Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett on Wednesday, August 19, 2026, called for expanding normalization with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and additional countries while building an alliance of what he described as “moderate forces” against Iran, Qatar, Türkiye and other forces he considers radical. His strategy is ambitious—but the Middle East Bennett wants to reshape is no longer the region in which the Abraham Accords were negotiated.
The remarks, delivered today, are significant because they come at a moment of rapid regional realignment.
Bennett says Israel should pursue normalization with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and additional countries, build an alliance of “moderate forces” against what he describes as Islamist or radical forces, and adopt a policy of actively shaping the region rather than simply reacting to events.
Former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett:
We will bring normalization with Saudi Arabia, with Indonesia, and with additional countries.
We will build an alliance of the “moderate forces” in the region against the “Islamist forces”—against Iran, against Qatar, Türkiye, and all the… pic.twitter.com/elVJadY7JK
— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 19, 2026
Today’s Israeli reporting also shows that Bennett’s broader security plan calls for reducing the role of Qatar and Türkiye in Gaza and giving Egypt a greater role.
The central question, however, is whether this strategy is based on the Middle East as it actually exists in August 2026—or on an older Israeli assumption that regional integration can proceed while the Palestinian issue is pushed into the background.
The evidence increasingly points to the latter.
Bennett’s Message Is Bigger Than Normalization
The most important part of Bennett’s statement is not simply his call for Saudi-Israel normalization.
It is the strategic architecture behind it.
His proposed model essentially seeks to create a regional alignment involving Israel and states regarded as “moderate,” while confronting Iran, Qatar, Türkiye and other perceived adversaries.
In simplified terms, the concept is:
Israel + selected Arab/Muslim states + Western support → regional containment of Iran and rival powers.
This represents an expansion of the logic behind the Abraham Accords.
The original Abraham Accords established diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states and opened the way for cooperation in trade, investment, technology, tourism and security.
Bennett’s vision goes further.
It seeks to turn those relationships into the foundation of a broader regional order.
That is where the strategy encounters serious problems.
Saudi Arabia Is the Real Test
If Israel wants to demonstrate that its regional strategy has succeeded, Saudi Arabia is the most important target.
A Saudi-Israel normalization agreement would be vastly more consequential than another bilateral agreement with a smaller Arab state.
Saudi Arabia is:
- the Arab world’s largest economy;
- custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities;
- a leading Arab and Muslim power;
- a major energy producer;
- an increasingly important regional security actor.
But Riyadh has repeatedly made clear that normalization with Israel cannot simply be separated from the Palestinian question.
Saudi Arabia continues to insist on a political pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Saudi officials have also rejected the idea that normalization should become an overriding condition for the wider US-Saudi strategic relationship.
This creates the central contradiction in Bennett’s strategy.
Israel wants normalization to advance its regional integration. Saudi Arabia wants Palestinian statehood addressed as part of any normalization process.
Those positions remain fundamentally different.
The Gaza War Changed the Equation
Bennett’s strategy would have been easier to advance in the political environment of 2020.
It is considerably more difficult in 2026.
The Abraham Accords were signed before the Gaza war.
The conflict transformed the regional political environment and made the Palestinian issue more politically difficult for Arab governments to ignore.
Saudi Arabia’s position has hardened rather than disappeared.
An analysis by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies found that the Gaza war, Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and Israel’s wider military activity have contributed to a deterioration in Saudi attitudes toward normalization. It concluded that normalization is currently not a Saudi priority and that Riyadh’s position is tied to developments concerning Palestinian statehood.
This is particularly important because it challenges a central assumption behind the normalization strategy:
that economic and security interests can eventually overwhelm the Palestinian issue.
At present, there is little evidence that this has happened.
Saudi Arabia Is Not the UAE
Another weakness in the strategy is treating the UAE experience as a template for Saudi Arabia.
The UAE normalized relations with Israel in 2020.
Saudi Arabia has not.
The two countries have different geopolitical roles, different domestic considerations and different calculations about regional leadership.
For Riyadh, the Palestinian issue has a direct connection to Saudi Arabia’s position in the Muslim world.
That makes normalization politically more complicated.
Saudi leaders cannot simply present a Saudi-Israel agreement as another economic or security arrangement.
It would carry enormous symbolic significance.
The Emerging Mecca Pact Complicates Bennett’s Vision
There is another development that makes today’s statement particularly interesting.
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, creating a mutual-defence framework in which an armed attack against one party is treated as an attack against all three. The agreement also envisages political and military coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation.
This is not an Israeli-led regional security structure.
It is a regional mechanism created by three Muslim-majority states with their own strategic calculations.
And it directly complicates any attempt to divide the Middle East neatly into Israeli-aligned “moderates” and opposing “radicals.”
