakistan’s role as a key partner in global counter-terrorism efforts.

Broader Context of Pakistan–US Military Cooperation

The Inspired Gambit series forms part of a longstanding Pakistan–US military-to-military engagement, focused on:

  • Counter-terrorism cooperation
  • Professional military education and training
  • Experience-sharing from real-world operations

Despite fluctuations in broader political relations, both countries have continued to engage through focused, domain-specific military cooperation, particularly in counter-terrorism and regional security.

Strengthening Capacity Against Evolving Threats

According to ISPR, such joint exercises are vital for:

  • Addressing evolving security challenges
  • Enhancing professional military standards
  • Improving the ability of both forces to operate jointly

The exercise also helps build trust, communication, and coordination between the two armies at the tactical level.

Commitment to Regional and Global Stability

Inspired Gambit–2026 reflects the continued commitment of Pakistan and the United States to collaborative efforts aimed at peace and stability, particularly in regions affected by terrorism and asymmetric threats.

The exercise is expected to conclude later this month with a closing ceremony and joint evaluation of operational outcomes.

Pakistan to Raise Somaliland Issue at Emergency OIC Meeting After Israel’s Recognition

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Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar is scheduled to attend an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Jeddah on Saturday, as Muslim countries coordinate a response to **Israel’s reported recognition of Somaliland.

The move has triggered widespread condemnation across the Islamic world, with concerns that it undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.

Why the OIC Called an Emergency Session

The emergency meeting follows Israel’s announcement last month regarding Somaliland—a self-declared region that broke away from Somalia in 1991 but has never been recognized by any United Nations member state.

Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu, along with regional and international bodies, sharply criticized the development, warning that it could destabilize the Horn of Africa and violate established principles of international law.

According to the OIC, the extraordinary session aims to:

  • Coordinate a unified position among Muslim states
  • Reaffirm unwavering support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
  • Review the political and legal implications of Israel’s move

Pakistan’s Position

Pakistan has strongly condemned the development, describing it as an attempt by Israel to undermine Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.

In a statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Office in Islamabad, officials confirmed that Ishaq Dar traveled to Saudi Arabia late Friday to participate in the conference.

“The OIC emergency session will address the implications of Israel’s recognition of the so-called Somaliland region of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” the statement said.

“During the session, the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister will share Pakistan’s position on the issue of Somaliland.”

Joint Muslim World Condemnation

Earlier this week, the OIC formally announced the emergency meeting, stressing that it would reinforce collective support for Somalia under international law and relevant OIC resolutions.

On Thursday, Pakistan joined other Muslim countries in issuing a joint statement condemning the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.

Saar’s visit on January 6 followed international media reports claiming Israel had contacted Somaliland authorities regarding the possible resettlement of Palestinians displaced from Gaza—a development that heightened alarm across the Muslim world.

Diplomacy on the Sidelines

In addition to addressing the Somaliland issue, Ishaq Dar is expected to hold bilateral meetings with foreign ministers of other OIC member states on the sidelines of the conference. These discussions are likely to focus on:

  • Regional security
  • Middle East developments
  • Broader international cooperation

Broader Implications

The Somaliland controversy comes amid heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and Africa, where questions of recognition, sovereignty, and forced displacement remain deeply sensitive.

For Pakistan and other OIC members, the issue is viewed not only through a regional lens but also as part of a broader challenge to international norms and the rights of Muslim nations.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s participation in the emergency OIC meeting underscores Islamabad’s diplomatic engagement on issues affecting the Muslim world. As the OIC seeks a coordinated response, the outcome of the Jeddah meeting could shape collective diplomatic and political action in the coming weeks.