Saudi Arabia is simultaneously:
- maintaining its strategic relationship with the United States;
- seeking greater regional security autonomy;
- maintaining its position on Palestine;
- cooperating with Türkiye;
- strengthening defence ties with Pakistan;
- managing relations with Iran.
This is multi-vector Saudi foreign policy, not simple bloc politics.
Türkiye Cannot Easily Be Put in the “Radical” Box
Bennett’s formulation places Türkiye among the forces Israel should confront.
But Ankara is not an isolated regional actor.
Türkiye is a NATO member.
It has a major military-industrial base.
It has extensive relations with Saudi Arabia.
It maintains significant economic and diplomatic links with Gulf states.
And it has become increasingly important to regional diplomacy, including efforts surrounding Gaza.
Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have also strengthened their bilateral relationship in recent years.
Therefore, any Israeli strategy that treats Türkiye simply as an adversary risks ignoring the extent to which Ankara has become part of the region’s evolving diplomatic and security architecture.
Qatar Is Another Complication
Qatar is also difficult to remove from the regional equation.
Doha has maintained relations with Hamas and has played an important role in mediation over Gaza.
Bennett’s proposal to remove Qatar from a future Gaza security or political role therefore represents a direct challenge to an existing regional diplomatic mechanism.
The question is not whether Israel likes Qatar’s role.
The practical question is:
Can Qatar simply be removed from Gaza diplomacy without another actor being able to replace its mediation networks and influence?
Bennett proposes Egypt as the alternative.
But Egypt’s role would come with its own constraints.
Egypt Is Unlikely to Simply Become Israel’s Gaza Manager
Egypt has a direct interest in Gaza because of its border with the territory.
But Cairo also has major security concerns.
Assuming responsibility for Gaza would expose Egypt to:
- enormous financial costs;
- security risks;
- political pressure;
- responsibility for reconstruction;
- possible confrontation with Palestinian factions;
- domestic criticism.
Egypt is therefore more likely to favour a Palestinian-led arrangement with international and regional support than accept indefinite direct responsibility for governing Gaza.
This makes Bennett’s proposed restructuring of Gaza more complicated than his formulation suggests.
Indonesia Presents an Even Bigger Strategic Challenge
Bennett also mentioned Indonesia as a target for normalization.
That is a much more ambitious proposition.
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and has historically maintained strong support for Palestinian rights.
Any Indonesian decision to establish relations with Israel would therefore have enormous political implications.
It cannot simply be compared with the normalization of smaller Gulf states.
Indonesia would have to weigh:
- its domestic political environment;
- relations with Muslim-majority countries;
- its position on Palestine;
- public opinion;
- its wider foreign-policy strategy.
Therefore, Bennett’s mention of Indonesia demonstrates the ambition of his strategy, but it does not mean normalization is close.
The Palestinian Issue Has Become More Important, Not Less
This is the central analytical point.
The assumption that Israel can bypass the Palestinian question has been repeatedly tested.
It worked to a degree with the Abraham Accords.
But Saudi Arabia presents a different challenge.
The Palestinian issue has acquired renewed regional importance after the Gaza war, while settlement and West Bank developments continue to influence Arab policy.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly tied normalization to Palestinian statehood.
Therefore, the idea that Israel can simply continue expanding its regional relationships while treating Palestine as a separate issue faces a major structural obstacle.
Washington Faces the Same Problem
The United States has a strong interest in achieving Saudi-Israel normalization.
A deal could strengthen Washington’s position in the Middle East and potentially create a much broader regional security and economic framework.
But Washington cannot simply offer Riyadh enough incentives and expect the Palestinian issue to disappear.
A recent Chatham House assessment argued that Riyadh wants its relationship with Washington to be based on a broader strategic partnership rather than making membership in the Abraham Accords a prerequisite.
This is an important distinction.
Saudi Arabia wants:
US security + economic partnership + technology + strategic cooperation
without necessarily accepting:
normalization with Israel as the price of admission.
That is increasingly the position Washington has to negotiate.
Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Thinking Has Changed
The regional environment has also forced Riyadh to rethink its own security strategy.
The Iran war and subsequent regional instability have reinforced Saudi concerns about becoming too dependent on any single security provider.
Saudi Arabia is therefore seeking greater ability to defend its own interests.
That helps explain the emergence of the Makkah defence framework with Pakistan and Türkiye.
It also explains Riyadh’s broader engagement with multiple powers.
A recent Chatham House analysis described Saudi Arabia as seeking greater responsibility for regional security while maintaining its strategic relationship with Washington.
This is crucial for understanding why Bennett’s proposed alliance is unlikely to be as straightforward as he presents it.
Saudi Arabia does not want to be merely a participant in someone else’s regional architecture.
It increasingly wants to help design the architecture itself.
The Makkah Pact Is a Major Strategic Counterpoint
The timing is striking.
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed their defence pact.
On August 19, Bennett is talking about constructing an alliance of “moderate forces” against Iran, Qatar and Türkiye.
The two developments do not automatically constitute opposing blocs.
But they represent different visions of regional security.
The Makkah pact places Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in a framework of mutual defence.
Bennett’s proposal seeks to pull Saudi Arabia toward an Israeli-centred regional alignment.
This creates an obvious strategic question:
Can Saudi Arabia simultaneously participate in a Turkish-Pakistani defence architecture and become the central Arab pillar of an Israel-led security bloc?
In theory, Riyadh could maintain relationships with both.
In practice, the political contradictions could become increasingly difficult to manage.
Pakistan’s Position Is Particularly Important
For Pakistan, the issue is clear.
Pakistan does not recognize Israel.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office has explicitly stated that Islamabad cannot recognize Israel unless there is a just settlement of the Palestine issue satisfactory to the Palestinian people.
Pakistan has also reaffirmed that it does not recognize Israel and continues to support Palestinian rights.
This matters because Pakistan is now part of the new Saudi-Türkiye security framework.
Consequently, any Israeli strategy seeking to build a broader regional security architecture around Saudi Arabia has to take into account the fact that one of Saudi Arabia’s newest defence partners does not recognize Israel.
That is a major strategic complication.
The New Middle East Is Not Divided Into Two Simple Camps
Bennett’s formulation suggests a relatively straightforward division:
moderate forces vs radical forces.
But the actual regional map is much more complicated.
Saudi Arabia can cooperate with the United States while developing its own defence partnerships.
Türkiye can cooperate with Saudi Arabia while criticizing Israel.
Qatar can maintain close relations with Washington while supporting Palestinian actors.
Pakistan can cooperate closely with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye while maintaining strategic relations with China and refusing to recognize Israel.
Egypt can maintain its peace treaty with Israel while supporting Palestinian statehood.
Indonesia can cooperate with Western powers while maintaining a strong pro-Palestinian position.
This is not a bipolar Middle East.
It is a multi-aligned Middle East.
Iran Remains a Common Concern—but It Is Not Enough
Bennett is correct that Iran remains a central security challenge for Israel and several Arab states.
Iran’s missile capabilities, regional networks and military posture remain important.
But opposition to Iran does not automatically translate into support for Israel.
Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that it can simultaneously:
- oppose Iranian military threats;
- engage Tehran diplomatically;
- cooperate with Washington;
- cooperate with Türkiye;
- cooperate with Pakistan.
That is the difference between shared threat perception and strategic alignment.
Bennett’s strategy appears to assume that the first can automatically produce the second.
The region’s behaviour suggests otherwise.
The UAE-Israel Model Has Also Shown Its Limits
The UAE-Israel relationship has produced substantial military and intelligence cooperation.
But the model has not automatically translated into a wider Arab-Israeli security alliance.
The Gaza war exposed the political limits of that relationship.
It also demonstrated that countries with formal relations with Israel can still maintain distinct positions on Palestinian issues and regional wars.
The lesson is straightforward:
Normalization does not eliminate strategic autonomy.
Saudi Arabia is likely to be even more protective of that autonomy.
What Would Make Saudi-Israel Normalization Possible?
A normalization agreement is not impossible.
But it would probably require considerably more than economic incentives.
A realistic pathway would involve some combination of:
- A credible Palestinian political process
- A clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood
- Arrangements for Gaza’s future governance
- Restrictions or reversal of further settlement expansion
- Security guarantees
- A US-Saudi strategic agreement
- Economic and technological benefits for Saudi Arabia
The precise formula remains uncertain.
But the Palestinian component cannot simply be deleted from the equation.
The Biggest Problem With Bennett’s Strategy
The biggest weakness is therefore not his desire to build alliances.
States routinely build alliances.
The problem is the assumption that Israel can shape the region while ignoring the political issue that continues to shape the region’s public and governmental attitudes toward Israel.
The Palestinian issue is not merely a humanitarian issue.
It affects:
- Saudi legitimacy;
- Arab diplomacy;
- Turkish foreign policy;
- Pakistani foreign policy;
- Indonesian policy;
- Gulf public opinion;
- international diplomacy.
That makes it a strategic issue.
If Bennett’s Doctrine Becomes Israel’s Next Government Policy
Bennett is not currently Israel’s prime minister.
He is a political opposition figure and leader of the B’Yachad party, which is positioning itself for the upcoming Israeli political contest. Israeli reporting has identified Bennett’s party as part of the opposition effort seeking to replace Benjamin Netanyahu.
That makes today’s statement relevant for another reason.
It gives an indication of what Bennett’s potential foreign-policy doctrine could look like if he returns to power.
And on the evidence of today’s remarks, a Bennett government would likely pursue:
- aggressive regional diplomacy;
- expanded normalization;
- Saudi-Israel normalization;
- outreach to Indonesia;
- stronger alignment with selected Arab states;
- confrontation with Iran;
- confrontation with Qatar;
- confrontation with Türkiye;
- a reduced role for Qatar and Türkiye in Gaza;
- a stronger Egyptian role in Gaza;
- greater Israeli activism in shaping the regional order.
That would represent continuity in some areas with previous Israeli strategy, but potentially a more activist and confrontational implementation.
The Strategic Paradox
There is a major paradox at the centre of Bennett’s approach.
Israel wants Saudi Arabia to join a regional security architecture partly because of the Iranian threat.
But Saudi Arabia is simultaneously building its own security relationships with Türkiye and Pakistan.
Israel wants Türkiye’s influence reduced.
Türkiye is becoming more deeply integrated into Saudi security cooperation.
Israel wants Qatar’s regional role reduced.
Qatar remains an important diplomatic intermediary in Gaza.
Israel wants Indonesia to normalize.
Indonesia continues to attach major importance to Palestinian statehood.
And Israel wants regional integration to move beyond Palestine.
Saudi Arabia continues to insist that Palestine remains central to normalization.
These contradictions do not make Bennett’s strategy impossible.
But they make it far more difficult than his statement suggests.
What This Means for Pakistan
From Islamabad’s perspective, the development should be viewed within the wider regional realignment rather than simply as an Israeli diplomatic initiative.
Pakistan’s position remains unchanged:
Pakistan does not recognize Israel.
Islamabad continues to support a just settlement of the Palestinian issue and Palestinian statehood.
At the same time, Pakistan is now part of a new defence framework with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
That gives the emerging regional order an important dimension that was largely absent from the Abraham Accords era.
Pakistan does not need to become part of an anti-Israel bloc to benefit strategically.
Its growing relationships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye already give Islamabad greater diplomatic and strategic weight.
Current Regional Balance: Two Different Models
| Bennett’s proposed model | Emerging regional reality |
|---|---|
| Israel-led regional alignment | Multiple overlapping partnerships |
| Saudi Arabia as a normalization partner | Saudi Arabia pursuing strategic autonomy |
| Iran as principal common threat | Iran important, but diplomacy also matters |
| Qatar and Türkiye as adversaries | Both remain influential regional actors |
| Palestine can be separated from normalization | Saudi Arabia continues linking normalization to Palestinian statehood |
| Abraham Accords as expanding framework | Makkah pact represents another security architecture |
| Israel actively shapes regional order | Regional powers increasingly shape their own order |
This comparison highlights the central challenge.
The Middle East is becoming more multipolar, not more Israeli-centred.
Final Analysis
Naftali Bennett’s statement today is important because it offers a clear glimpse into the regional strategy he would likely pursue if he returns to power.
His formula is ambitious:
expand normalization + build a regional alliance + confront Iran and rival powers + actively reshape the Middle East.
But the strategy faces a Middle East that has changed substantially since the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020.
Saudi Arabia is pursuing greater strategic autonomy.
Türkiye is strengthening its regional role.
Qatar remains an important diplomatic actor.
Pakistan has entered a new defence framework with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Indonesia remains strongly focused on Palestinian statehood.
And the Gaza war has made the Palestinian issue more politically sensitive across the Muslim world.
Most importantly, Saudi Arabia continues to insist that meaningful Palestinian statehood must be addressed before normalization with Israel.
That makes the Palestinian question the central test of Bennett’s strategy.
Israel can certainly expand diplomatic relations with additional countries.
It can deepen the Abraham Accords.
It can cooperate with selected Arab governments against shared threats.
But a Saudi-Israel normalization agreement of the magnitude Bennett envisions cannot realistically be treated as simply another diplomatic transaction.
The emerging regional order is also moving in another direction.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan demonstrates that major Muslim powers are building their own security mechanisms rather than simply waiting to be incorporated into an Israeli-led architecture.
That does not mean the Makkah pact is an anti-Israel alliance.
It does mean the region has more than one centre of strategic initiative.
And that is perhaps the most important reality Bennett’s strategy has to confront.
Israel can try to shape the Middle East. But the Middle East is increasingly shaping its own strategic order.
For Pakistan, the implication is equally clear: Islamabad’s non-recognition of Israel remains official policy, while its emerging defence relationship with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye gives it a significant place in a regional security architecture that exists independently of Israel.
The decisive question now is not whether Israel can expand normalization.
It is whether Israel can achieve the Saudi normalization breakthrough Bennett is proposing without making a substantive political move on Palestine.
At present, the regional evidence suggests that this remains the biggest obstacle.
